

NEGOTIATING DEMOCRATIC CORRIDORS IN PARAGUAY

The Report of

The Latin American Studies Association
Delegation to Observe the 1993 Paraguayan National Elections

Principal Author

Marcial A. Riquelme



Latin American Studies Association

NEGOTIATING DEMOCRATIC CORRIDORS IN
PARAGUAY

NEGOTIATING DEMOCRATIC CORRIDORS IN PARAGUAY

The Report of
The Latin American Studies Association
Delegation to Observe the 1993 Paraguayan National Elections

Delegation Members

Jan Black
Jerry Cooney
Kennett Cott
Nora Hamilton
Paul Lewis
Frank Mora
Beverly Nagel
Marysa Navarro
Martin Needler
John Portner
Harald E.L. Prins
Marcial A. Riquelme
Timothy R. Scully
Héctor Vélez

Principal Author

Marcial A. Riquelme



Latin American Studies Association
William Pitt Union, 9th Floor
University of Pittsburgh
Pittsburgh, PA 15260

1994

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

On behalf of the LASA delegation, I wish to express gratitude to Alvaro Caballero, Director of the *Centro de Información y Recursos para el Desarrollo* (CIRD) of the Paraguay-Kansas Committee and his staff, for providing invaluable logistical support to our delegation during our stay in Asunción. A debt of gratitude is also owed to the Paraguayans who escorted each LASA member during the day of the election, especially Mike Moses, who also provided us with a collection of newspaper articles for our discussions after the election.

In the production of this report, special thanks go to several members of the observation team --Jan Black, Nora Hamilton, Paul Lewis, Frank Mora, Martin Needler and Harald E.L. Prins-- who read the entire manuscript and made valuable suggestions for improving it. Thanks are also due to Jorge Riquelme, who helped in the elaboration of the tables, provided bibliographical materials and volunteered all of the word processing support; Nidia Glavinich who prepared summaries of the major news items used as secondary sources; Lyman Baker for his insightful editorial comments; and Sandra del Castillo who provided technical support in the preparation of the manuscript.

Finally, I would like to acknowledge the financial support received by the members' respective institutions for sponsoring their travel arrangements without which this delegation would not have been possible.

Marcial A. Riquelme
LASA Delegation Coordinator

TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	xiii
INTRODUCTION	1
PART I	
<i>Background on the Paraguayan Transition</i>	
I. BRIEF POLITICAL HISTORY OF PARAGUAY	3
II. MILITARY COUP AND POLITICAL "OPENING FROM ABOVE"	4
III. POST-STROESSNER ELECTIONS	5
A. National Elections of May 1, 1989	5
B. Municipal Elections of May 26, 1991	7
C. Constituent Assembly Elections of December 1, 1991	7
PART II	
<i>The New Rules of Political Participation</i>	
IV. FORM OF THE STATE	11
V. ELECTORAL SYSTEM	11
A. Election Procedures	12
B. Organization of Political Parties	12
C. Electoral Bodies	13
D. Elective Posts	15
E. Electorate and Electoral Register	15
VI. ELECTORAL CONTENDERS	16
A. Political Parties and Movements	16
1. Major Political Parties	19
2. Minor Political Parties	23
B. Presidential and Vice-Presidential Candidates	24
C. Party Platforms	29
VII. POLITICAL CAMPAIGNS	32
A. The Message and the Target Groups	32
B. Mobilizations	35
C. Publicity Drives: Access and Coverage by the Media	36

1.	Radio	36
2.	Newspapers	37
3.	Television	37
D.	<i>Fund-raising and Campaign Costs</i>	37

PART III

Evaluation of the Elections

VIII.	ELECTION RESULTS	41
IX.	ASSESSMENT OF THE ELECTIONS	50
	A. <i>Pre-election Irregularities</i>	50
	B. <i>Election Day</i>	55
	C. <i>Post-election Process</i>	58
X.	POLLS: Why did they "fail"?	60
	CONCLUDING REMARKS	63

PART IV

Individual Experiences and Comments of LASA Observers

PRESENTATION	67
Department of Cordillera	69
Nora Hamilton	69
Frank Mora	71
Department of Itapúa	73
Harald E.L. Prins	73
Department of Misiones	77
Jan Black and Martin Needler	77
Department of Paraguari	79
Paul Lewis	79
Department of Alto Paraná	81
Beverly Nagel	81
Timothy R. Scully	85

Department of Central	87
Kennett Cott	87
Marysa Navarro	89
Héctor Vélez	91

PART V

Documentation

ANNEXES	
A1. <i>SAKA's Request to LASA for an Academic Delegation of Observers</i>	95
A2. <i>SAKA's Request to LASA for an Academic Delegation of Observers</i> <u>English Translation</u>	96
B1. <i>AEN's Request to LASA for an Academic Delegation of Observers</i>	97
B2. <i>AEN's Request to LASA for an Academic Delegation of Observers</i> <u>English Translation</u>	98
C1. <i>PLRA's Request to LASA for an Academic Delegation of Observers</i>	99
C2. <i>PLRA's Request to LASA for an Academic Delegation of Observers</i> <u>English Translation</u>	100
D1. <i>Statement by the U.S. Embassy in Asunción</i>	101
D2. <i>Statement by the U.S. Embassy in Asunción</i> <u>English Translation</u>	102
E. <i>Members of the LASA Delegation</i>	103
F. <i>Organizations and Individuals Interviewed in Paraguay</i>	105
REFERENCES	107
ENDNOTES	109



LIST OF MAPS, FIGURES, AND TABLES

MAP


I	Paraguay: Department Divisions	xvii
---	--------------------------------	------

FIGURE

I	Parties and Political Movements: May 9, 1993 National Elections in Paraguay	16
II	Official Ballot for the May 9, 1993 Presidential/ Vice-presidential Elections in Paraguay	18
III	Political Advertisements Used by the Colorado Party in the May 9, 1993 National Elections in Paraguay	53

TABLE

I	Population of Paraguay (1992) and Registered Voters for the May 9, 1993 National Elections in Paraguay (by Departments)	17
II	General Results of the May 9, 1993 National Elections in Paraguay	42
III	Results of the May 9, 1993 National Elections for President and Vice-president in Paraguay (by Departments)	43
IV	Results of the May 9, 1993 National Elections for Senators in Paraguay (by Departments)	44
V	Results of the May 9, 1993 National Elections for Deputies in Paraguay (by Departments)	45
VI	Results of the May 9, 1993 National Elections for Departmental Governors in Paraguay	46
VII	Results of the May 9, 1993 National Elections for Departmental Legislatures in Paraguay	47
VIII	Districts Won by the ANR, PLRA, and AEN for Each of the Elective Posts in the May 9, 1993 National Elections in Paraguay (by Departments)	48
IX	Summary of Election Results in Paraguay: 1989-1993	51
X	Voting Tables (<i>mesas</i>) Annulled by the Bicameral Congressional Commission for the May 9, 1993 National Elections in Paraguay	60



EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

At the official request of two opposition political parties, the *Partido Liberal Radical Auténtico* (PLRA) and the *Alianza Encuentro Nacional* (AEN) and a consortium of non-governmental organizations (SAKA) in Paraguay, the Latin American Studies Association (LASA) authorized on March 25, 1993 the formation of an observer team of academics from thirteen universities across the United States to monitor and evaluate the process leading up to and including the national elections of May 9, 1993 in Paraguay. The request by the Paraguayan opposition parties and the non-governmental organizations came as a result of a tense climate during the last stage of the elections campaign.

What follows are the delegation's summary conclusions concerning central aspects of the electoral process.

Voter Turnout and Participation

Of the total voting age population almost 78% was registered. Evidence of the enthusiasm and broad participation of the electorate was demonstrated by the fact that over 69% actually voted. This was the second highest election turnout since the 1989 coup d'état. Civic spirit prevailed in a very contested election and was essential for the peaceful completion of the electoral journey. There is no doubt that the election was an important step in Paraguay's democratization process.

Violent Acts Against Freedom of Speech and Movement

Three serious acts of violence were committed during the election day: (1) In the early morning Channel 13 and Radio Cardinal which had been very critical of the candidate of the Colorado Party during the presidential campaigns, were subject to a rifle and grenade attack against its installations by an unidentified group. As a result of this attack they were not able to go on the air until after the elections began. (2) Early in the afternoon all telephone lines of a prestigious independent poll-counting consortium, SAKA, were suddenly disconnected for the remaining of the election day. This interrupted communications between their central offices and the organization's field operators. The state-owned telephone company (ANTELCO) explained that it was experiencing technical difficulties. (3) The international borders were closed by the military to prevent the entrance of Paraguayan citizens coming from abroad, as a result of a court order issued to prevent them from voting. With respect to the first incident it remains unclear who was responsible, although it appears to have been politically motivated. In our judgement these events compromised the credibility of the government's commitment to guarantee freedom of speech and movement of Paraguayan citizens.

Election Law and Procedures

As the electoral bodies were not yet integrated, as mandated by the new Constitution (1992), the Colorado-controlled Central Electoral Board was entrusted with organizing the electoral process. This resulted in an unequal distribution of representation in the Electoral Board, and since membership on it was reserved only for parties with parliamentary representation, it excluded other newly formed political organizations, among them one of the major electoral contenders of the past May elections, the *Alianza Encuentro Nacional* (AEN). Furthermore, the National Congress, elected under the previous authoritarian Constitution and with a two-thirds Colorado majority, was entrusted to pass judgement on the final results of the May 9, 1993 elections. In other words, Colorados were both judge and jury of the entire electoral process.

Election Results

After a delay of several weeks that included the opposition disputing some results in several departments, Juan Carlos Wasmosy of the *Asociación Nacional Republicana* (ANR) or Colorado Party, was declared officially the winner of the presidential race with 39.92% of the votes. Domingo Laíno of the *Partido Liberal Radical Auténtico* (PLRA) or Liberal Party obtained 32.13% of the votes and Guillermo Caballero Vargas of the *Alianza Encuentro Nacional* (AEN) received 23.14% of the votes. These three candidates received a 95.19% of the total valid vote. From the country's 17 departments disputed for the gubernatorial races, the Colorado Party won in 12 departments, the PLRA in four, and the AEN in one. In the Senate, out of a total of 45 seats, the Colorado Party won 20 seats, the PLRA 17 seats, and the AEN eight seats. Finally, in the Chamber of Deputies, out of a total of 80 seats, the Colorado Party obtained 38 seats, the PLRA 33 seats and the AEN nine seats. As these results indicate, the combined opposition now controls both houses of parliament. For the first time in its history since independence in 1811, Paraguay now has a system of checks and balances. This may foster a tempering of the executive power in a country which has had a strong presidentialist tradition.

Allegations of Electoral Fraud and Irregularities


Fraud and irregularities were observed in several departments, especially in Boquerón, Concepción, Cordillera, Amambay and Caaguazú. Although 433 voting tables were disputed, after long deliberations the Colorados -- through their majority -- only acknowledged fraud in 137 tables. Through this maneuver, only 1.59% (of the 8,468 tables for the entire country) instead of 5.11% voting tables were annulled. It appears, therefore, that the irregularities were deemed not to have been sufficiently severe as to have altered the results of the presidential elections. However, they could have affected the results of other races.

Menacing Declarations by President of the Ruling Party and Military Officers


Specifically, the most troubling aspect of the electoral process was the unwillingness on the part of the ruling Colorado Party and high-ranking officers of the Armed Forces to accept a possible defeat and transfer of power to the opposition. Intimidating statements were made by the president of the Colorado Party and high-ranking military officers. This made the electoral climate tense and uncertain and met with no sanction from the appropriate authorities.


Obstacles for Consolidation of Democracy in Paraguay

The observer team considers the lingering alliance between the State, the Colorado Party and the Armed Forces to be the major obstacle threatening the consolidation of democracy in Paraguay. The extrication of the military from the political process and its subordination to civilian control are of fundamental importance. Further, the institutionalization of an independent judiciary is also deemed to be of great significance.



