

**LATIN AMERICAN STUDIES ASSOCIATION**


**ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND  
UNIVERSITY AUTONOMY IN CHILE**

**Michael Fleet**

**1977**



**LATIN AMERICAN STUDIES ASSOCIATION**



LATIN AMERICAN STUDIES ASSOCIATION  
Box 13362 University Station  
Gainesville, Florida 32604  
(904) 392-0377

## ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND UNIVERSITY AUTONOMY IN CHILE<sup>1</sup>

Michael Fleet

The assessment of the status of academic freedom and university autonomy in another country is a difficult and somewhat presumptuous undertaking. In preparing this report, we have thus been acutely aware of both our presumptions and our limitations. In an effort to mitigate the latter, we have attempted to build as broad an informational base as possible within the United States and to examine and assess this information in as rigorous, responsible, and discriminating a manner as possible. Above all, we have attempted to hear and consider all perspectives and assessments regarding Chilean universities by interviewing current government and university officials as well as former public figures, university officials, professors, and students. In addition, we have relied extensively on published accounts in the U.S., Chilean, Latin American, and European presses, and on Chilean government and university reports and documents.

Before turning to the body of the report, we should clarify one additional matter, i.e., the relationship between academic freedom and university autonomy and the broader issue of human rights. Human rights in Chile have been the object of considerable attention and concern since September, 1973. Individual governments, international human rights organizations, the Organization of American States, and the United Nations High Commission on Human Rights have conducted inquiries and issued reports confirming the widespread, recurrent, and frequently tragic violations in this regard. During the past year, the Chilean government has released a large number of political prisoners and has sought to improve its image in connection with human rights. There is little evidence, however, that its concern runs beyond that for its image, and current conditions remain depressingly bad.<sup>2</sup>

In view of the widespread awareness of the human rights issue, we have confined our attention to developments affecting university education as such. The reader is asked to keep in mind, however, that the violation of or threats against academic freedom and university autonomy are but one aspect of the country's larger tragedy. On the one hand, their impact has been limited to a small and relatively privileged sector of the population, and has thus been less directly prejudicial to human life and integrity. On the other, they cannot be fully understood, nor prospects for the future assessed, unless examined within this larger context. It is clear, for example, that military authorities believe Chile to be living in a virtual state of war, and that this requires occasional, if not continual suspension or violation of human and civil rights. In this light, it is little wonder that the "less fundamental" rights of intellectual freedom and criticism have been restricted. In view of the scant progress to date in restoring human rights, the prospects for reasserting rights and freedoms less widely understood and less the focus of massive public concern and protest would not seem good.

### INTRODUCTION

The 1973 coup in Chile brought to power a military government determined to rid the country of both its "Marxist cancer" and the conditions permitting its growth. From early

statements and actions, it was clear that the military planned to hold power indefinitely and exercise it absolutely. It was also clear that it was interested in more than a mere restoration of the pre-Allende status quo. Military leaders were (and remain) convinced that the Allende government was an expression of the generally pathological condition of Chilean society, and that a complete transformation of the latter's moral, intellectual, and political values was in order. These concerns and convictions led the military to assume direct control of the country's educational institutions. In its view, "foreign ideas" and the politicization of national life had been major factors in Marxist penetration of the country. The educational system and the universities in particular were believed to bear considerable responsibility. Accordingly, the military sought to reorient higher education in line with "national" values and with its own thinking and priorities. To this end, it has sought to "depoliticize" higher education by eliminating students, faculty members, and administrators who oppose or critically discuss its educational or other policies. Further, it has reduced and redistributed state support of the universities for both political and economic reasons, adversely affecting the quality and scope of teaching and research activities. It has laid the foundation for a new, uncritical university designed to inculcate students with "proper" values and prepare them with largely technical training and skills for the assumption of productive social roles.

In its public statements, the military has linked its intervention to a restoration of integrity allegedly lost as a result of the University Reform Movement begun in 1967. In its three years of direct control, the government has gone beyond such a goal. Its efforts to depoliticize the universities have in fact politicized their structures, academic activities, and social impact to a degree unparalleled in the country's history. The steps it has taken to restore academic integrity have, in effect, robbed the universities of much of the high quality for which they were once known. In describing and assessing the current situation in Chilean universities, we will first deal with university life and development prior to 1973; second with the initial phase of military intervention (September to December, 1973); third, with the consolidation of military control; fourth, with the impact to date on individual universities; and finally, with the overall status of academic freedom and university autonomy.

#### A) Chilean Universities Prior to 1973

As noted above, the military has characterized its intervention as an effort to restore academic integrity lost as a result of the Reform Movement begun in 1967. By almost any criterion, the Reform was a major turning point in the development of the country's universities, and even before the coup its impact on them was the subject of considerable attention and controversy. On balance, it brought many positive and badly-needed changes to university life, and most of its allegedly disastrous consequences were in fact the result of broader, exogenous forces which enveloped all Chilean institutions.<sup>3</sup> When placed in broad, historical perspective, the Reform can be seen as having a positive, modernizing, and democratizing effect on Chilean higher education. Prior to the mid-1960's, Chilean universities were stereotypically traditional institutions. They were collections of isolated and virtually sovereign Faculties devoted almost entirely to teaching (done overwhelmingly by part-time lecturers who read notes that students later purchased and memorized), and governed by unaccountable, sometimes poorly-prepared, academic administrators. During the late 1950's and early 1960's, forces of renewal and change began to stir from within. Frustrated students, along with increasing numbers of U.S. and European trained faculty, began to call for new curricula, greater emphasis on research, new methods of instruction, and more modern, integrated structures. These forces were subsequently joined by others calling for a democratization of university life and governance. The result was a sweeping reform process, beginning in the Universidad Católica de Valparaíso in 1967, and spreading to the remaining universities by the following year.

Although the proportions varied from university to university, the Reform involved both modernization and democratization. Courses and fields were restructured and redesigned in line with recent trends and to meet better the needs of Chilean society. Greater emphasis was placed on research. Additional funds were obtained and set aside for full-time appointments for recently-trained scholars in the natural and social sciences. Junior faculty members were given full voice and vote in departmental, school, and university affairs.

Students and non-teaching personnel were also represented on university bodies and were permitted to participate in limited fashion in the election of university authorities. Enrollments increased substantially as efforts were made to open the university to lower-income students traditionally denied access to higher education by lack of finances, or requisite educational credentials.