MAP I. PARAGUAY: Department Divisions





INTRODUCTION


Paraguay, the South American country generally considered the least likely to undergo a process of genuine democratization, celebrated on May 9, 1993, its first freely contested election with an all-civilian slate since 1928. On August 15, 1993, General Andrés Rodríguez presented Juan Carlos Wasmosy with the presidential sash. Although the newly elected civilian president belongs to the same party that has been in power since 1947, the May elections marked, at least formally, both the culmination of one phase and the beginning of another in a process of political opening initiated by the military coup of 1989. This opening allowed a high degree of political participation and representation of all the citizenry, thus dramatically increasing the possibilities for a peaceful transition to democracy in Paraguay.

Despite enthusiasm over the prospects made possible by the coup, important obstacles prevailed, and the threat remained constant throughout the 1989-1993 period that the process of political opening would be interrupted. Purges in the Armed Forces, rumors of coups, inflammatory declarations by military officers and governmental figures all created an atmosphere of concern and tension. Less than two months before the election, the president of the ruling Colorado Party threatened that his party would resort to cheating and violence in order to remain in power.¹ Taking into consideration this context of intimidation, including the increasingly active role of the military in the electoral process, SAKA (a consortium formed by various Paraguayan non-governmental organizations) requested a delegation of LASA observers to verify the fairness and transparency of the elections [see Annex A].

In addition, Paraguay's two major opposition parties, *Alianza Encuentro Nacional* (AEN) and *Partido Liberal Radical Auténtico* (PLRA), issued a similar request [see Annexes B and C]. In response, the Executive Council of LASA agreed to send a delegation of fourteen academic observers from the United States to Paraguay to evaluate the electoral process and to produce a report of their findings.²

This report covers more than the strictly "observational" task and goes beyond the electoral performance itself. It offers an assessment of the entire electoral process, paying attention to pre-electoral as well as post-electoral events.³

We found it important to begin Part I of this report with a brief background of the country's political history since very little information on Paraguay is produced in English, and there exist many stereotypes and misconceptions about the country and its people. Part II covers the main issues involved in the formal preparations of the electoral process. Part III provides the official results of the elections with an analysis of the outcome. Part IV contains the individual testimonies of the LASA delegation members. Finally, Part V provides documentation and additional information in the form of annexes, references and endnotes.



PART I

Background on the Paraguayan Transition

I. BRIEF POLITICAL HISTORY OF PARAGUAY

Paraguay's defeat in the Triple Alliance War (1865-1870), resulted in the virtual destruction of the country, its occupation for seven years by the allied forces and the imposition of a new political system. Since then, Paraguay has experienced protracted periods of political instability and violence with only a few short periods of order without repression. Between 1870 and 1912, there were 22 presidents, and between 1936 and 1954 there were 12 presidents. Over half of these were forced from office by violent means or the threat of violence. Twice during the 20th century the country was ravaged by civil wars. Between the two, Paraguayans faced yet another international conflict, this time against neighboring Bolivia, which was resolved in what came to be known as the Chaco War (1932-1935).

Whereas the first civil war (1922-1923) involved two factions of the then-ruling party, the Liberal Party, the second one (1947) involved two factions of the Armed Forces, each supported by different political parties. This conflict, which ended with the victory of the faction supported by the Colorado Party, was undoubtedly a watershed in the political history of the country. The post-civil war period of 1947-1954, which was also characterized by violent factionalism, instability, and an increasingly active role of the Armed Forces in national politics, set the ground for a new form of domination that began with the coup d'état of May 4, 1954. General Alfredo Stroessner, leader of that coup, seized power and established a new type of regime; one which lasted longer than any other in Paraguayan history. Stroessnerism was based on an institutional triad of Government, Armed Forces, and the Colorado Party. A skillful combination of selective brutal repression and pervasive corruption accounted for its longevity.

After 1982 the dictatorship progressively weakened. It was ultimately deposed in 1989 as a result of a combination of pressures from within the ruling bloc, from civil and political society, and from beyond the country. More specifically; in the context of a serious economic crisis, internal factionalism broke out within the ruling Colorado Party for the control of the prebendary system, as well as for the succession to Stroessner. This factional dispute ended with the displacement of the *Tradicionalistas* from the party and the government by an extreme right-wing faction, the *Militantes*. The increasing interference of the latter in the internal affairs of the military culminated in a series of purges designed to assure the succession of the aging dictator's son, Colonel Gustavo Stroessner.

When the *Militantes* attempted to force the retirement of General Andrés Rodríguez,

Commander of the First Army Corps (the dominant component of the Paraguayan Armed Forces), the latter led a coup deposing Stroessner. An additional factor behind Stroessner's downfall was the growing mobilization of political parties and social movements, which gradually weakened the regime. Finally, external pressures were brought to bear by civilianized regimes in Argentina and Brazil. Furthermore, the Reagan and Bush administrations, in order to gain Congressional support for their Caribbean and Central American policies, called for the liberalization of the two remaining dictatorships of South America: those of Pinochet in Chile and Stroessner in Paraguay.

Despite this history of political convolutions and repression, contrary to the widespread image of a country which has never experienced stability without authoritarian rule, Paraguayans have twice enjoyed periods of political stability under democratic/quasi-democratic rule: in 1912-1921 and again in 1924-1935. In fact, during the latter period, for the first time in Paraguayan history, civilian candidates of the ruling Liberal Party faced the challenge in an open election of the main opposition party, the Colorado Party.⁴ It was not until the 1993 national election that Paraguay again held competitive elections with an all-civilian slate.

II. MILITARY COUP AND POLITICAL "OPENING FROM ABOVE"

A remarkable period of political opening followed the 1989 coup: Repression ended, political prisoners were freed, exiles returned, freedom of the press was established, and opposition parties were allowed to organize. There were three major elections in the two years following the coup: the presidential and congressional elections of May 1, 1989; the municipal elections of May 26, 1991; and the December 1, 1991 election of delegates to the Constituent Assembly which drafted a new Constitution between January and June of 1992.

Despite these positive changes, it should be stressed that, in contrast to most transitional processes taking place in the region, two important democratizing factors were absent: extensive negotiations between the transitional government and leaders of the major opposition parties to set jointly the agenda of the process; and a gradual withdrawal of the military from the political arena and a return to the barracks. Instead, the Paraguayan case began with a military coup that, according to its own proclamation, had among its objectives the "reunification of the Colorado Party in government." From the start, the military became the major political actor, maintaining the same triadic alliance which had served as Stroessner's power base: the Armed Forces, the Colorado Party, and the governmental bureaucracy.

Instead of a negotiated transition, the political opening in Paraguay came from above;

from within the ruling bloc, which unilaterally imposed its own agenda and set the limits of political liberalization. This became evident when General Rodríguez called for national elections to be held three months after the coup, without any consultation with the opposition. In response, the opposition made several requests, including a four-month postponement of the elections; a minimum of 60 days' extension of the voting registration deadline; and permission to form coalitions, which was forbidden in the electoral law written under Stroessner's regime. Gen. Rodríguez ignored the major requests, made only some minor concessions, and went ahead with the plans to hold elections as initially scheduled.

III. POST-STROESSNER ELECTIONS

A. *National Elections of May 1, 1989*

Gen. Rodríguez declared that these elections were called to comply with the constitutional norm that mandated elections within three months of a government dissolution. His argument was criticized as beside the point, in as much as the Constitution had already been violated by the military coup. The major reason behind the hasty call for elections appeared to be the need to legitimize his *de facto* government.

The general population anticipated that this election would not be fair. In fact, even the president of the Central Electoral Board (JEC), Expedito Rojas, during a meeting with the NDI delegation admitted that "...there existed several flaws in the electoral process, but added that fraud would not reach 'unacceptable' levels." (NDI, 1989:7). Since this was the first free electoral contest in several decades, a large percentage of the population went to the polls anyway.

In total, eight parties participated in the elections, although as expected only two were serious contenders, the Colorados and the *Partido Liberal Radical Auténtico* (PLRA). Together, they garnered about 95% of the votes. With a turnout of 1,189,657 (53.37%) voters, Gen. Rodríguez, running as the candidate of the Colorado Party, received 882,957 (74.22%) votes, whereas Domingo Laíno, from the PLRA, came in second with 241,823 (20.33%) votes.⁵

In the legislative elections, the Colorado Party received 73.86 percent of the vote, running slightly behind Rodríguez. Under the existing proportional representation system, the Colorados received 48 of the 72 seats in the Chamber of Deputies, and 24 of the 36 Senate seats. The PLRA won 11 Senate seats and 21 positions in the Chamber of Deputies. The Febrerista Party won just two percent of the vote, coming in a distant third. The Liberal Radical Party, part of the so-called 'rented opposition' that was allowed to participate in the Stroessner-era elections, garnered only one percent of the vote and one seat in the Chamber of Deputies. The Christian Democratic Party, the Humanist Party, the Unified Liberal Radical Party, and the Liberal Party did not draw enough votes to win

representation in the parliament.⁶

The election was characterized by both the national and the international press as "free but not fair." Major criticism centered around the electoral registers --*padrones*--, which were basically the same as those compiled under Stroessner. They were badly out of date and clearly inflated --2,226,061 registered voters-- with Colorado party members. For example, in important urban areas such as Coronel Oviedo and Pedro Juan Caballero, 88% and 94% of their total populations, respectively, were registered voters (Abente, 1989:44). Furthermore, the register was made available to the opposition parties only shortly before the day of the elections, so that it was virtually impossible to check and challenge.

In terms of specific irregularities, according to reports by neutral observer groups such as the National Democratic Institute (NDI), Freedom House, and LASA, there were systematic and widespread instances of abuses and fraud. These included: issuing duplicate voter registrations, on election day, to non-registered Colorado voters; lack of privacy of voting booths (e.g., in the countryside, policemen, soldiers and/or Colorado party officials openly handed out Colorado ballots to the voters); multiple voting by Colorados; and tampering with voting registers to eliminate the names of many opposition supporters.

Finally, massive partisan utilization of state resources further compromised the fairness of the electoral process (e.g., government vehicles and armed forces trucks were used to transport party loyalists to the polls). And public employees were coerced into working for the official candidate during regular office hours.

After decades of rigged elections, the Colorados were quite knowledgeable about tricks they could use to widen their margin of victory. Thus, in the countryside they stapled together congressional and presidential ballots in a clear move to capitalize on the good will towards Gen. Rodríguez among the electorate (Freedom House, 1989). This practice helps explain the 73% of the votes obtained by Colorado legislative candidates; around 20% higher than what several polling agencies had predicted and a very high percentage for a party which served for decades as the civilian branch of the dictatorship's repressive apparatus.

It should be mentioned, however, that even without these irregularities, Gen. Rodríguez could have easily won; several independent polling agencies gave him around 70% of the votes (Abente, 1989:45). Furthermore, he ran a very professional campaign and enjoyed a great popularity for having led the coup that ended the Stroessner regime.

Despite the fact that the Colorados once more had an overwhelming majority in the Legislature, they were unable to become the "united party in government" that the senior military leadership was fervently seeking. Consequently, after the May 1, 1989, elections, Gen. Rodríguez and top military officers continued in control of the process of liberalization from above. Under

their guidance, the *Militantes* were temporarily denied a voice in the Colorado Party; a new electoral law was drafted by the Executive and approved by Parliament; and the Central Electoral Board, still under the control of the ruling party, started to compile a new register.

B. *Municipal Elections of May 26, 1991*

On May 26, 1991, direct elections for mayors and city councils of the 206 municipalities were held for the first time in Paraguayan history. Moreover, they were organized under the new (1990) Electoral Code and with a new electoral register with 1,383,307 people in it. There was a 71.2% voter turnout. This was the highest level of participation of all the elections carried out since the beginning of the transition process.⁷ They were significantly freer than the national elections two years earlier. This improvement was due in large part because the Colorado Party torn by internal power struggles, was unable to organize as effectively as before to control the results. Also contributing to the greater freedom was the fact that the register had been revised and many urban Paraguayans had become more comfortable with the idea of voting against the Colorado Party.