Concurrently with these developments the country was swept by a process of increasing social tension and politicization. Inevitably, these currents enveloped both the universities and the Reform, accentuating the political character of each. As in the nation at large, leftists, Christian Democrats, and right-wing groups formed clearly delineable blocs within the universities, and began to vie for control of Faculties, schools, and departments. University politics were often difficult to distinguish from national politics, and occasionally academic activities were interrupted by strikes, building seizures, elections, and the like.<sup>4</sup> During the Allende years, these trends and tensions grew even more intense. Increasingly, leftist elements came to defend the notion of a universidad comprometida, a university committed to the revolutionary transformation of society, and oriented their activities directly to that end. Christian Democrats and others countered this conception with the notion of an independent, pluralistic intellectual community with no direct political mission as such. The right oscillated between general support for the Christian Democrats (in a broad anti-leftist front) and more direct efforts to undermine and ultimately overthrow the government.

Interestingly enough, Allende himself opposed prevailing leftist student activism, believing that a student's most effective contribution to the revolution was the acquisition of the knowledge and skills which promote the country's development. Though he may not have effectively controlled his supporters, his government generally respected university autonomy, despite the adverse political consequences often involved. One reflection of this stance was the government's decision (in May, 1973) to authorize a substantial supplement to the University of Chile's budget (10% of the original) at a time when the Christian Democrats (who controlled the University administration) and Marxists were locked in battle over the University's television station. Although they held majorities only at the University of Concepción and the Universidad Técnica del Estado (Santiago), Marxists were for a time a virtually co-equal force within the University of Chile (controlling its Consejo Superior and many of its Faculties),<sup>5</sup> and one to be reckoned with in most of the others. Their commitment to carrying on the political struggle within the university had mixed results from an academic point of view. In some instances it produced rigorous and imaginative social research (as with the Universidad Católica's CEREM and the University of Chile's CESO), but more often it led to sectarian activities that helped neither the universities nor the Popular Unity government.

However politicized the university became during these years, it continued to govern itself in keeping with its own established principles and statutes. Moreover, despite a frequently uncondusive atmosphere, quality teaching and research were carried on in the natural sciences, agronomy, and veterinary medicine, while the social sciences enjoyed a period of growth and creativity that, while of uneven quality, was a marked improvement over the years prior to the Reform. All currents of political and philosophical thought continued to be represented within the University, with people free to do as they would and say what they wished. If those holding minority views within a department or Faculty were occasionally inhibited or harassed intellectually, they were almost always able to go elsewhere within the university to work and express their views, thus accounting for the phenomenon of "parallel" Faculties and departments (e.g., Medicine, Physics, and Economics in the University of Chile segregated along political lines.

Inexorably, university life was enveloped and immobilized by the national political struggle. As it entered its final, fatal phases, universities became political and often physical battlegrounds. Under the circumstances, little serious academic work was possible. In view of the character of university institutions and practices prior to the mid-1960's, however, the Reform must nonetheless be considered a generally positive development. Whatever harm it may have directly engendered was more than outweighed by its elimination of outmoded practices. To the extent that university life did ultimately deteriorate, this was not the fault of the Reform, but of the broader social forces and processes by which all of national life was affected.

## B) The Initial Phase of Military Intervention

Following the coup, student registrations were cancelled, university personnel retained on an interim and contingent basis, and known leftist activists and sympathizers dismissed from faculty and administrative positions. Many were arrested and held without charges, and at least three are believed to have been executed.<sup>6</sup> The departments, schools, and institutes in which leftists were dominant were either dissolved or reorganized.<sup>7</sup> Documents were seized, "subversive materials" confiscated, and large numbers of books, particularly in history and the social sciences, were taken off the shelves and burned.<sup>8</sup> In some cases, these initial moves were undertaken with the acquiescence of existing authorities (most of them political "moderates" who had opposed the Allende government), some of whom appeared to approve wholeheartedly. Others objected strongly, but saw the reprisals as an inevitable and perhaps bearable price for an ultimate return to normalcy. Still others were simply eager to take advantage of the opportunities created by the sudden removal of erstwhile rivals or enemies.

All were soon swept aside, as military authorities rejected the offer of self-imposed reorganization, and depoliticization under existing structures and leadership. Military Rectores Delegados ("Delegate Rectors") charged with implementing policies and enforcing decisions made by the Minister of Education and the Junta itself were assigned to each of the eight universities. In the University of Chile, concurrent with the designation of Air Force General César Ruiz Danyau as Rector Delegado, well-known conservative Dean Enrique D'Etigny (of the Faculty of Physical and Mathematical Sciences) was appointed Pro-Rector (senior academic officer) in an effort to provide a semblance of continuity and academic responsibility. While there were issues on which the Pro-Rector might exert influence, those of consequence would invariably be determined by either the Rector Delegado or higher government officials.

The central task of the new military authorities was to restructure the universities in order that they "might fulfill their lofty and indispensable educational function within the spirit that inspires the government of national reconstruction." The government characterized its intervention as serving to restore university autonomy by "extirpating" those who would use it to subvert the university's true essence and function. In the Junta's view, true academic freedom required the depoliticization of university life, and this in turn implied the elimination of Marxists, leftists, and other "undesirable" elements.

The principal casualty area during this period was that of the social sciences, although others were affected as well. In the social sciences, courses were dropped, major programs discontinued, and research institutes closed on the grounds that they were instruments of Marxist-Leninist indoctrination, or that their subject matter was unduly "conflictive." In the University of Chile, the Faculties of Social Sciences, Political Economy (including the Center of Socioeconomic Studies, the Center of Mathematical and Statistical Studies, and the Institute of Economics), and Political Science were either closed or dismantled, and the Faculty of Architecture (particularly its Department of Regional and Urban Studies) was drastically restructured. In the Universidad Católica, the Center for the Study of National Reality, the Center for Agrarian Studies, and the Program in Economic History were dismantled, and the Center for Regional and Urban Development, and programs in Social Work, Sociology, Architecture, Communication Arts, and Journalism were all substantially restructured. With minor exceptions, this same pattern prevailed in the remaining universities as well.<sup>9</sup> Chile's third university, the private Universidad de Concepción, was also decimated by the military after the coup.

Most of the dismissals or suspensions of personnel, both in social sciences and elsewhere, came as the result of personal, often anonymous, denunciations. In the University of Chile, some 54 fiscales (prosecutors) were assigned to hear accusations and determine if there was sufficient evidence to warrant suspension and formal charges. Technically, the person charged had the right to appeal and review, but it was almost never used, and most of the initial suspensions held. In many instances, the denunciations were made by undercover informants, and in others by academics fueled as much by jealousy and professional ambition as by ideological fervor. Virtually overnight, one no longer knew whom to fear or trust, and a generalized atmosphere of uneasiness and intimidation quickly developed.

Beyond this initial "purification" of programs and personnel, military efforts were characterized by a concern for order and bureaucratic reorganization. Government officials

were impatient with what they saw to be waste and inefficiency in existing structures, and sought to coordinate and centralize overall decision-making and control. A national university system was to be created under the Minister of Education to coordinate the work of the eight universities "in accord with the common criterion of efficiency and based on national priorities." Steps were also taken to eliminate duplication of function and resources. A decision also was made to reduce financial support of universities, initially by 10%, with additional cuts to be made in succeeding years. Cited by the military in this regard were the country's general economic condition, the need to reduce all government spending, and allegedly inordinant increases in administrative and teaching personnel in recent years.<sup>10</sup>

As this initial phase of military intervention came to an end, the situation was unclear and future prospects uncertain. Drastic measures had been taken, many academics arrested, persecuted, and expelled, and worthwhile programs dissolved. But it was possible to regard these actions as "one-time" emergency measures somehow compatible with an ultimate reassertion of academic freedom and integrity. Moreover, individual "civilian" administrators had in some instances been able to protect moderate and leftist faculty members from expulsion, leading some to conclude that one could "deal" with the military, and that the future would bring an easing of restrictions and control. Under the circumstances, however, it was impossible to say how long, how extensive, or for what ultimate purposes military control would be. The military's approach to the university would almost certainly depend on political developments at the national level, and these were difficult to foresee. And, as in other policy areas, it would probably be some time before a university plan or program satisfactory to the Junta's various component elements and supporters could be developed.

The military's long-term intentions would, however, become increasingly clear over the succeeding three years. Whatever its initial determination or objectives, it would be caught up in the dynamic of action and response, and forced or persuaded to go farther than many had initially hoped or expected. A major factor in this regard was opposition from moderate and rightist elements of the academic community. Though initially sympathetic to military intentions and motivations, they would grow increasingly restive under its insensitivity to academic principles and integrity. The military, however, was not prepared to accept resistance of any sort from any quarter, and as a result "normalization" of university life would come to imply elimination of all who would question or challenge it in any way.

### C) Consolidation of Military Control

In this section we shall briefly discuss the principles and concepts governing the military's approach to the universities, and then consider the major policies, programs, and decisions adopted since September, 1973. The principles or guiding notions are 1) nationalism; 2) apoliticism; 3) hierarchy; and 4) national unity. The policies, programs, and decisions include 5) military control; 6) regionalization; 7) financial self-sufficiency; 8) reductions in the number of students and personnel; and 9) curriculum changes.

1) Nationalism--From the beginning of its intervention, the military government's principal aim has been to restore respect and appreciation for traditional Chilean values and virtues. This concern has greatly influenced its approach to the university and to education. The military regards educational institutions as agents of cultural formation, and has effected changes in personnel, curriculum, and overall orientation in order to inculcate greater awareness of, and devotion to "Chilean" values and traditions. As is frequently the case with nationalist movements, the Chilean variant is less an adherence to what is Chilean than to the military's own view of what should be Chilean. Its principal connotations are a glorification of past military exploits, of the "enlightened dictatorship" of 19th-century figure Diego Portales, opposition to foreign ideas, ideologies and criticism, rejection of class or partisan political concerns as illegitimate, and concern for maximizing economic and military power.<sup>11</sup>

2) Apoliticism--The military is further characterized by its pronounced hostility toward "politics" and politicians, each of which it blames for the country's "near-fatal collapse". It sees politics as an obstacle to the rational understanding of social and economic reality. And it proposes its elimination as part of the process of national recon-

struction, permitting other groups and institutions (including the universities) to fulfill their own functions more effectively, thus assisting the military in its. During the past three years, however, the military has tended to define all ideas, views, and actions other than its own as "political". As a result "depoliticization" has amounted to the elimination of those questioning or resisting government policies, not of political interests, viewpoints, or indoctrination as such. The government refuses to acknowledge, for example, that its apoliticism is in fact a political position, and that its conception of the country's national interest is as fully political as are the views to which it is strongly opposed.<sup>12</sup>

3) Hierarchy--The Chilean military has attempted to restore what it believes to be proper respect for "hierarchy" in the exercise of authority and in the distribution of rewards and opportunities. It has reestablished unipersonal (individual) and vertically-structured authority within the university, restricted entrance to the most highly qualified students (who also tend to be the best endowed financially), and discontinued certain "technical" courses and programs as unsuitable for institutions of higher learning.

4) National Security--A final commitment of the military is to the doctrine of National Security. The doctrine stems largely from the ideas and experiences of the Brazilian military government. According to the Brazilians, effective national security requires not only military strength and development, but corresponding social, economic, and political growth and development as well. In their view, actions and policies in all areas must be coordinated and integrated, with emphasis on the potential internal and external threats to national security, the need for permanent vigilance, and the need to expand national economic and military power. An additional feature of the doctrine of National Security is the commitment to ethically desirable ends, and at the same time to the most forceful and expedient means for achieving them, whether or not such means violate the spirit or the letter of these ends in the process.<sup>13</sup>

5) Military Control--Military control of Chilean universities is best described as total. Military Rectores Delegados direct each of the eight institutions, and report directly to the military Minister of Education. All collegial authority has been abolished. Power and authority have been restructured along vertical lines, with little or no opportunity for horizontal contact, and authority is unipersonal, resting in the hands of the individual Rector.

The Rectores Delegados, who have served thus far have varied considerably in intellectual quality, administrative ability, and sensitivity to the academic nature and needs of their institutions. Some, while committed to the overall goals and perspectives of the military government, have challenged, or at least attempted to circumvent, policies in certain areas. This has accounted for some of the difficulties encountered in connection with the government's regionalization and financial self-sufficiency proposals, and has led to the dismissal of several Rectores Delegados. Despite these phenomena, the overall trend of tight military control remains clear. In the final analysis, only Rectores Delegados willing to do the government's bidding have remained, and, in turn, only those academics unconditionally supportive of the Rector Delegado have any degree of latitude or influence in university policy. A case in point was the dismissal (between December, 1975 and March, 1976) of 300 University of Chile faculty and administrators who had begun to oppose continuing budget cuts and political persecutions.<sup>14</sup>

Under the military, the Minister of Education has come to exercise increasing amounts of direct control over university policy and activities. In addition to formulating the goals and overall policy for higher education, he sets the budgets for all eight universities, is responsible for formulating principles governing formation of teachers within the Schools of Education, and can introduce obligatory curriculum reforms, as in the case of the program in National Security (see below). The major flaw in this otherwise integrated fabric has been the Council of Rectors, which was to have served as the basic governing body for all eight universities. An essentially consultative body prior to September, 1973, it has been given policy-making authority, although it is now chaired by the Minister of Education. Whatever its potential for effective influence or leadership, the Council has been unable to function as a whole. Several of the military Delegate Rectors have been caught up in the needs, interests, and perspectives of their respective institutions, and have either been unable or unwilling to hammer out integrated national policy. By default or design, this task has been assumed by the Minister of Edu-



cation, who has become the central force and figure in Chilean higher education.<sup>15</sup>