Although the Colorado Party triumphed in 155 municipalities out of 206, it lost in Asunción to an independent movement called *Asunción Para Todos* (APT),⁸ and suffered major defeats to the PLRA in some of Paraguay's largest urban areas (mainly in the Department of Central) as well as other cities of the interior totaling 44 municipalities. Other regional independent movements won also in 6 municipalities. The results for the mayoral races were as follows: ANR 412,529 (43.38%); PLRA 316,882 (33.33%); Independents (APT and other regional independent groups), 182,941 (19.24%); *Partido Revolucionario Febrerista* (PRF) 32,966 (3.47%); *Partido Demócrata Cristiano* (PDC) 3,227 (0.34%); and others 2,270 (0.24%).⁹

Two important lessons to be drawn from these elections were: (a) the official Colorado machinery is not unbeatable, and (b) despite the long tradition of two-party monopoly there are many possibilities for independent political parties for national elections. One might say that the results of the May 26, 1991, municipal elections became a catalyst for the formation of the third major contender in Paraguayan politics: the *Alianza Encuentro Nacional* (AEN).

C. *Constituent Assembly Elections of December 1, 1991*

These elections were crucial for all major actors in the process because elected representatives would have the responsibility of drafting a new Constitution. High-ranking officers were not merely concerned over what their professional roles would be under the new constitution: the corporate interests of the military *per se* as well as the personal fortunes they themselves had accumulated under the Stroessner regime and consolidated during the

liberalization period were at stake as well.

After the poor performance of the Colorado Party in the municipal elections, the military grew concerned over the increasing factionalism (by that time the official party was already split into six factions) that weakened the Party before the Constituent Assembly elections and it was feared, might eventually lead to its defeat in the national elections of 1993. Gen. Rodríguez himself, in an historical speech delivered shortly after the municipal elections, declared that:

"we [the Armed Forces] have accomplished four of the coup objectives...but one is still lacking and that is the granitic unity of the Colorado Party".¹⁰

To achieve that last objective, the Armed Forces undertook several lines of action. On the one hand, they called for a civil-military dialogue, using a more institutional language. On the other, they took upon themselves the task of reorganizing the official party, in order to accomplish the still-unfulfilled objective of the "total unification of the Colorado Party in government." Thus, during most of the second half of 1991, the military became actively involved in different stages of the official party's campaign for the Constituent Assembly elections of December 1, 1991.


Finally, the military intensified its efforts in favor of the official party, through direct intervention of recently retired generals like the former ministers of Defense and of the Interior, who now undertook to serve as liaisons between the Party and the Armed Forces. Furthermore, some military officers on active duty were assigned to the computer center of the Central Electoral Board, which was charged with preparing the electoral register for the upcoming elections.¹¹ In addition, soldiers and officers of all ranks participated directly in the mobilization and transportation of Colorado voters to the polls in the countryside. This direct military involvement --not evident in the previous two elections-- may be seen as a determinate and, ultimately successful attempt to reestablish the old triad of the Armed Forces, the government, and the Colorado Party. With the military's logistical and personnel support and the expertise of a Brazilian consulting group, in the December 1, 1991 election, the Colorados obtained 409,730 (55.10%) votes, winning 122 (out of 198) of the seats and therefore an absolute majority in the Assembly. The remaining 76 seats were distributed among the opposition thus: the PLRA obtained 201,040 (27%), winning 55 seats; the newly formed independent movement *Constitución Para Todos* (CPT) obtained 81,860 (11%), winning 19 seats; the *Partido Revolucionario Febrerista* (PRF) 9,140 (1.2%) and the *Partido Demócrata Cristiano* (PDC) 6,316 (0.8%) votes respectively, winning one seat each.¹²

Other factors which also contributed to the official party's resounding victory included the general apathy of the electorate, as reflected in the rather low turn-out of voters. Out of the 1,438,543 registered voters, only 743,546 (51.69%) actually voted; the fragmentation of the opposition; and the poor organization of the strongest opposition party, the PLRA, whose voting

strength decreased from 33.33% in the municipal elections to only 27.00% in the Constituent Assembly elections (Arditi, 1992:138).¹³

Although the Constitutional Assembly was controlled by the Colorados, the new Constitution was far more democratic than the previous one written under Stroessner. This success was largely due to the negotiations --however limited-- which took place between Colorados and opposition representatives. However, regarding all controversial issues which could have affected the official party and/or the military, the Colorados voted consistently to protect the interests of the newly reestablished alliance between the official party and the military.

Thus --with notably few exceptions-- they voted at the Constituent Assembly against the right of Paraguayan citizens living abroad to vote. They defeated the system of "ballotage" (run-off election) proposed by the opposition, which would have allowed another election between the two front-runners among all presidential candidates in the event that none of the candidates achieved a majority of over 50%. They approved an ambiguous formulation of the constitutional norm by which the President is nominally the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, while the Commander of military forces is the real holder of power in that post.



PART II

The New Rules of Political Participation

IV. FORM OF STATE

As a result of the political opening initiated after the overthrow of Stroessner in 1989, the authoritarian form of the Paraguayan state has been replaced by one which in some important respects approximates a democratic one. The state now guarantees freedom of speech and association and individual civil and political rights. It incorporates a new and more liberal framework aimed at institutionalizing democratic practices through competitive elections, representation, and checks and balances.

In its opening article, the new constitution states that

The Republic of Paraguay adopts representative, participatory and pluralist democracy for its government, founded in the recognition of human dignity.

As is known, however, a constitution is simply a political framework which delineates 'how power is distributed but not how it is used' (Derbyshire and Derbyshire, 1989:12). For Paraguay, as in the case of many other 'emergent democracies,' "the armed forces remain watchdog arbiters, influential in the background, who may be tempted to reassert direct control in the near future if the democratization process moves ahead in a direction which sharply conflicts with their own interests."¹⁴ In Part III of this report, we will discuss this in more detail and show how in fact prospects for the consolidation of democracy in Paraguay are being frustrated by the open intervention of the military in the political process on behalf of the ruling party.

V. ELECTORAL SYSTEM

According to the new Paraguayan Constitution,

"The suffrage is a right, a duty and a public act of the voter. It constitutes the base of the democratic and representative regime. It is founded in the universal, free, direct, equal and secret vote; in the public and supervised count, and, in the system of proportional representation." (Art. 118)

For the first time since 1928, electoral politics in Paraguay becomes a relevant element in the process of democratization. The widespread public interest in the first contested presidential election in Paraguay since 1928 was heightened by the profound changes incorporated into the Paraguayan electoral system.

The current Paraguayan electoral system is codified by a new Electoral Code passed into law in 1990 (Ley N^o 01/90)¹⁵, to replace the one used under Stroessner since 1981 (Ley N^o

886/81) and for the last time by Gen. Rodríguez in the May 1, 1989 election. Substantive changes were introduced in the new Electoral Code at three levels: (1) in the election procedures for candidates running for public office; (2) in the internal organization of political parties and the formation of political movements and alliances; (3) in the official electoral bodies in charge of coordinating the electoral process.

A. *Election Procedures*

For the Executive office, the Electoral Code (in accordance with the mandate of the new Paraguayan Constitution) requires presidential candidates to be civilians, prohibits their reelection,¹⁶ and no longer makes religious affiliation a requirement.¹⁷ It also restored the office of the vice-president, absent since 1940. The presidential and the vice-presidential candidates must run on the same ticket and are elected to office through a direct vote by obtaining a simple plurality of the electorate (Article 230, constitution; Article 256, electoral code). The new Constitution has thereby eliminated the possibility of a run-off election in the case that no candidate obtains an absolute majority.¹⁸

For Congress, senators and deputies are elected by a direct vote of the electorate through the party list system of proportional representation.¹⁹ For the selection of members of the Upper Chamber, the national territory is treated as a single electoral jurisdiction and therefore all senators run "at large," in that they do not represent any particular geographical or politico-administrative constituency, but rather the totality of the country's electorate.

On the other hand, for the selection of the members of the Lower Chamber, deputies are elected by departments and are considered departmental representatives.²⁰ The number of seats for each department is based on the number of registered voters.²¹

The distribution of seats for both chambers is based on the proportion of votes cast for each party list using the d'Hont system (Articles 221, 223 of the Constitution and 273 of the Electoral Code).

The new Constitution created the office of governor and departmental legislatures. Governors are to be elected in the same fashion as the President and the members of the departmental legislatures are to be elected in the same fashion as the deputies (Article 161).

B. *Organization of Political Parties*

Some important changes were introduced respecting the internal organization of political parties. These changes were aimed at institutionalizing and democratizing the two main political parties of the country: The *Asociación Nacional Republicana* (ANR), also known as *Partido Colorado*, and the *Partido Liberal Radical Auténtico* (PLRA), also known simply as *Partido Liberal*. The ruling

Colorado Party, in exchange for power, had under the Stroessner regime submitted to the authority of the dictator and had no experience in internal democratic elections. The *Partido Liberal*, which opposed Stroessner's authority, had been declared outlawed and forced to operate semi-clandestinely, and therefore had little space for public deliberation.²²

Political parties were required to revise their statutes and adapt them (where necessary) to the mandates of the new Electoral Code.²³ Perhaps the most significant change involved the procedures for the selection of party authorities and the nomination of candidates for public office: whereas previously selection had been made by delegates in party conventions, now both matters had to be decided through a direct vote by party affiliates (Art. 34^o).

Other important changes included the stipulation of voting age for party affiliation,²⁴ maintenance of an updated register of party affiliates by districts, to be monitored by the electoral judiciary (Art.51^o); and prohibition of compulsory affiliation (Art.44^o.1.c), which as mentioned before, was the common practice of the ruling party.²⁵

The Electoral Code also allowed for the formation of electoral movements, independent candidacies and political alliances outside conventional party structures.²⁶

One of the most important changes in the Electoral Code (later sanctioned by the Constitution) was the explicit prohibition of affiliation to political parties by members of the Armed Forces and the Police (Art.47^o.2.d). The Code added that "any member of the Armed Forces and the police on active duty who has been affiliated to a party or political movement before the promulgation of the current Code, will abstain from any partisan activity," (Art.49^o). In other words, although the practice of affiliation was eliminated by law, it did not proscribe it retroactively; as a result the security apparatus of the State remains in effect affiliated to the ruling party. The consequences of this will be discussed in detail in Part III of this report.

C. *Electoral Bodies*

With the purpose of strengthening the judiciary power, the new Constitution introduced significant changes in the selection process for members of the electoral bodies by insuring its impartiality and autonomy as well as in the functions to be performed by them.

According to the 1992 Constitution, the entity in charge of the coordination and judgement of elections would be the **Electoral Judiciary**, a jurisdictional dependency of the Judicial Power. The Electoral Judiciary would be formed by a **Superior Tribunal of Electoral Justice** (*Tribunal Superior de Justicia Electoral*). The procedures for the selection of members of this body and for its functioning were to be codified in a law written by the Congress elected for the 1993-1998 period. This, however, created a lacuna, or "temporal impasse" for the period between the moment the new Constitution came into force (June 20, 1992) and the moment the new Congress,

began to operate (June 30, 1993).

This situation created confusion and debate over who should organize and coordinate the coming national elections. When in August, 1992, the members of the Electoral Tribunal of Asunción (*Tribunal Electoral de la Capital*) took upon themselves these functions, on the grounds that it represented a non-partisan dependency of the Judicial Power, the Supreme Court (which is overwhelmingly controlled by Colorado judges) ruled against the Electoral Tribunal of Asunción and in favor of the Central Electoral Board (*Junta Electoral Central*).²⁷ With this act, it became clear that the electoral tribunals, generally considered the most impartial, were to play a merely decorative role, and exercise no power of decision whatsoever. After this conflict, but clearly with ulterior political motives, ostensibly in order to harmonize the Electoral Code with the mandates of the new constitution, Congress passed a law (Law Nº 75) on November 12, 1992 to overcome the temporal impasse. It provided as follows:

TRANSITORY PROVISIONS

Article 2º Extends the term of validity and operation of the Central Electoral Board, the District Electoral Boards, and the Electoral Tribunals until the organization and operation of the Electoral Judiciary contemplated in Section V "Of the Electoral Judiciary," established by Articles 273, 274 and 275 of the National Constitution.