6) Regionalization--One of the issues on which the Council of Rectors has bogged down continually during the past three years has been regionalization, an idea involving integration of Chile's universities and redistribution of their collective resources and energies. The declared object of regionalization was a more efficient use of academic resources in meeting the diverse needs of the country's various regions. In December, 1973, the Council of Rectors committed itself to the development of a regional plan and directed that plans for a national university system be drawn up as quickly as possible. In the meantime, regional campuses and centers were to share research, extension, and instructional resources, and to coordinate activities in order to avoid duplication.<sup>16</sup> The Council's efforts were to produce only meager fruit during the next three years. It was unable to agree on either basic definitions or criteria and continued to postpone decisions and resubmit proposals for further study and clarification. By late 1976, little significant progress towards regionalization has been made. Several northern branch campuses and centers were placed under the control of the Universidad del Norte in Antofagasta, and those of Valdivia, Osorno, Llanquihue, and Chiloé under the Universidad Austral in Valdivia. Since 1974, there has been a relative reduction of the University of Chile's operations to the benefit of more conservative and politically manageable provincial universities. But little progress has been made in identifying or distributing areas of specialization among the universities, or in establishing the status and responsibilities of so-called "regional" versus "national" universities (the University of Chile, the Universidad Técnica del Estado, and the Universidad Católica de Chile).

As one well-informed critic has argued, the lack of progress in this regard may be the result of the lack of a coherent notion or plan for the university system as a whole.<sup>17</sup> It no doubt also reflects a certain amount of institutional self-defense on the part of individual Rectores Delegados. An even more determining factor has probably been the military's own overriding concern for unity of university policy and purpose. In effect, emphasis on the need to defend the universities from "ever threatening" subversive elements appears to have outweighed the Junta's commitment to a more efficient use of energies and resources. Indeed the past three years have seen a countervailing trend toward centralization of power and decision-making authority, as in the case of the abolition of the four regional campuses of the University of Chile in Santiago, despite their fulfillment of the stated criteria and objectives regarding regionalization and decentralization.

7) Financial Self-sufficiency--The other issue on which the Council of Rectors has divided repeatedly has been financial self-sufficiency (autofinanciamiento). The idea has had a checkered career since its initial formulation in early 1974. At that time the Council suggested that university research might be sold commercially to help finance other activities, and to show that the universities pursued "practical ends". The following June, General Pinochet himself ordered all public agencies, including the universities, to reduce their expenditures and to move toward ultimate financial self-sufficiency. Subsequently, in a Treasury Ministry memorandum, it was announced that state support for the eight universities would be cut by 40% in 1975 and eliminated entirely by 1976. The universities were thus to be included in the government's overall austerity program. At the time of the announcement it was emphasized that universities could raise considerable amounts of money by charging tuition, and that the goal of self-sufficiency would encourage more efficient use of resources and more effective coordination with other universities. It was clear from the beginning, however, that the budget cuts would also provide the occasion and pretext for laying off politically undesirable professors and staff, and for redistributing resources among universities in line with political criteria. The introduction of tuition charges would also assure that only the most able and determined students would be able to continue their studies, thus reducing enrollments and restoring high standards.

The notion of self-sufficiency immediately became the object of public concern, and of widespread, though discreetly voiced, criticism. Even the Council of Rectors was moved to object and "respectfully" urge that universities be excluded from the government's "pay one's own way" program.<sup>18</sup> Negative reaction led the government to restrict self-sufficient status first to teaching, administrative, and teaching-related research activities (60% of total expenditures), and later to teaching alone. In addition, a number of ways were proposed by which students unable to meet the tuition charges might still enter or remain within the university.<sup>19</sup>

Despite these developments and suggestions, opposition to the overall ideas remained intense. Initially the government refused to back down, and Rectores Delegados and others who had spoken or worked against the program were dismissed from their positions. A substantial budget cut (roughly 15% for all universities), while less than initially projected, was ordered for 1975. In late 1975, the Ministry of Education commissioned a study of the per-capita cost of instruction in the various major field areas, with an eye to implementing the program in either 1976 or 1977.<sup>20</sup> At present, the government appears to have accepted a stalemate on the issue. Budget cuts for 1976 were again substantial, and the government now devotes the greater part of its educational budget to primary and secondary education, reversing traditional patterns in this regard.<sup>21</sup> It no longer seems inclined to push financial self-sufficiency as such, and there are indications that support for the universities may stabilize at existing levels. On the one hand, the military appears to have concluded that implementation of self-sufficiency would involve both administrative difficulties and academic and general political opposition. On the other, it seems more sensitive to the possibility that additional cuts might also entail disproportionate costs in terms of academic quality.

8) The Reduction of Student Body Size and Academic Personnel--Along with cut-backs in university budgets, there have been reductions in the size of university student bodies and in the number of staff and faculty personnel. Exact figures are difficult to obtain, and estimates vary widely, often in line with one's sympathies toward university developments generally. Some data are available, however, which permit fairly reliable conclusions in both respects. Further, there is considerable evidence suggesting that faculty dismissals have been as much political as economic.

a) Regarding student body size, critics charge that a substantial reduction has taken place, initially because of the political purifications and later due to the rising cost of university education. Government supporters allege, in contrast, that overall numbers remain about the same. The latter claim appears closer to the truth, although the leveling off marks a sharp departure from the growth rates of previous years, and thus a substantial "net" reduction in the size of the student population. Official student enrollments in Chilean universities for 1975 are given in a Ministry of Education study of per-capita instruction costs. It lists the number of students in the various fields of study at each university (including regional campuses and centers). The total for the second semester for 1976 was 138,202.<sup>22</sup> This figure is considerably higher than the approximately 80,000 enrolled in 1970, and roughly equal to the number enrolled in 1973.<sup>23</sup> The University of Chile, which had an enrollment of about 65,000 in 1973, fell to 60,000 by 1975, and to about 50,000 in 1976.<sup>24</sup> These figures are consistent with reports indicating continuing reductions in the number of students taking entrance examinations at the University since 1974, in the proportion of those taking the exam who are subsequently accepted, and in the number of openings for first year students.<sup>25</sup>