Article 3º For the elections of President and Vice-President of the Republic, Members of the National Congress, Governors and Departmental Legislatures, the Central Electoral Board (*Junta Electoral Central*) will carry out the count of the votes in all the country. At its conclusion, the board will send the records to the National Congress to determine the validity of the election results in conformity with what is authorized in Article 6º of the "Final and Transitory Provisions" of the National Constitution. Consequently, for the general elections of May 9, 1993, the norm established in Article 238 of this Law will not apply.²⁸

The section on "Final and Transitory Provisions" of the Electoral Code provides as follows:

"Art.362º.-1. Until the general elections for the selection of members of the Central Electoral Board are carried out, it will remain composed of the members nominated by the political parties and confirmed by the Honorable Chamber of Deputies in the proportion corresponding to the votes obtained for the representation in the National Congress in the last general elections.

2. The District Electoral Boards will be composed of the members nominated by the political parties and confirmed by the Central Electoral Board, in the same proportion as above."

As a result of the above, the official electoral body entrusted with the organization, coordination, control, and implementation of the entire electoral process for the May 9, 1993 election would be the Central Electoral Board (*Junta Electoral Central*) and the final decision on those elections would be in the hands of the Congress.

The Central Electoral Board would also be in charge of coordinating the registration of

voters and organizing and updating the Permanent Civic Register (*Registro Electoral Permanente*). The implementation of the mandate of the Central Electoral Board would be carried out at local level by the District Electoral Boards (*Juntas Electorales Seccionales*), which functioned as auxiliary electoral bodies.²⁹

The temporary impasse discussed above was not the product of an unanticipated loophole. The relevance of all of these juridical technicalities should be understood as an astute maneuver of the ruling party, which took advantage of the majority it had obtained through a non-democratic constitution (1977) and election.

The majority of the voting members of the Central Electoral Board and its local branches are Colorados, as are the members of the public service at its disposal. Furthermore, since membership on the Central Electoral Board was reserved only for parties with parliamentary representation, it excluded other new parties and movements, among them one of the major electoral contenders of the past May elections, the *Alianza Encuentro Nacional* (AEN).

The fact that the old Congress --elected in 1989, with a two thirds Colorado majority-- was endowed with a mandate to pass judgement on the 1993 National Elections, further guaranteed Colorado control of the electoral process.

D. *Elective Posts*

Interest in the presidential election in Paraguay should not obscure the fact that a total of 310 elective posts were simultaneously being contested, all of them for a five year-term (1993-1998). These included 125 seats in congress, 45 senators for the Upper Chamber and 80 deputies for the Lower Chamber, and at the departmental level, 17 governorships and 167 seats in the departmental legislatures.³⁰

E. *Electorate and Electoral Register*

According to the 1992 Constitution, all Paraguayan citizens of voting age (18 years or older) living in the national territory are eligible to vote (Art. 120). In conformity with this provision, a law was passed (Law N° 39) suppressing the article of the Electoral Code that had allowed Paraguayans living abroad to vote.³¹

The only personal document valid for demonstrating entitlement to register and to vote is the Police Identification Card (*Cédula de Identidad Policial*). In order to encourage people to register to vote, a law was passed (Law N°11/91) which made the ID free of charge for the first time (Art.82).

According to the most recent population census (1992), the number of eligible voters for the 1993 election should not have exceeded 2.2 million people. After the closing date for voters'

registration (October 30, 1992), 1,698,984 persons were eligible to vote in the May 9, 1993 elections. This figure represents a 77.95% registration rate [see Table I].³²

VI. ELECTORAL CONTENDERS

A. *Political Parties and Movements*

Fourteen parties and political movements presented candidates for the various public offices contested in the national elections of May 9, 1993 [see Figure I].

FIGURE I. Parties and Political Movements: May 9, 1993 National Elections in Paraguay

NAME OF PARTY OR MOVEMENT	ACRONYM	NUMBER	COLOR
Asociación Nacional Republicana	ANR	1	Red
Partido Liberal Radical Auténtico	PLRA	2	Blue
Concertación Democrática y Social	CDS	4	Orange
Partido Liberal	PL	5	Gray
Partido Blanco	PB	6	Brown
Partido de los Trabajadores	PT	7	Beige
Partido Nacional Socialista	PNS	8	Lavender
Alianza Encuentro Nacional	AEN	9	Purple
Movimiento Amplio de Participación Nacional	MAPN	10	Yellow
Movimiento Político Democrático 26 de Mayo	MPD 26	11	Pink
Movimiento Político Social Progresista	MPSP	12	Green
Movimiento Político Regional Unidad Nacional	MPRUNA	13	Light Brown
Movimiento Político Regional Concepción de Todos	MPRCT	14	Light Yellow
Movimiento Político Regional Popular Paranaense	MPRPP	15	Copper

Of the 14 parties which entered the electoral race, only three presented candidates for all elective posts: ANR, PLRA and AEN.

Nine parties or movements presented candidates for the presidential race. The official ballot contained the following information: last names of the presidential and vice-presidential candidates with their photographs and the acronyms, numbers and color of the parties or movements nominating them. Clearly, for the design of the ballot consideration was given to the fact that Paraguay has a very high illiteracy rate [see Figure II].³³

TABLE I. Population of Paraguay (1992) and Registered Voters for the May 9, 1993 National Elections in Paraguay (by Departments)

DEPARTMENTS	Total Population [%Tot.Pop.]	Voting Age Population [*] 18 and + [%Tot.Vot.Age Pop.]	Registered Voters [%Tot.Reg.Voters]	%of voting age population that registered to vote
ASUNCION (Capital)	502,426 [12.18%]	320,516 (14.70%)	276,094 (16.25%)	86.14%
CONCEPCION	166,946 [4.05%]	78,467 (3.60%)	55,276 (3.25%)	70.44%
SAN PEDRO	277,110 [6.72%]	130,237 (5.98%)	96,717 (5.69%)	74.26%
CORDILLERA	206,097 [5.00%]	108,081 (4.96%)	100,295 (5.90%)	92.80%
GUAIRA	162,244 [3.93%]	82,731 (3.80%)	69,853 (4.11%)	84.43%
CAAGUAZU	383,319 [9.30%]	184,821 (8.48%)	138,526 (8.15%)	74.95%
CAAZAPA	128,550 [3.12%]	60,598 (2.78%)	46,375 (2.73%)	76.53%
ITAPUA	375,748 [9.11%]	180,914 (8.30%)	137,956 (8.12%)	76.26%
MISIONES	88,624 [2.15%]	44,374 (2.04%)	42,120 (2.48%)	94.92%
PARAGUARI	203,012 [4.92%]	106,209 (4.87%)	92,008 (5.42%)	86.63%
ALTO PARANA	403,858 [9.79%]	208,322 (9.56%)	131,584 (7.74%)	63.16%
CENTRAL	864,540 [20.97%]	485,889 (22.29%)	382,494 (22.51%)	78.72%
ÑEEMBUCU	69,884 [1.69%]	38,879 (1.78%)	35,241 (2.07%)	90.64%
AMAMBAY	97,158 [2.36%]	48,672 (2.23%)	35,707 (2.10%)	73.36%
CANINDEYU	96,826 [2.35%]	48,720 (2.24%)	22,016 (1.30%)	45.19%
PTE. HAYES	59,100 [1.43%]	31,750 (1.46%)	23,144 (1.36%)	72.89%
ALTO PARAGUAY	11,816 [0.29%]	5,927 (0.27%)	5,263 (0.31%)	88.80%
BOQUERON	26,292 [0.64%]	14,490 (0.66%)	8,315 (0.49%)	57.38%
TOTAL	4,123,550 [100.00%]	2,179,597 (100.00%)	1,698,984 (100.00%)	77.95%

*These figures are inflated since they include non-citizens who by law cannot vote

Sources: Tabulations based on the official results provided by the *Junta Electoral Central* (JEC) for the May 9, 1993 general elections in Paraguay and *Censo Nacional de Población y Viviendas 1992 (Cifras Provisorias)*, 1992. Asunción: DGEEC.

FIGURE II. Official Ballot for the May 9, 1993 Presidential/Vicepresidential Elections in Paraguay

ELECCIONES GENERALES

Presidente - Vice Presidente

PERIODO 1993 - 1998

WASMOSY 1 SEIFART
1
ANR
 PARTIDO COLORADO

MARQUE AQUI

LAINO 2 BENITEZ
2
PLRA
 PARTIDO LIBERAL RADICAL AUTENTICO

MARQUE AQUI

CANESSE 4 MONTANER
4
CDS
 ALIANZA CONCERT DEMOC SOCIAL

MARQUE AQUI

ZAPAG 5 PEREZ
5
PL
 PARTIDO LIBERAL

MARQUE AQUI

ARCE 7 ACOSTA
7
PT
 PARTIDO DE LOS TRABAJADORES

MARQUE AQUI

IBANEZ 8 GARCIA
8
PNS
 PARTIDO NACIONAL SOCIALISTA

MARQUE AQUI

CABALLERO 9 BRUSQUETTI
9
EN
 ALIANZA ENCUENTRO NACIONAL

MARQUE AQUI

CAVALARI 10 BETSCHLER
10
MAPN
 MOVIMIENTO POPULAR DE PARTES

MARQUE AQUI

PRIETO 12 BENITEZ
12
MPSP
 MOVIMIENTO POL SOCIAL PROGRES

MARQUE AQUI

1. Major Political Parties and Movements

Major parties identified with a particular class or any other form of interest group, whether from the right or the left, cannot be found in Paraguay. If the two main political forces of the country, the *Asociación Nacional Republicana* (ANR) and the *Partido Liberal Radical Auténtico* (PLRA) draw heavily from the rural sectors, it is only to the extent that Paraguay is a heavily rural country.³⁴

The ANR and the PLRA are Paraguay's so-called "traditional" political parties (both parties having been founded in 1887). They appeal to the masses by invoking the past through the deployment of emotionally-charged symbols such as the color of their banners (red and blue, respectively), by their popular polkas ("Colorado" and "18 de Octubre," respectively), and, most importantly, by the paternalistic and clientelistic practices they exchange for loyalty. The "traditional" epithet attached to these parties, however, has been overworked. The allegedly unshakable family loyalty to party is an exaggeration, particularly since the middle of the 20th century. In fact, under Stroessner, the Colorado Party became a prototype of a patronage political association; party cross-overs (specifically, becoming member of the Colorado Party) became a prerequisite for securing a job for a large sector of the population and, among middle and upper class Paraguayans, for increasing one's patrimony. As a matter of expediency, even prominent political figures from the *Partido Liberal* (PL), *Partido Revolucionario Febrerista* (PRF) or the *Partido Demócrata Cristiano* (PDC) switched to the Colorados.³⁵

Both "traditional" parties are multi-class and share some salient traits with what Dix (1989) calls 'catch-all' parties. That is, "they are nonideological and pragmatic, and they successfully mobilize the support of a broad array of groups and social classes, from landowners and industrialists to shopkeepers, peasants, and workers." However, as Dix correctly notes, the two major Paraguayan parties are not strictly catch-all since for electoral purposes they rely more on the mobilization of committed constituencies, rather than on appealing to the uncommitted and undecided voters.³⁶

Furthermore, in line with recent political trends in the region, Paraguay has also experienced the formation of 'independent' political movements, primarily of an electoral nature. The *Alianza Encuentro Nacional* (AEN) has emerged as Paraguay's major challenger to the more than century-old hegemony of the 'traditional' parties.