The overall student population's relatively static character under the military government contrasts sharply with trends prior to the coup. During the late 1960's and early 1970's, enrollments increased substantially from year to year, reflecting general population growth, the dramatic increase in the number of secondary school graduates, and an effort to open the university to those traditionally denied access.<sup>26</sup> Taking note of these trends and factors, a UNESCO report on Chilean higher education projected a student population of over 200,000 by 1975, and of 279,000 by 1976.<sup>27</sup> Freezing at or pulling back to 1973 levels thus represents a large net reduction of the student population. The introduction of substantial tuition charges appears to be one reason for this reduction. Tuition for the year varies from about \$1,000 pesos (at 16 to the dollar) at the University of Chile to over \$2,200 at the smaller private universities. These amounts are between two and four times the monthly minimum wage, and represent a substantial burden for lower-income individuals. In this connection, the government offers student loans (whereby one borrows to cover tuition and other expenses, and repays the amount within 5 years of beginning professional employment), which it considers more than adequate to meet existing needs. It is difficult to pass judgment on the matter, although the government's own figures, and reports of sharp drops in applications and enrollments in areas (e.g., technical education) normally attracting lower-income students, cast some doubt on official claims that the system is working adequately.<sup>28</sup>

b) The evidence indicates that reductions in faculty and administrative personnel have been substantial, and that political considerations have played a central role. As noted earlier, the social sciences (traditionally a leftist stronghold in virtually all Latin American universities) have been particularly hard hit, with people almost invariably dismissed unless their views accorded with those of the military government.<sup>29</sup> "Politically undesirable" professors in other areas were also dismissed both immediately after the coup and in the period since. Exact numbers of those dismissed are not known.<sup>30</sup> In addition to these clearly political cases, even greater numbers have resigned or been laid off for apparently economic reasons. Low salary levels (\$4,000 pesos--roughly \$250--appears to be average), and the lack of adequate research support and facilities have driven many to seek positions abroad. Further, budget cuts imposed since the coup have frequently been accompanied by instructions to eliminate a certain number of full-time faculty and staff, often as many as 200. Many not actually dismissed have been reassigned to part-time or hourly status, reducing their involvement and salaries to minimum levels. In 1975, the total number of faculty (full- and part-time) at the University of Chile was slightly over 7,000, compared with about 9,000 in 1973. Of these, 4,179 (60%) were full-time, and although we do not have comparable figures for 1973, the proportion of full-time faculty appears to have dropped considerably.<sup>31</sup>

As suggested above, there is considerable evidence indicating that these apparently economic moves have been substantially political in character. In the cases which have come to light, virtually all those dismissed have been either leftists, Christian Democrats, or, more recently, independent rightists. All, in one way or another, have been seen as obstacles in the way of thoroughgoing military reorganization of the universities.<sup>32</sup> Second, the dismissals have included some of the country's most distinguished teachers, researchers, and educators, not the sort one normally considers expendable in a strictly economic reduction.<sup>33</sup> And finally, in a number of instances, dismissals of persons let go for allegedly economic reasons have been continued despite the subsequent procurement of funds which would permit their retention.<sup>34</sup>

These cutbacks in the numbers of students, faculty and staff have been accompanied by significant reductions in the extent and quality of university activities. In general, the social sciences have been reduced to shadows of their former selves, and many university centers and programs oriented toward lower-income sectors and community problems (e.g., Social Policy and Action, Legal Aid, etc.) have been discontinued. In the sciences, (natural, medical, and agricultural), the amount and calibre of research have slipped markedly<sup>35</sup> as financial support has dwindled, and leading figures have sought positions elsewhere.<sup>36</sup> The widespread use of informants and the encouragement of denunciations has created a climate of fear and mistrust, inhibiting intellectual candor and criticism, and producing a passive, uncritical environment in which independent intellectual activity is virtually impossible.

9) Curriculum--Curriculum changes introduced under the military have been considerable. Heavy emphasis has been placed on technical and scientific subjects, along with primary and secondary education. The social sciences have been cut back sharply, and have been purified of their "subversive," "conflictive," or "distractive" potentials. Finally, coursework in the field of National Security is now beginning to be required of all university graduates.

During the second semester of 1975, only 3% of the total number of students enrolled were in courses in the social sciences, and if the fields of Law and Psychology are excluded, the figure falls to 1.5%.<sup>37</sup> The remaining students were enrolled in either the humanities, education, or science, with the overwhelming majority in the latter two. This distribution appears to reflect government efforts to redirect university activities in line with "national needs", and in accord with the personnel requirements of public agencies and private industry.<sup>38</sup> In the sciences and education, and notably the law as well, military authorities have encouraged a narrow conception of and approach to the fields, stressing technical aspects, and ignoring the varying theoretical perspectives from which they might be viewed, and the social applications or consequences to which they might lead.<sup>39</sup> The fields of sociology, economics, political economy, and political science, once among the most prominent in Chilean university life, have simply been eliminated except where the prevailing orientation accords with that of the government. The latter seems to be the case with the programs of Sociology, Economics, and Administrative Sciences at the University of

Chile, that of Sociology at the Universidad del Norte, that of Basic Social Sciences at the University of Concepción, and Sociology and Urban Development at the Catholic University.<sup>40</sup> Even in these programs, discussion of "contingent" or controversial subjects is forbidden, as is the presentation of views or theories in a manner that "exceed the natural limits of objective information."<sup>41</sup>

The major curriculum development under the military has been the obligatory program in National Security. First proposed in 1974, it reflects the military's strong conviction that national security is the responsibility of all citizens, and that the average university graduate was insufficiently aware of both the requirements of national security and the many subtle and direct threats against it. After considering several alternative programs, authorities selected one requiring as many as 60, and possibly 96, hours of classwork of all students prior to graduation.<sup>42</sup> The subject matter would include such themes as subversion, political "deviations", political and ideological aggression, national defense, the armed services, and the Chilean doctrine of national security. Given these themes, the program would appear to represent an effort by the military to convey its thinking and priorities in a forceful and persuasive manner. As might be imagined, it has attracted considerable attention and commentary. To date, so far as we know, it has been implemented at both the Catholic University and the University of Chile, although not on the scale, or with the intensity originally planned. Student reaction and the program's overall impact are unclear at this writing.

#### D) The Situation in Individual Universities

1) The University of Chile. By far the largest of the eight universities, the University of Chile has also been the most severely affected by military intervention. As the largest and most visible, it was perhaps inevitably the principal object of the military's concern, even though it had remained in the hands of opposition forces from 1970 to 1973. In the immediate wake of the coup, all schools, departments, and institutes dominated by the left were dissolved or reorganized. These included the entire Faculty of Philosophy and Education, the Faculties of Music, Fine Arts, Science, Political Economy, Political Science, and Architecture, and various regional campuses and centers.<sup>43</sup> Hundreds of faculty members were expelled in the period immediately following the coup. Roughly, a total of 2,000 (22%) have been dismissed.

The University has endured budget cuts of 10%, 15%, and 17.6% during the three years of military government, and in this regard has been the most seriously affected of the eight institutions. The extent and quality of teaching and research activities have suffered as a result, and the total student enrollment during 1976 of 50,000 is significantly lower than the 65,000 enrolled in 1973. In some ways the most dramatic single development within the University was the dismissal in late 1975 and early 1976 of some 300 academics and administrators, among them many of the University's most distinguished scientists and educators. Many were political moderates and conservatives who had initially collaborated with military authorities, although more recently they had sought to challenge or circumvent certain policies.<sup>44</sup> Their dismissal was explained as a function of economic necessity and the need to give the new Rector, Julio Tapia Falk, a freer hand. In fact, Col. Tapia had been named precisely to carry out this move (his predecessor, General Agustín Rodríguez, had been fired for refusing to do so), and most of those dismissed were immediately replaced by new, and presumably more compliant, appointees.