Asociación Nacional Republicana (ANR)³⁷

In the political spectrum, the ANR, more commonly known as the *Partido Colorado*, amounts to a right-to-center populist party.

The ANR has been Paraguay's ruling party since 1947. For length of time in power it is

surpassed in the Western Hemisphere only by Mexico's *Partido Revolucionario Institucional* (PRI). The ANR gained power after winning the 1947 Civil War. Previously, the Colorado Party as a formal political organization had been in power from 1890 to 1904. Originally it closely resembled its 'traditional' adversary, the Liberal Party (Velázquez, 1990). But during the 1930s and 1940s the party departed dramatically from its liberal identity in favor of a nationalist-corporatist one in which state intervention became central to its program for re-organizing society (Lewis, 1980: 148; Seiferheld, 1985:45-46).

The Colorado Party experienced its first important split under Stroessner in 1959 when he purged a faction of the party leadership interested in democratizing the country. This group in exile later formed the *Movimiento Popular Colorado* (MOPOCO).³⁸ With the motto "democracy within and outside the party," they challenged Stroessner, were arrested and many of them tortured and sent to exile in 1959. They joined the *Partido Liberal Radical Auténtico* (PLRA), *Partido Revolucionario Febrerista* (PRF) and the *Partido Demócrata Cristiano* (PDC) in forming in Buenos Aires, in 1979, an anti-dictatorial alliance called *Acuerdo Nacional* (National Accord). After the 1989 coup, the exiled Colorados returned and joined the ranks of the Party. Without strong base in Paraguay, however, they were soon absorbed and practically disappeared. The second and last major split of the party under the Stroessner regime occurred in 1987.³⁹

The party became divided into two main factions: the *Militantes*, who tied the future of the Party to Stroessner and his family, and the *Tradicionalistas*, who were concerned to project a more flexible future for the Party. This split has been pointed out as a major political turning point which ultimately signaled the collapse of the Stroessner regime (Riquelme and Martini, 1988; Arditi, 1992). The *Tradicionalistas* supported the military coup of 1989 and became the power base of General Rodríguez' administration. In the aftermath of the coup, the most prominent *Militantes* were removed from power, and some were prosecuted and jailed for illicit enrichment. It should be mentioned however, that the vast majority of the *Militantes* became active during the 1992 Colorado primaries.⁴⁰

The party structure of the ANR is organized under a central governing board (*Junta de Gobierno*) that supervises local branches, known as *seccionales*, which cover the entire national territory. Although the ANR is a multi-class party, it draws heavy support from a rural constituency. Party support is based almost exclusively on affiliated membership. But it also draws support from the civil and military bureaucracies. This is a result of the pre-1989 requirement of affiliation with the party for all individuals seeking public employment, a practice which continued during the first few months of the Wasmosy administration. Since the state is one of the major employers in Paraguay, with 121,971 employees in 1989, it also underwrites a very significant proportion of the support base of the ANR, whose membership for 1991 was

estimated at 650,000.⁴¹

As Arditì (1992:163-164) puts it:

...the bureaucracy and the state apparatuses became the exclusive terrain of *coloradismo* and the document of affiliation became a practically unavoidable requirement for gaining access to a career in public administration, the teaching profession or the judiciary. In other words, the relation between the Colorado Party and the public power was similar to that of the Party-State identity characteristic of fascist and Leninist thought and practice.

In light of this situation, it is not clear how much of the Party's support comes from tradition, as is often alleged, and how much of it is the product of coercion and patronage. Given its patronage character, not surprisingly, the Colorados are a party with a strong statist orientation.

In order to keep their employment, public servants were required to 'contribute' to the Party coffer as well as to support it at the ballot box. Although compulsory deductions from state employees' salaries is now banned by law, there remains a strong element of coercion for state employees to continue offering 'voluntary' contributions.

Even though the Colorado Party has been forced to adapt to important changes since the coup, the Armed Forces-Party pact and Party utilization of State resources remain (see Arditì: 1992). Moreover, authoritarian practices still distinguish the behavior of the party leadership, which has demonstrated its inability to resolve its internal differences through democratic means.

Partido Liberal Radical Auténtico (PLRA)

Although established in 1977, the PLRA claims for itself the banner of authentic Paraguayan liberalism and traces its roots to the original Liberal Party founded in 1887. In fact, today the PLRA is the product of a series of splits experienced by the original Liberal Party during the Stroessner era.

Before the Liberal Party became divided, it was in office from 1904 to 1936 and from 1937 to 1940. During this period it had eight constitutionally elected presidents. Of these, only three completed their mandate, four were overthrown and one died while in office.

In 1942 General Higinio Morínigo ordered the Liberal party's legal dissolution until 1946. Following its defeat in the civil war of 1947, the party was once again outlawed and most of its leadership sent into exile. In response to pressures from the United States government to liberalize the political scene, the Stroessner regime allowed a small faction of Liberals to operate legally as a political party. This group was recognized in the 1963 presidential elections as the Liberal Party (PL), but was opposed by the larger abstentionist faction of the Liberal Party in exile. In 1967, however, with the announcement of an election for a constitutional convention to draft

a new constitution, the abstentionist and exiled Liberals sought recognition from the government and were legalized under the name of Radical Liberal Party (PLR). In 1977, when Stroessner called for a constitutional amendment which would allow him to be reelected as many times as he wished, the PL and the PLR went along with Stroessner and became the loyal opposition until the overthrow of the regime. The same year (1977), however, an important faction decided no longer to participate in the elections and formed the PLRA, which was declared outlawed by the regime (Morínigo & Silvero: 1986).

The PLRA participated for the first time in an election on May 1, 1989. As a result of that election, the PLRA became the unquestioned major electoral force among the various liberal parties and the opposition as a whole.

Like the Colorado Party, the PLRA is a multi-class party with a strong base in the countryside and the cities of the interior. It is registered as a member of the Progressive Liberal International. Ideologically, the party has been described as being in the center-left of the political spectrum (Kafka: 1989).

Party membership is by individual affiliation. The Party's membership by the end of 1992 was reported to be 468,863.⁴² The PLRA has a central governing board (*Directorio*) and party branches, called *comités*, covering the entire national territory and several cities abroad (mainly in Argentina and Brazil).

Alianza Encuentro Nacional (AEN)

The AEN is a newly created political movement based on a coalition of factions of other parties and movements which aspired to break the century-old monopoly of the 'traditional' rivals on the Paraguayan political scene. AEN became a reality as a result of the resounding victory of the independent movement *Asunción Para Todos* (APT) in the May 26, 1991 municipal elections in the city of Asunción.

AEN made important inroads among the urban middle-class, the intellectuals and all those disenchanted with the traditional parties; most of its leadership was made up of 'tecnopolíticos.' However, this political movement owes its creation primarily to its main figure, Guillermo Caballero Vargas, a business magnate. According to AEN's Chief of Campaign for the May 9, 1993 election, ideologically the alliance approximates a social-democratic movement.⁴³

The AEN's platform was similar to that of the two major parties, with somewhat more emphasis on progressive social policies to improve the lot of the peasants and urban workers. The AEN itself was largely an urban-based middle-class movement that appealed to independent voters. Many of these had avoided politics during Stroessner's dictatorship. Quite a few were young and distrustful of the two major parties. Consequently, they were open to an appeal from

a "progressive" centrist movement which was able to mount a political campaign based on enormous financial resources and sophisticated marketing.

This political movement is more easily distinguished by what it is not than by what it is. This of course is understandable in a new entity which capitalizes on the discontent of an important urban middle-class sector of the population with the traditional parties.

The AEN includes factions from the *Partido Revolucionario Febrerista* (PRF), *Asunción Para Todos* (APT), *Unidad Social Cristiana* and a "Colorado fringe" made up of dissident members of the ruling party.

2. Minor Political Parties and Movements

Concertación Democrática y Social (CDS)

The CDS is a left-wing movement created for the May electoral contest that incorporated some known figures from other minor parties and movements that did not run for these elections, especially from the *Partido Revolucionario Febrerista* (PRF), the *Partido Demócrata Cristiano* (PDC) and *Asunción Para Todos* (APT).

Partido Liberal (PL)

The PL (not to be confused with the old Liberal Party that joined the PLRA after the May 1, 1989, elections) is a right-wing party created for the May electoral contest.⁴⁴ Its leader and presidential candidate was a businessman.

Partido de los Trabajadores (PT)

The PT (Worker's Party) is a class-based left-wing Trotskyite internationalist party created in 1989. It did not participate in the 1989 presidential race, but in 1991 did present official candidates for the municipal and the National assembly elections.

Partido Nacional Socialista (PNS)

Perhaps the most noticeable aspect of this recently formed party is its name: the National Socialist Party. Although this is the same name as that of the German Nazi Party, it appears that this is all this party shares with it.

Movimiento Amplio de Participación Nacional (MAPN)

The MAPN (Movement of Broad National Participation), is a left-wing nationalist coalition created for the May election.⁴⁵

Movimiento Político Social Progresista (MPSP)

Although there is not very much information available on this political movement, its leader and presidential candidate was a prominent Stroessnerist ideologist of the Colorado Party.

All of the remaining parties and political movements were strictly regional, appealing to the popular sectors. No specific information is available concerning them.⁴⁶

B. *Presidential and Vice-Presidential Candidates*

Asociación Nacional Republicana (ANR)

Presidential Candidate

Juan Carlos Wasmosy, 54 years old, civil engineer. Businessman, cattle rancher, and prominent figure of the powerful *Asociación Rural del Paraguay*. He had served as Minister of Integration in the Rodríguez administration. Not known as a politician, he had never held a post in the Colorado Party.

Vice-Presidential Candidate

Angel Roberto Seifart, 51 years old, lawyer. Cattle rancher and also a prominent figure of the *Asociación Rural del Paraguay*. Unlike his running mate, Seifart is an important figure in the Colorado Party. He was a congressman for 10 years during the Stroessner regime. In the 1987 Colorado Party internal struggle, he sided with the "Tradicionalista" faction. Under Rodríguez's mandate he was elected congressman and subsequently appointed Minister of Education. He is member of the governing board of the Colorado Party and is known as a Party hard-liner.

Selection Process

The Colorados entered the race badly divided and worried about losing control of the government after 45 years in power. They had been shocked by losing the May 26, 1991, municipal elections in Asunción and other major cities and were also concerned about the adverse effects of Paraguay's sluggish economy on their chances.

Since General Rodríguez had promised not to seek reelection --the new Constitution banned him from running anyway--, there was a scramble to obtain the official Colorado nomination. One possibility was Luís María Argaña, Supreme Court Justice under Stroessner and Minister of Foreign Relations under Rodríguez, who had the backing of many hard-line Colorados, some of whom had been close to the deposed dictator. Although an earlier supporter of the Rodríguez administration, Argaña's public defiance of the authority of Rodríguez (which resulted in Argaña's removal from his post) together with his campaign to de-

militarize the Colorado Party (while not "de-coloradizing" the military) made his candidacy unacceptable both to Rodríguez and to the Armed Forces.

Argaña officially announced in July, 1992, his intention to run for the Colorado presidential nomination. For the election of authorities to the governing board of the ANR in August, 1992, Argaña gave his support to the list headed by Carlos Romero Pereira. This internal election of the ANR, the first one carried out under the provisions of the new Electoral Code, divided Colorados into two main camps: "*Rodriguistas*" and "*Anti-Rodriguistas*." The former was headed by Blás N. Riquelme and the latter by Argaña. Argaña sought to disassociate himself from the former by charging that "currently the country is not ruled by the Colorado Party but by an elite group of a capitalist-liberal ideology."⁴⁷

However, these internal party elections of August, 1992, strengthened Rodríguez's position. With the resounding victory of his candidate, Blás N. Riquelme (who obtained 38.4% of the Colorado vote) and the distant fourth-place obtained by Argaña's man, Carlos Romero Pereira (who obtained 18.6% of the vote)⁴⁸ Rodríguez was able to promote the candidacy of a relative unknown, Juan Carlos Wasmosy. The latter was a businessman with little political experience, but with plenty of money derived from construction contracts for the Itaipú dam. He was not the natural choice of the old party bosses, but arm-twisting by Rodríguez and promises of prominent places on the official ticket brought most of them around. In fact, the newly elected president of the ANR declared that,

"...Wasmosy was not the ideal candidate for the Colorado Party because he had no track record within it."⁴⁹

To strengthen Wasmosy's candidacy, the nomination as his running mate, was offered to the candidate who had received the next-highest total of votes as the ANR's candidate for the presidency. It was hoped that Seifart's high profile as a party hard-liner would balance out that of the businessman without a history of activism in the party.