The government's action evoked substantial criticism in both university circles and the national media. Elements normally loyal to the Junta joined with critics and the government was left with only the most blatantly Fascist and traditionalist forces standing with it.<sup>45</sup> Tapia made matters worse by indiscreet remarks and actions in ensuing months, and was relieved of his duties in June, although none of those who had been dismissed was recalled. The fourth Rector Delegado, General Agustín Toro Dávila, has attempted to rebuild confidence in the University and its administration. Under him, increased (although still inadequate) attention has been given to research.<sup>46</sup> There has been some discussion of raising salaries or supplementing them in an effort to retain existing faculty. These are only initial signs of a potential reversal of the trend to date, and past experiences suggest caution, if not pessimism, in projections for the future. Despite the relative improvement, existing conditions remain extremely unfavorable. Many outstanding academics

appear permanently lost to the University, and an atmosphere of intimidation pervades the entire institution, making independent or critical intellectual activity virtually impossible.

2) The Catholic University. The experience of the Universidad Católica differs substantially from that of the University of Chile, although the effects of military intervention have been similar in several respects. Initially, the Católica was little affected. Helping in this regard was the University's status as a Pontifical (i.e., papal) institution, and the government's desire not to antagonize either the Chilean Church or the Vatican. It should be pointed out that the Católica has always been a predominantly conservative institution, despite its once radical student government, its former left-wing Christian Democratic Rector, and several left-oriented research institutes.<sup>47</sup> There were relatively few "undesirables", and therefore few students, staff or faculty members to be expelled during the immediate post-coup period. In subsequent years, however, leftist and more moderate elements have been "eased out" under the guise of economic necessity or structural reorganization.

In sharp contrast with the University of Chile, the Catholic University has been governed by a single Rector Delegado, retired Admiral Jorge Swett, since October, 1973. Swett is reputed to be under the influence of a group of right-wing gremialistas led by Law Professor Jaime Guzmán, a Catholic traditionalist and former personal advisor to General Pinochet. Swett has used his power forcefully and skillfully, and has managed to eliminate virtually all potential opponents, many of whom could conceivably have used Church contacts and leverage to retain their posts and influence.<sup>48</sup>

Initially, the Católica was subject to budget cuts much like those imposed on the other universities (10% for 1974 and 15% for 1975). Along with these cuts came layoffs of 110 and 165 faculty and staff for assertedly economic reasons. Virtually all affected were Christian Democrats, and in 1975 the layoff still stood even though additional financial resources more than enough to cover the salaries involved, were subsequently obtained from the government. Since the military's intervention the total number of academic work hours has diminished by 27%, and support for research has fallen by 25%.<sup>49</sup> In general, positions of academic and administrative importance are occupied either by traditionalist (ultra-conservative) Catholics or persons unconditionally supportive of the Rector Delegado or the military government. During 1976, the Católica was relatively unaffected by either budget cuts or government intervention, a phenomenon which some attribute to its close ties with former Economics and Finance Minister Jorge Cauas. In any event, some academic salaries are currently being supplemented by additional amounts of money in an effort to halt the exodus of economically pressed personnel. In general, under the tight control of Rector Delegado Swett, the University enjoys a relatively-privileged position among the eight universities.

3) The Remaining Universities. Information regarding developments in the remaining institutions is far less substantial. Of them, the Universidad Técnica del Estado (Santiago) and the Universidad de Concepción have been the main objects of "purification" and reorganization. Both had been leftist strongholds during the Allende years and were believed by the military to have been major staging areas for revolutionary groups. In the case of the Técnica, most of the changes came in the several months immediately following the coup, when many faculty members were expelled and virtually all programs and structures of social content or consequence dissolved. Since then, the University has remained under strict vigilance, with authorities relying on a system of informants to keep political ideas and activities under control.<sup>50</sup> With respect to the Universidad Católica de Valparaíso, the Universidad Austral, the Universidad del Norte, and the Universidad Técnica Federico Santa María, the general pattern of political dismissals, marginalization of the social sciences, and promotion of new values and ideals appears to have been applied in the same manner, depending on the degree of need and resistance, as in the Universidad de Chile and the Universidad Católica.

#### E) University Autonomy and Academic Freedom

In view of the foregoing, there would appear to be little question regarding the status of either university autonomy or academic freedom in Chile. Neither exists in any meaningful sense or to any significant extent at the present time. Each of the eight universities

is governed in absolute fashion by a military officer responsible to superiors in the Ministry of Education and to the Junta itself. Budget, personnel, and academic program matters are determined by military authorities and communicated through Rectores Delegados to their respective staffs and faculties. To the extent that there is civilian involvement, it is contingent on prior and unconditional compliance with military objectives and determinations. Those attempting to use personal or academic prestige in order to challenge or circumvent military control laws have invariably been removed from their positions.

Of course, the very notion of university autonomy can be defined in a number of different ways, and has long been the object of considerable, legitimate controversy. A minimum definition would nonetheless seem to require that the university community as a whole or its duly constituted authorities formulate academic and institutional policy free from all external intrusion or control. In the light of such a standard, the conclusion that no real autonomy exists in Chile appears inescapable.

Regarding academic freedom, a similar conclusion must be drawn. Currently, the advocacy of certain views and theories is in effect proscribed. Under the broad prohibition of political "activism" and "conflictive" and "distractive" material, controversial subjects may not be discussed, even by those professionally trained to deal with them. Finally, under the shield of "depoliticization", the Junta itself, several Ministers of Education, and individual Rectores Delegados have been engaged from the outset in the systematic persecution of groups and individuals who adhered to values, convictions, and programs which differed from those of the regime.<sup>51</sup>

#### NOTES

<sup>1</sup>The present report is submitted to the LASA Executive Council in compliance with its charge to the Committee on Academic Freedom and Human Rights. It has been written by Professor Michael Fleet of Marquette University, who served as Chairperson of the Working Group on Chile. For largely logistical reasons, the Working Group never functioned as such. An initial draft, however, was circulated among members of the Working Group (Henry Landsberger, Patricia Fagen, Rev. Joseph Eldridge, and David Pion), and other interested and informed parties. Many of their comments and suggestions have been incorporated herein.

<sup>2</sup>It is still possible, under the continuing state of seige, for example, for someone to be detained without formal charges and without access to legal counsel for up to 10 days, thus precluding effective control regarding treatment of the detainee.

<sup>3</sup>For a pre-coup conservative view, see Thomas P. McHale, "Ideologías en la Reforma Universitaria", in Visión Crítica de Chile (Santiago, Ediciones Portada), 1972, pp. 271-291.

<sup>4</sup>Of course, university and national politics can never be entirely dissociated since one's broader political notions and convictions are bound to affect his or her views of university education.

<sup>5</sup>The conflict between the Christian Democratic Rector (Edgardo Boenninger) and the leftist majority on the Consejo Superior led to a number of crises in 1971 and 1972, but was resolved with Boenninger's victory over Felipe Herrera in the Rector elections of 1972.

<sup>6</sup>The Buenos Aires based Consejo Latinoamericano de Ciencias Sociales (CLACSO) reported in its November 20, 1973, circular that the University of Chile (La Serena campus) professors Riquelme Zamora and Jorge Peña were both shot by firing squads, as was Professor Leopoldo Benítez, of the Catholic University's Department of Architecture.

<sup>7</sup>This was the case, for example, with the entire eastern campus of the University of Chile, as well as its Faculties of Fine Arts, Medicine, Architecture, and Political Economy, and with the Catholic University's several leftist research institutes, and its Departments of Journalism, Architecture, Social Work, Communication Arts, and Economic History. For

details, see the CLACSO circular, ibid., pp. 3-7.

<sup>8</sup>French reporter Pierre Kerkevan (Le Monde, 11 September 1975, p. 12) cites the following exchange between administrators of the University of Chile, Valparaíso shortly after the coup: "Mr. Secretary of the University of Chile, what administrative measures should our Faculty adopt regarding the books which are to be withdrawn from the library inventory because of their political content?" "(Sir) you are to proceed immediately with the their incineration." Books on the list included those of John Kenneth Galbraith, Maxim Gorki, Celso Furtado, and Alain Joxe, as well as those of Marx, Lenin, Mao Tse Tung, and Engels. For a copy of the memorandum indicating the books, see Galo Gómez, Chile de Hoy, Educación, Cultura, y Ciencia (México, Case de Chile en México), 1976, pp. 141-42.

<sup>9</sup>CLACSO, op. cit., pp. 3-13, plus appendix.

<sup>10</sup>Junta spokesmen have charged that additions of personnel during the Allende years were excessive and politically inspired. In view of broader developments during these years, this judgment would seem unfair. According to former Rector Boenninger, for example, the increase for the entire period was about 2,000, a "reasonable" figure given the increases in student populations (8 to 10% per year), the large number of academics returning from doctoral studies abroad, the practice in some Faculties of offering jobs to a certain percentage of each year's graduating class, and systematic efforts to upgrade the sciences generally (with substantial numbers of full-time researchers being hired). Moreover, according to Dr. Boenninger, the University's watchdog Committee on Recruitment, chaired by conservative Professor Juan Morales Malia, had the final say on at least 60% of the new appointments, thus minimizing the potential for political abuse.

<sup>11</sup>See Gómez, op. cit., p. 46.

<sup>12</sup>In this connection, it is worth noting the predominant influence of right wing gremialistas (latter-day corporatists) in the Catholic University, and their substantial (and unfettered) presence in several areas of the University of Chile.

<sup>13</sup>Joseph Comblin, "La Doctrina de la Seguridad Nacional", Mensaje (Santiago) no. 247 (Marzo-Abril de 1976), pp. 96-104.

<sup>14</sup>For a fuller discussion of this matter, see Section D, The Situation in Individual Universities, of this report.

<sup>15</sup>Admiral Arturo Troncoso, who had been Minister of Education for almost three years, was recently succeeded by Admiral Luis Niemann. The change may reflect the desire to strike a more conciliatory image, or merely to acquire the greater flexibility inherent in an essentially unknown quantity.

<sup>16</sup>Any substantial changes of the sort envisioned would almost certainly come at the expense of the Universidad de Chile, which operated campuses and centers in most provincial cities. Such a prospect no doubt was a motivating factor for those promoting and for those opposing regionalization.

<sup>17</sup>Gómez, op. cit., p. 57.

<sup>18</sup>Gómez, ibid., pp. 64-65, cites the full text of the Council's response.

<sup>19</sup>Some suggested that a special educational tax be levied and the revenues used to assist needy students. Others proposed that the National Health Service and the Ministry of Education give subventions to students in exchange for commitments of post-graduate service. And finally, still others urged the creation of a capital fund to be invested commercially and drawn by students as needed.

<sup>20</sup>Ministerio de Educación Pública Asesoría Económica, El Costo de la Docencia en las Universidades Chilenas-1975 (Santiago, República de Chile, Oficina Fiscales), Agosto 1976.

<sup>21</sup>17.6% for the University of Chile, and somewhat smaller for the other universities. The larger expenditure for primary and secondary education would seem eminently reasonable, had it not been achieved at the expense of basic university programs and resources.

<sup>22</sup>El Costo de la Docencia en las Universidades Chilenas-1975, *op. cit.*, p. 5. For some reason, this figure does not include the University of Chile's Law School.

<sup>23</sup>Both figures were provided by former Rector Boenninger in an interview.

<sup>24</sup>The figure of 50,000 has been extrapolated from remarks made by current University of Chile Rector Delegado Agustín Toro Dávila, in a written response to questions prepared by the author. According to General Toro, the 15,000 students receiving special loans during 1976 amounted to 30% of the total student population.

<sup>25</sup>See El Mercurio (Santiago), 1 de Octubre and 31 de Diciembre 1975.

<sup>26</sup>According to the Centro de Investigaciones Socioeconómicas (CISEC) in a report prepared for the Chilean Catholic Bishops' Conference, student enrollment in secondary schools increased by 68% between 1969 and 1973. See CISEC, Serie C, Estudios Sectoriales de la Coyuntura Chilena (Santiago, 1975, mimeo), p. 20.

<sup>27</sup>The UNESCO study is cited in Gómez, *op. cit.*, p. 76.

<sup>28</sup>According to General Toro Dávila, for example, the 32 million pesos in loans disbursed to University of Chile students in 1976 was divided into study loans (27 million pesos given to 8,800, averaging over 3,000 pesos per student); emergency loans to Santiago and all provincial campuses except Valparaíso (1.15 million to almost 3,000 students, averaging \$400 pesos per student); emergency loans (\$4.16 million to 136 students, averaging \$30,631 per student); and food loans (\$165,000 to over 3,100 students, averaging \$518 pesos per student). These figures prompt one to ask why so much money was given to relatively few students in the form of study loans, since tuition charges at the University for 1976 were around \$1,000; and why the disproportion between the emergency loans made to Valparaíso students (an average of over \$30,000 per student) and those made to students at other campuses (an average of \$400 per student).

<sup>29</sup>An exception to this rule, at least until recently, was the Catholic University of Valparaíso's Institute of Social Studies, which continued to function despite the independent or Christian Democratic orientations of its staff.

<sup>30</sup>See CLACSO, *op. cit.*, p. 313, plus appendix.