Why then select Wasmosy? It has been suggested that:

Wasmosy represents the continuation of the power-structure that served as the basis of Stroessnerism --that is, of the collaboration among the Armed Forces, dominant economic interests and Colorado elites--. His business profile is useful to this triad in its confrontation with what polls show to be its main adversary, namely, the *Encuentro Nacional* and its candidate Guillermo Caballero Vargas, who is receiving enough support from the disenchanted Colorado electorate to arouse fears that a strong migration of Colorado voters could take place.⁵⁰

The primary election to choose the party's candidates for president and vice-president was scheduled for November 15, 1992. Because of violence and irregularities in the campaign, however, the election was postponed to December 27, 1992.

Polls in November indicated that Argaña would win the nomination by a 7.1 point

margin over Wasmosy.⁵¹ By coincidence or conspiracy, during the month of the party primaries, out of the blue, the archives of Stroessner's secret police, were made public. Allegedly their public release was intended to damage the image of Argaña since during his tenure as president of the Supreme Court of Justice –during which some of the worst atrocities against human rights were committed by the Stroessner regime-- he was responsible for denying all petitions for habeas corpus, ignoring reports of tortures and refusing to prosecute anyone identified with criminal acts of repression.⁵²

Despite all this, however, and running against the candidates endorsed by General Rodríguez, the Armed Forces, and the president of the ANR, the Argaña-Ibáñez team managed to defeat the Wasmosy-Seifart team with a comfortable margin in the December 27 election. The unofficial result gave Argaña-Ibáñez ticket 49.66% (213,482 votes) and the Wasmosy-Seifart ticket 43.30% (186,116 votes).⁵³ Insistent rumors of a coup to annul the primary result only died away after strong representations, both public and private, were made by the United States ambassador. On January 2, 1993, all Paraguayan newspapers printed a statement from the Embassy warning that the United States did not approve of coups and would not recognize a *de facto* government [see Annex C].

Accordingly, the Wasmosy faction (with the full backing of Rodríguez) pursued a 'non-violent' strategy for getting the result changed.⁵⁴ Wasmosy claimed fraud and asked the Party's electoral tribunal to annul the result. When the judges of the Colorado Electoral Tribunal hesitated, they were pressured to resign. Thereupon the Wasmosy faction demanded an extraordinary party convention to select a new tribunal. That was held in February, 1993, and produced the desired outcome, although it remains curious that the number of votes cast was larger than the number of convention delegates. On March 4, "the Colorado Electoral Tribunal imposed by *Wasmosismo* granted the victory to the Wasmosy-Seifart team after secret sessions in which the representatives of List 4 (*Argañistas*) did not participate."⁵⁵ Thus, Wasmosy secured the nomination of the Colorado Party, more than two months after the primary election. Now it was the Argaña faction's turn to protest. Argaña announced that he would not support the Colorado ticket. Just how his supporters would vote became one of the important unknowns of the campaign.

The strongest criticisms made against the official candidate came from within his own party. The defeated Argaña did not give Wasmosy a minute of peace during his short campaign and called on Colorados not to vote for him because to do so would mean to support the "candidacy of the fraud." Furthermore, he questioned Wasmosy's past as a businessman who had made a fortune on the Itaipú project, and stressed his alleged affiliation with the Liberal Party. The latter earned him the nickname of "*mbatará*" which in Guaraní stands for a chicken with

multicolored feathers (alluding to his previous association with a party of another color).

By December of 1992, the presidential candidates for all other political parties and movements had been officially selected. The sole straggler was the Colorado Party. The vicious struggle for the nomination in the Colorado Party had pernicious effects for the rest of the country,

The internal electoral process of the governing Colorado Party practically paralyzed the country. Public officials abandon their posts to proselytize; reports circulate of the indiscriminate use of state resources, for example, vehicles, on behalf of one of the candidates; virulent campaigns are waged in paid advertisements printed in the press, trading accusations of collaboration with the previous regime, of embezzlement, of corruption; highly-placed state officials who do not openly cast their support in favor of one of the candidates are disposed and replaced: taken together, these goings-on increase instability.⁵⁶

As a result of the internal disputes of the Colorados, the dead-line for registering candidates was extended until March 22, 1993.

Partido Liberal Radical Auténtico (PLRA)

Presidential Candidate

Domingo Laíno, 57 years old, economist. Elective Posts: Congressman for the PLR from 1967 to 1977 and Senator for the PLRA during the 1989-1993 period. Elected to the Constituent Assembly which drafted Paraguay's current Constitution. Presidential candidate for the PLRA in the May 1, 1989 elections. Party Posts: Former president of the PLRA (1980-82 and 1988-90); currently, vice-president of the PLRA and of the Progressive Liberal International. Several times detained and tortured during the Stroessner regime. Deported to Argentina in 1982 and exiled until 1987.

Vice-Presidential Candidate

Juan Manuel Benítez Florentín, 56 years old, lawyer. Elected to the National Constitutional Assembly which drafted the 1967 and 1992 constitutions. Founding member of the PLRA, president of the party in 1982, 1990 and 1992. Several times detained and beaten during the Stroessner regime. Elected congressman for the 1989-1993 period.

Selection Process

The Liberals were much more united than the Colorados. By early 1991 most factions had set aside their differences and rallied behind the leadership of Domingo Laíno. Political analysts agree that throughout the transition, "the PLRA has distinguished itself as the party that has better managed its internal conflicts."⁵⁷ In the internal elections of the PLRA held in November 8, 1992, Laíno won the party nomination by a landslide, as expected.⁵⁸

Of the three main presidential candidates, Laíno was the only career politician and the only charismatic leader. He was also famous for his outspoken opposition during Stroessner's dictatorship. However, there was some concern regarding two issues: (a) whether he could rise above his image of a brave *caudillo* and assume the role of a statesman, and (b) whether the PLRA, under his leadership, would be able to attract and capture the independent vote beyond the one-third of the vote normally held by the PLRA. Despite these misgivings, no other Liberal could claim his stature, and his candidacy was a foregone conclusion. Instead of dissipating their energies in factional bickering, the Liberals concentrated on voter registration.

Alianza Encuentro Nacional (AEN)

Presidential Candidate

Guillermo Caballero Vargas, 49 years old, lawyer and businessman, and owner of Paraguay's major textile industry "Industrias Pilar," large landowner, with no prior political experience.

Vice-Presidential Candidate

María Victoria Brusquetti, 53 years old, businesswoman. Human rights activist, well connected with the hierarchy of the Catholic Church. Paraguayan delegate to several international conferences of the Christian Renovation Movement. Co-founder of DECIDAMOS, a non-governmental organization for Civic Education.

Selection Process

The electoral potential of an independent movement had been brilliantly demonstrated in May 26, 1991, when the newly-formed *Asunción Para Todos* (APT) won the capital's municipal elections. The lesson was underlined later that year when a similar movement *Constitución Para Todos* (CPT) got 11 percent of the vote in the December 1, 1991 election for delegates to the Constituent Assembly, nearly wiping out such traditional "third parties" as the *Partido Revolucionario Febrerista* (PRF) and the *Partido Demócrata Cristiano* (PDC).⁵⁹

Shortly after the elections for the Constituent Assembly, Guillermo Caballero Vargas, a highly-regarded businessman, announced his presidential candidacy. In the months that followed the *Alianza Encuentro Nacional* (AEN) took shape as the product of an alliance between reformist sectors of the Catholic Church, a trade union federation (*Central Unica de Trabajadores* -CUT), *Asunción Para Todos* (APT), a faction of the *Febreristas*, and of the *Demócrata Cristianos*. They were joined eventually by dissident Colorados and some Liberals. Unlike the two traditional parties, the AEN drew up its ticket through direct negotiations among its component factions, instead of

by holding primaries. An important feature in this ticket was the announcement that Caballero Vargas' running mate would be a woman. Thus, with the reestablishment of the vice-presidential figure by the 1992 Constitution, María Victoria Brusquetti became the first woman in Paraguayan history to aspire to this post.⁶⁰

C. *Party Platforms*⁶¹

Paraguay's politics are not characterized by sharp ideological divisions. The three major contenders in the May 9, 1993 election agreed in their platforms on the need to redefine and rationalize the functions of the state within the parameters of a market economy. State intervention would only be exercised as a complementary and corrective measure in the economy. They all agreed to different degrees on the need of privatizing State enterprises, and on political, administrative and territorial decentralization. Government policy would focus on improving the infrastructure of the country and the social conditions of the population. The parties favored the process of regional integration.⁶² Each expressed a commitment to the advancement of disadvantaged categories of the population, such as women and indigenous groups. Each expressed concern over the protection of the environment. Each declared a commitment to combat corruption. While there were no significant ideological differences in their platforms, nevertheless important differences in how certain controversial issues were treated or ignored set the platforms apart.

The ANR's platform made continual reference to the coherence of its program with the ideology and history of the Party, a gesture which no contending party felt obliged to make. Do so, however, did require adoption of a somewhat novel view of what that history might had been. In a passage of the Colorado government program, for instance, an interesting disclaimer is made:

Since its foundation and throughout its conduct in the National scene, the Colorado Party was not statist nor inimical towards private initiatives and investments (DIC, 1993:38).

In fact, the program even disassociated the party from policies implemented under previous Colorado governments, declaring that

the creation of the great official monopolies of the COPACAR, COPAL, the Joint Commission of Sugar Sales, the nationalization of the telephone, the control of the currency exchange rate, the rationing of the basic food stuffs and their fixed prices, were not works of Coloradismo but of the *Tiempista* corporatism of the 40s (DIC, 1993:39).

Such maneuvers are revealing indices of the party's predicament. On the one hand, the leadership felt it had to create an image that it was not against the principles of a market economy. On the other, it had to appease party members by assuring them that the Colorados were not becoming liberals. The latter has been one of the strongest points of contention and division among Colorados.

We propose to redirect the productive activities of the country towards a framework of market economy with equity, in which the State and the private sectors have complementary and specified spheres of action. We do not espouse a return to a superseded liberalism nor to the prevalence of a savage capitalism as some sectors of public opinion have (erroneously) declared (DIC, 1993:39).

The leadership was desperately concerned to calm party members who thought that supporting a free market meant firing public employees who are Colorados.

The AEN program pays attention to issues of social justice, including education, health, housing and employment. It adopts a non-conflictive approach to the past. That is, it calls for overcoming legacies of the previous regime without seriously questioning the wealth and power of those who benefitted from corruption.

According to its program, the main objective was to rebuild the foundations of the Republic by "profoundly transforming the basis itself of the institutional, political, economic, social, labor and cultural relations that have up to now constrained us" (Encuentro Nacional, 1993:13-14). The party proposed to carry out this transformation within the framework of the New Constitution.

The AEN states that "we have lived in the present century under the almost constant sign of fratricidal fights waged by the great traditional parties," and presented itself as the option for overcoming once and for all "the historical polarization of Paraguayans into two irreconcilable bands" (Encuentro Nacional, 1993:15-16).

Except in a few respects, the program appeared to be little more than a declaration of principles of administration. It made only passing references to such issues as the involvement of the Armed Forces in partisan activities, the scandal concerning Itaipú, and the recuperation of illegally obtained property.