<sup>31</sup>El Costo de la Docencia . . ., *op. cit.*, p. 5. Figures also indicate that the number of part-time or hourly employees exceeds that of full time employees in all other universities. In general, this phenomenon can be explained by the far greater incidence of full-time employees in the social sciences, sciences, and education (where leftist academics were concentrated), since universities were the only places that these professions (in contrast with those of Law, Engineering, and Medicine) could be exercised.

<sup>32</sup>It is impossible to prove such an assertion formally. Nonetheless, virtually all of the dismissals of which we have news involved leftists, Christian Democrats, or rightists identified as either independent or critical of government policies. Further, in several instances, Christian Democrats have been told explicitly that they were being let go because they were Christian Democrats (the cases of Professors Francisco Cumplido and Máximo Pacheco of the University of Chile's School of Law). And finally, the most recent wave of dismissals (December, 1975, to March, 1976) came on the heels of a public campaign calling for the ouster of "subversive" and obstructionist elements.

<sup>33</sup>Among the distinguished academics dismissed in late 1975 and early 1976 from the University of Chile were Enrique D'Etigny, Rene Orozco, Francisco Cumplido, Antonio Bascuñán



Valdes, and Osvaldo Cori. See "Estado de Situación" in Ercilla, 17 de Marzo 1976, pp. 27-36.

<sup>34</sup>According to a January 28, 1975, letter written to Cardinal Raúl Silva Enríquez, then still pro-Chancellor of the Catholic University, by a Católica professor urging him to take more decisive action in defense of those being dismissed from their posts. In this connection, the case of the Political Science Department at the Católica in Santiago is instructive. Though tolerated for a time, the best members of the faculty were fired in the aftermath of the Department's attempt to hold a seminar on the "Crises of Democracy". Ironically, the seminar had been approved by intellectual circles in the armed forces. Yet, the presence of former politicians, notably President Frei, in the seminar was enough justification for Rector Delegado Swett to remove the Department's director and replace him with a new director who immediately fired most of the faculty.

<sup>35</sup>All respondents, including current University officials, recognized a significant decline in both regards. The remarks of Professor Juan de Dios Vial Correa, appearing in "Estado de Situación", loc. cit., are representative of those of the people with whom we spoke: "In this manner a 'banalization' of research is induced, one which instinctively avoids important subjects and takes refuge in the security of the banal."

<sup>36</sup>General Toro Dávila, in his written response, claimed that the professional exodus since September, 1973, has been less than it was under Allende, and that it has been due entirely to economic conditions for which Allende was to blame. Such an assessment is challenged by virtually all other studies and/or estimates made to date, however. To cite the most recent of these, Cardinal Silva Enríquez has recently stated publicly (apparently on the basis of commissioned studies) that over one-half of the country's scientists, and an estimated 500,000 of its professionals, had left the country since September, 1973.

<sup>37</sup>These calculations are based on figures provided in El Costo de la Docencia..., op. cit.

<sup>38</sup>This theme is stressed consistently in speeches by General Leigh and Admiral Troncoso.

<sup>39</sup>Under new Dean Hugo Rosende, the University of Chile's Law School recently (February and March, 1976) abolished all course work in philosophy, economics, and sociology from its curriculum, leaving only the legal codes themselves as the object of study. See CISEC, Serie C, Estudios Sectoriales, op. cit., p. 3.

<sup>40</sup>CISEC, (ibid., p. 2) reports the discontinuation of the program in Social Science at the southern campus of the University of Chile, Santiago, in late 1975 (which would bring social-science enrollments down to about 1% of the overall student population).

<sup>41</sup>Speech by Troncoso appearing in El Mercurio, 26 de Febrero, 1976, p. 8.

<sup>42</sup>See Gómez, op. cit., pp. 110-15.

<sup>43</sup>The Faculty of Political Science was dissolved, assertedly because of its proximity to the headquarters of the Carabineros, the national police force.

<sup>44</sup>"Estado de Situación", loc. cit.

<sup>45</sup>Traditional Conservative Jorge Ivan Hubner and former Patria y Libertad chieftain Pablo Rodríguez spoke publicly of the continuing need to "purify" (depurar) the University of subversive and obstructive elements. But more moderate conservatives (such as sociologist Jorge Millas and El Mercurio itself) were sharply critical of the moves, precipitating a species of national debate on the matter during February and March.

<sup>46</sup>The construction of new facilities for the Faculty of Science of the University of

Chile was announced in October, 1976.

<sup>47</sup>The student federation (FEUC) has been controlled by left-wing Christian Democrats from 1966 until 1971, when it was taken over by right-wing gremialistas. The Christian Democratic Rector (ousted by the Junta) was Fernando Castillo Velasco.

<sup>48</sup>The Church was unable to effectively challenge Swett in the dismissal of Channel 13 Director Rev. Raúl Hasbun (who had been an influential critic of the Allende government), or in that of Vice-Rector Jorge Awad, a long time friend and confidant of the Cardinal. Swett has apparently been able to undercut Cardinal Silva's influence with Rome by the effective use of the conservative Papal Nuncio.

<sup>49</sup>These figures are taken from conversations with former professors of the University who have closely followed developments therein. Gómez (op. cit., pp. 88-89) speaks of 152 dismissals in 1975, and the total of 235 teaching personnel laid off in 1975 and 1976 (Ercilla, 17 de Marzo, 1975, p. 38) would represent almost 25% of the total number.

<sup>50</sup>CISEC, Serie C, Estudios Sectoriales..., op. cit., pp. 16-16.

<sup>51</sup>In their defense, university officials have insisted that Chilean academics enjoy full freedom of thought, and that only "destructive" political activism has been forbidden. Unfortunately, they have refused to define either of these notions, or to provide a basis for distinguishing between them. And in any case, their claims contrast sharply with the repeated statements of high-ranking government officials. As Junta member Gustavo Leigh put it in a December, 1974, speech (El Mercurio, December 19, 1974), "full democratic liberties" were appropriate to "a civically healthy nation", but could not be invoked in one "that has just emerged from the most complete anarchy". And as General Pinochet himself has stated, "absolute pluralism" cannot [and will not] be tolerated, nor can [or will] "any doctrine which tended to foment social antagonisms" or "any thought contrary to the established regime (El Mercurio, various issues, March and September, 1976)." According to military authorities, these restrictions are needed to undo the damage inflicted by past and continuing politicization. In their view, freedom and autonomy must be denied in the short run in order to be restored and preserved in their proper form over the long run. Chile's military authorities have thus set themselves as sole judges of what is acceptable and unacceptable, obstructing the free interplay of ideas and the full development of critical reason. In this regard, it is well to recall the many instances in recent history in which those who would preserve freedom for the future have in fact destroyed all practical possibilities of freedom for the present and future. This, of course, is a pitfall to which many ideological traditions have been drawn. But it is particularly apparent in the case of those who, in keeping with the doctrine of National Security, are willing to divorce ends from means, and to pursue their objectives free from moral and/or institutional restraints.