The PLRA sought to highlight how different government could be under its administration by calling for the restructuring of political power on the basis of a complete autonomy vis-a-vis the Armed Forces, economic interests groups and party clientelism (DIC, 1993:81).

The Liberals offered --in their own words-- a government totally different from that of stroessnerism:

without corruption, without privileges, without a partisan Armed Forces, with truly new people and with social sensitivity (DIC, 1993:92).

Moreover the PLRA made explicit reference to four issues which the ruling Party and AEN dealt with only marginally:

Land Reform

Both ANR and AEN spoke of the need to rationalize the distribution and use of land within the framework of the Constitution. The PLRA considered this insufficient: after all, in the drafting of the new Constitution, the Colorados had an absolute majority. For the PLRA,

[t]he land reform will have as its pillars the recuperation of illegally obtained lands, the acquisition of property, the arrangement of the physical and institutional infrastructure and the settlement of peasants. Said reform will be of a structural nature and will have as its basis the fight against *latifundio* and a policy of employment creation" (DIC, 1993:85).

The Role of the Armed Forces

The PLRA was the party that most strongly emphasized the need for departisanisation of the military. The Paraguayan Armed Forces, it maintained, should be professional and hold themselves disengaged from politics. Furthermore, "all the privileges derived from a spurious conception of the role of the military will be abolished" (DIC, 1993:82-83).

Bilateral Treaties: the Itaipú Hydroelectric Plant

The Colorado candidate stated that Paraguay did not have the "moral authority" to renegotiate the Itaipú Treaty with Brazil.⁶³ The AEN took a technical approach to the issue. In contrast, the PLRA considered the treaty to constitute a political problem, in that it compromised the country's sovereignty. The Liberal candidate attacked the ruling party's candidate on this issue, singling out Wasmosy as one of the principles involved in the project.⁶⁴

The Liberal government will demand the fulfillment of the Itaipú Treaty and its renegotiation, as well as investigate the frauds committed around it (DIC, 1993:87).

One of the issues that Laíno exploited to impeach the character of the two other candidates had to do with the Itaipú Treaty. Asked in an interview why he thought the other candidates were not so committed as he to renegotiating the Itaipú Treaty with Brazil, Laíno responded that:

[it is] because both have great personal interests, with powerful groups formed in Itaipú. Both allegedly are receiving financing from those economic groups that form part of the powers that be and constitute a financial-business elite that became spectacularly wealthy in a short time with the corruption in Itaipú.

That group of privileged people hand-picked by the clientelistic and corrupt system of the dictatorship, accumulated fortunes without merit and wishes to maintain its privileges. Its members wish that crimes go on unpunished. That is why it bets a lot of money on the campaigns of *continuista* candidates that differ a little bit in their style, but that in reality are the same. To them not to speak about Itaipú is also another way of doing business, it is a guarantee of whitewashing and of protection."⁶⁵

Paraguayans Abroad

On this issue, the governing party had made it clear during the National Assembly that it had strong misgivings about what sort of rights Paraguayan expatriates should have. Exploiting its numeric majority in the National Assembly, the ANR blocked passage of the provision which would have allowed Paraguayan expatriates to vote in general elections, thus eliminating it from the Electoral Code. The AEN expressed interest only in the possibility of repatriating highly skilled Paraguayans from abroad.

Again in contrast, one of the PLRA's central themes throughout the transition has been the need to guarantee the welfare and secure the civil rights of Paraguayans living abroad. This insistence reflects the party's history: outlawed as a political organization, the PLRA survived to a great extent thanks to its bases abroad. Its platform declares:

In conformity with the mandate of its convention, the PLRA will propose the constitutional amendment in favor of the rights of Paraguayans living abroad; for the purpose of guaranteeing their vote in national elections, promoting the signing of treaties of dual nationality, encouraging the voluntary repatriation of Paraguayan families, [and] checking that Paraguayan consulates provide a preferential attention and assistance to Paraguayan citizens... (DIC, 1993:81).⁶⁶

VII. POLITICAL CAMPAIGNS

The electoral objectives of the three main political forces were clear: The ANR sought to maintain its committed constituency (*voto cautivo*) of affiliates; the PLRA sought to expand beyond its committed constituency; and the AEN sought to capture the vote of uncommitted voters, disenchanted Colorados and Liberals and, via alliance, the constituencies of smaller political parties and movements. The strategies to accomplish these objectives were based in a combination of old and new politics.

The prospect of forming a broad alliance of the opposition around the two strongest political forces, the PLRA and AEN, was frequently discussed through different media in the first months of 1993. Although Liberals and *Encuentristas* carried on negotiations over the possibility of such an alliance, it became clear that neither Laíno nor Caballero Vargas were willing to accept the second place on a joint ticket.⁶⁷ This intransigence was transmitted to all the other elective posts as well and eventually would have fateful consequences for the opposition. We will discuss this further in Part III of the report.

A. *The Message and the Target Groups*

Although the Colorados had a powerful committed constituency, because of their bitter

internal fights they feared a possible "migration" of Colorado votes to other parties. The ANR leaders knew that if their affiliates voted for the party, they could win the election provided that the opposition ran divided. It was with this in mind that it opted for the campaign slogan "Vote for your party" (*Votá por tu partido*). The ANR launched an aggressive campaign directed almost exclusively at Colorados. This strategy proved to be very effective. It was able to transmit to its electorate a clear, simple and effective message: "The best friend of a Colorado is another Colorado" (*El mejor amigo de un colorado es otro colorado*).⁶⁸ At the same time the ANR did not neglect to sound themes connecting with the general interest of the country as a whole. Reminiscent of Stroessner's self-proclaimed indispensability and the myth that Paraguay without him would revert to chaos and civil war is the following declaration by the vice-presidential candidate for the Colorado Party, Angel R. Seifart:

The threat of chaos and of misgovernment will be a constant in the country if the ANR does not remain in power because it is the only institution that can guarantee political stability... In a political environment in which a dangerous dispersion of power occurs and in which it is not known where authority lies, the threat of chaos, of misgovernment will be constant... The political stability and the governability of the democratic system is a condition that only Coloradismo can guarantee to the people.⁶⁹

Although the Colorado Party came out of the presidential selection process exhausted, divided, and with a sense of despair publicly acknowledged by its leadership, nevertheless in the last minute, the cavalry came to the rescue in the person of General Lino Oviedo. As local political analysts described the turn of events,

[t]he incorporation of the Commander of the First Army Corps, General Lino Oviedo, as the Colorado's real chief of campaign, disciplined and militarized the electoral campaign and managed to regroup a portion of the *Argañista* Colorados, literally saving the Colorado Party from a defeat that seemed quite likely.⁷⁰

Part III of this report provides important details about this military intervention in the electoral process on behalf of the official candidate.

For its part, the PLRA projected the image of an unified party. But in a series of elections during the 1989-1991 period the party consistently showed to have a popular following of about 30% of the electorate. In his campaign, Laíno made a desultory effort to transcend his party's "ceiling", shopping for party switchers and the undecided in the nation's fickle "electoral market," especially in Asunción where he had the least support. Consequently, in particular when prospect of an alliance with AEN was dashed, the PLRA had no choice but to broaden its appeal and refashion its basic message. For instance, its attack on the Colorado Party now focussed directly upon its leadership,⁷¹ and its new campaign slogan became "The only alternative." However, as usual, the PLRA faced image problems in its effort to gain non-liberal votes. The image of Laíno as "*caudillo*" did not really appeal to the urban middle-class, especially in comparison to the

well polished "businessman" figure of Caballero Vargas. Not until Laíno demonstrated he headed a well organized political team and that he was committed to a government of national unity was the PLRA able to make major head way.

Only during the final stage of his campaign, when speaking repeatedly and reassuringly of his vision of a government of reconciliation and the need to uproot of vendettas, hatred and resentment, was Laíno able to project a more attractive image to the non-liberal electorate.⁷²

The AEN sought to capture the growing urban middle class electorate which was disenchanted with the traditional parties or had been apolitical during the Stroessner regime. It adopted a conciliatory tone and insisted that its victory would introduce a new way of doing politics. Its campaign slogan, and the basis for its logo, was "The sun begins to shine" (*El sol comienza a brillar*). After the resounding victory of Carlos Filizzola, who ran as an independent candidate for mayor of Asunción, in the municipal elections of May 26, 1991, it became clear that independent movements had an important electorate of their own in the Capital. But like the PLRA, the AEN knew that its proven support base would not be enough. Hence it set out to capture the disenchanted Colorado electorate. In an effort to show the Colorado electorate that AEN was a valid option short of betraying their party, it wanted to disassociate itself from the PLRA.

The AEN wisely decided to welcome members of other parties into the movement without requiring them to give up their party affiliation. The AEN incorporated some important middle-level figures of the Colorado Party into its movement and bet on the disenchanted Colorado voter who, they assumed, would not shift loyalties to their traditional adversaries, the Liberals.

The sheer cost of the campaign launched by AEN at times began to draw strong criticism, as for example, when the party's presidential and vice-presidential candidates went to the Vatican to visit the Pope, and photos of the three personages were printed in the papers.⁷³

Of the three presidential candidates, Domingo Laíno was the one which most strongly criticized the character of the other two. He concentrated his attack on Wasmosy's long association with the Stroessner regime. But he also attacked Caballero Vargas on similar grounds. In the closing act of his campaign Laíno insisted that,

[t]his candidate has his hands clean and free to rebuild a new society. He does not have his hands tied. He was the first candidate to present a sworn statement of his assets publicly, and not to hide it in the drawer of a clerk's office.⁷⁴

Since the migration of Colorado voters was anticipated to go to AEN, Wasmosy concentrated most of his attack on Caballero Vargas and referred to him as an opportunist. Caballero Vargas, bound by his movement's commitment to conciliation, used a moderate tone and confined himself to merely generic criticisms.

B. Mobilizations

The ANR, PLRA and AEN were the only political forces with a proven ability to summon large numbers of sympathizers during the pre-election campaigns.

After the nomination of their respective presidential candidates --with the exception of the Colorado Party-- the first month of 1993 was characterized by mass rallies of supports for the parties and movements. The two largest mobilizations were carried out by the AEN and the PLRA.

On January 22, the AEN organized its inaugural rally with a massive support, estimated at 50 to 60 thousand people in Asunción. Local political analysts considered this mobilization to be of crucial value to the future prospects of AEN as a political force with real possibilities to succeed in the May elections.

January 22 is a key date for this political movement as it became consolidated, before the public opinion and its adversaries, as a truly mass organization... The most notable consequences are its own consolidation as a movement, and the securing of a place of respect for possible negotiations of electoral alliances.⁷⁵

The PLRA did not wait long to demonstrate its electoral strength, both at the beginning and at the end of the campaign. The party organized its inaugural political rally to take place on January 31, 1993 beginning in the city of Coronel Oviedo (Department of Caaguazú). This rally has been described by some political analysts as "one of the most spectacular mass concentrations of the transition."⁷⁶ According to some reports of the press, the PLRA gathered as many as 100 to 150 thousand people.⁷⁷ The closing act of the political campaign of the PLRA, which took place in Asunción, was reportedly even larger than the first, drawing an estimated crowd of 150 to 200 thousand. The ANR responded with another massive rally, also in the capital city, and with an estimated figure close to that of the PLRA. The closing of Wasmosy campaign took place in Encarnación where the candidate of the ruling party gathered around 12,000 followers.⁷⁸ The AEN closed its campaign with a colorful caravan of cars, organized in different cities of the country, including Asunción. In the latter, the caravan that included approximately 10,000 cars stopped in different neighborhoods for short improvised speeches by Caballero Vargas.⁷⁹

It should be noted that the two established parties succeeded in carrying out an electoral strategy which aimed at momentum during the campaign's final and decisive phase: the last two weeks preceding election day. Accordingly, albeit for different reasons and through different methods, Wasmosy and Laíno running second and third respectively in most polls, rushed forward in the final days before the elections. In contrast, Caballero Vargas campaign appears to have peaked prematurely. This may have been due to a combination of several factors such as the following: Since the AEN campaign started very early, it is very likely that the massive advertisement of its messages -which according to critics from both established parties, was

lacking in content- may have reached a point of saturation in the final stage of the campaign. Apparently, AEN campaign strategists failed to adequately dosage its messages to avoid saturation and to adjust their content to overturn the criticisms of its opponents. Also, AEN leadership was overconfident in the polls the majority of which gave Caballero Vargas a comfortable lead early in the campaign. When late in April, the two major parties began to win back their traditional followers, AEN *tecno-políticos*, caught by surprise, were unable to revise its strategy to face this challenge. Hence, Caballero Vargas lost momentum and his early support eroded rapidly in the final days of the campaign.

C. *Publicity Drives: Access and Coverage by the Media*

By law, all the means of mass communication were to offer equal access to all political parties and movements.⁸⁰ However, coverage was to a great extent dependent upon financial resources. In this respect, the ruling party and the AEN, both headed by independently wealthy businessmen, were at an advantage over the PLRA.

The AEN launched a modern political campaign, resorting to sophisticated marketing techniques and an ostentatious display of money. In its electoral campaign, the AEN literally saturated all the means of communication with their political propaganda, to the point that the PLRA expressed concern that it was exceeding the limits approved by law.⁸¹ In fact, the Colorado Party filed a formal complaint with the Central Electoral Board against the AEN on these grounds. However, in terms of financial resources spent on political campaigning, the AEN was the only opposition party capable of effectively competing with the governing party.

1. **Radio**

In a country with a high illiteracy rate (about 23% fully illiterate and 27% functionally illiterate)⁸² and a large Guaraní-speaking population, radio is the major nation-wide means of communication. For a total population of 4,123,550, there are 42 AM and 45 FM radio stations out of which 22 (including both AM and FM) are located in the capital city.⁸³ The total number of radio sets for the country is estimated in 1,800,000.⁸⁴

Since the beginning of the process of political opening (1989), by and large, there have been no legal restrictions on the use of radio. As it is one of the least expensive means of reaching the voters, most candidates, including those of minor parties, chose this medium to broadcast their political messages. However, we received reports from Ciudad del Este that a radio station (*Radio Parque*, owned by Carlos Barreto, Colorado Candidate for Governor of Alto Paraná) either refused to air some publicity submitted by opposition candidates, or interfered with their programs.

Another important element was the ANR unlimited free usage of the state-owned *Radio Nacional del Paraguay*. Also, twice a day --at noon and in the evening-- all private-owned Paraguayan radio stations enter into a hook-up with *Radio Nacional*, to broadcast a program which is naturally biased toward the ruling party. Despite much criticism from political parties and social movements, this undemocratic practice for media control continues in Paraguay.

2. Newspapers

The use of the printed medium was more restricted. Paraguay has only four dailies with national coverage: *abc Color* (average daily circulation of 40,000); *Ultima Hora* (30,000); *El Diario Noticias* (30,000) and *Hoy* (12,000).⁸⁵ All of these are metropolitan papers, given that about 95% of the national news originates in Asunción and its orbit, and also because 80% of its circulation is in this central region. In terms of their political leanings, *abc Color* and *Ultima Hora* are more or less independent. *abc Color* has a strong neoliberal editorial line, whereas *Ultima Hora* is more moderate. *Diario Noticias* has a pro-Argaña owner and *Hoy* was until recently owned by Wasmosy and his business associates. Finally, the ANR has its own newspaper, *Patria*, with a daily circulation of approximately 2,000. In short, Paraguayan daily newspapers have a total circulation of about 114,000. In addition, there are also five weekly journals with a total circulation of approximately 120,000.⁸⁶

3. Television

There are only two television channels: Channel 9, owned under the previous regime by Gustavo Stroessner, and after the coup transferred to General Rodríguez's entourage (half of its stocks are owned by Rodríguez son-in-law, Gustavo Saba). This channel also has retransmitting stations in six urban areas of the countryside. Channel 13 belongs to the same family that also owns *Diario Noticias* and *Radio Cardinal*. During the Colorado primary, Channel 13 (as well as the above mentioned newspaper and radio station) had a pro-Argaña (Colorado) orientation.

It is estimated that in Paraguay there are some 620,000 TV sets, which reach approximately 44% of the country's total population.⁸⁷ In spite of its more limited reach, TV is considered a very powerful political medium, and the two wealthiest contenders, Wasmosy and Caballero Vargas spent approximately one third of their campaign funds in TV.

D. Fund-raising and Campaign Costs⁸⁸

All registered political parties and movements qualify to receive state subsidies to cover some of the expenses incurred in the course of electoral campaigns. Funds, however, are reimbursed in accordance with performance in the election. This includes the number of

candidates elected to contested posts and the number of votes obtained.⁸⁹

The Electoral Code prohibits political parties and movements from accepting funds from any public administration office, from foreigners, from organized interest groups such as trade unions, business associations, and sets a ceiling for the amount of contributions an individual or a corporation can donate.⁹⁰

In Paraguay, where a tradition of patrimonialism in the administration of public funds as formalized under Stroessner continues to operate, there is no way to enforce this kind of provision. That the confusion of public treasury and private interests remains is reflected in the indiscriminate use of state financial and other resources to campaign for ruling party candidates. This practice, coupled with the furtiveness with which the topic of campaign financing is usually handled, makes it especially difficult to secure reliable information about campaign funds and expenditures in the May 9, 1993 Paraguayan elections.

Despite these and other limitations, we conducted numerous informal interviews with coordinators and/or insiders of the three campaigns, as well as with independent political analysts. Based on their responses, and other sources, including indirect indicators such as the time and/or space each party bought in radio, TV and newspapers, we conjectured that a low estimate of the total campaign expenditures of the three major contenders in the May 9, 1993 elections was around \$27,500,000.


Because of the bitterly fought primaries and the prolonged open conflict which culminated with the nomination of Wasmosy as ANR's official candidate, its campaign was the shortest among those of the three major contenders. Still, it proved to be the most expensive: the Colorados spent approximately \$15,000,000. It is estimated that Wasmosy himself contributed about one third of this sum. Naturally, this figure does not include the utilization of state resources. The campaign adviser was a well known Brazilian specialist -Favio Campana-, one of the major campaign strategists for Brazil's abdicated President Collor de Mello.

In terms of duration, the AEN campaign was the longest of all: it started about 18 months before the May 9, 1993 elections, and it cost approximately \$10,000,000. Its candidate, Guillermo Caballero Vargas, contributed about one half of this sum. AEN's media campaign was directed by Paraguayan consultants, specially a firm called MAS Publicidad. AEN was reportedly very successful in its fund-raising drive as well as in sales of campaign publicity items such as shirts, hats and party stickers.

In contrast to the financially well-endowed ANR and AEN, PLRA campaign organizers estimated that their party spent only around \$2,500,000⁹¹. With modest funds, the PLRA waged an old-style campaign and mobilized its political cadres and popular support base. Only in the final two weeks of its campaign, did the PLRA become competitive in use of TV, projecting

a more modern view of the party and its leadership.

In short, for reasons already noted, these sums are rough estimates. According to independent analysts, one could add another 25% to 30% for a more realistic accounting of each of the three parties' campaign expenditures.



PART III

Evaluation of the Elections

VIII. ELECTION RESULTS

Out of the 1,698,984 citizens who registered to vote, 1,172,883, representing 69.03%, did cast their votes in the May 9, 1993 presidential election.⁹² After a delay of several weeks, owing to allegations of fraud by the major opposition parties, the Congress declared the victory of the ruling party's presidential candidate, Juan Carlos Wasmosy, who received 468,213 (39.92%) of the votes. Domingo Laíno of the PLRA got the second place with 376,868 (32.13%), whereas Guillermo Caballero Vargas of the AEN came out third with 271,421 (23.14%) of the votes. These three parties garnered 95.19% of the total votes. The latter figure, the 1.82% of blank votes, and the 2.29% of null votes add up to 99.30%. This means that all other political parties and movements taken together received a meager 0.69% of the total votes [see Table II].

The ANR (*Colorados*) and the PLRA (Liberals) were the major contenders in this election; combined they obtained more than 72% of the votes. They are the only parties with strong bases both in urban areas of the countryside and in rural villages. This is important in a country with a 50% of its population classified as rural.

The Wasmosy/Seifart ticket won in 13 departments, the Laíno/Benítez Florentín won in three and the Caballero Vargas/Brusquetti won in the capital city and, oddly enough, in a sparsely populated department of the northwestern part of the country in the Chaco region. The presidential race was heatedly contested between Colorados and Liberals in several departments, most notably San Pedro and Caaguazú, where the Colorados beat the Liberals by less than a 1% margin and in Central where the difference was only 1.2% in favor of the ruling party. Out of the 240 electoral districts, Wasmosy won in 174, Laíno in 57 (conspicuously, not a single one of the six districts of Asunción) and Caballero Vargas in nine (four of which are in Asunción) [see Tables III and VIII].

As far as the other election races are concerned, the candidates of the ANR and the PLRA performed better in the legislative and gubernatorial races than in the presidential ones. Whereas Wasmosy obtained 39.92% of the presidential votes, his party got 42.14% for the Senate, winning 29 seats in the upper chamber; 41.68% for the deputies, winning 38 seats in the lower chamber; 43.02% in the gubernatorial race, winning in 12 departments; and 42.92% in departmental legislatures, winning 79 seats [see Tables II, IV, V, VI, and VII].

TABLE II. General Results of the May 9, 1993 National Elections in Paraguay

PARTIES	PRESIDENT (%vote) [*]	SENATORS (%vote) [*] 45 seats	DEPUTIES (%vote) [*] 80 seats	GOVERNORS (%vote) [*] 17 gov'nshps	LEGISLATURES (%vote) [*] 167 seats
ANR	468,213 (39.92%)	493,697 (42.14%) 20 seats	488,342 (41.68%) 38 seats	410,485 (43.02%) 12 gov'nshps	409,495 (42.92%) 79 seats
PLRA	376,868 (32.13%)	408,282 (34.85%) 17 seats	414,208 (35.35%) 33 seats	346,614 (36.33%) 4 gov'nshps	337,576 (35.39%) 58 seats
AEN	271,421 (23.14%)	202,672 (17.30%) 8 seats	199,053 (16.99%) 9 seats	139,214 (14.60%) 1 gov'nshp	150,100 (15.73%) 30 seats
PT	2,025 (0.17%)	2,960 (0.25%)	3,771 (0.32%)	2,553 (0.27%)	2,487 (0.26%)
CDS	1,998 (0.17%)	10,554 (0.90%)	10,137 (0.86%)	5,764 (0.60%)	5,378 (0.56%)
PL	1,155 (0.10%)	2,332 (0.20%)	2,298 (0.20%)	1,364 (0.14%)	1,567 (0.16%)
MAPN	1,091 (0.09%)	1,156 (0.10%)	851 (0.07%)	132 (0.01%)	66 (0.01%)
MPSP	1,042 (0.09%)	986 (0.08%)	1,206 (0.10%)	622 (0.06%)	1,067 (0.11%)
PNS	850 (0.07%)	NA	223 (0.02%)	435 (0.04%)	NA
PB	NA	2,347 (0.20%)	844 (0.07%)	NA	NA
MPD26	NA	NA	892 (0.08%)	NA	NA
MPRUNA	NA	NA	274 (0.02%)	343 (0.04%)	316 (0.03%)
MPRCT	NA	NA	NA	NA	981 (0.10%)
MPRPP	NA	NA	2,779 (0.24%)	5,338 (0.56%)	2,901 (0.30%)
BLANK	21,333 (1.82%)	19,416 (1.66%)	19,000 (1.62%)	18,893 (1.98%)	18,512 (1.94%)
NULL	26,887 (2.29%)	27,088 (2.31%)	27,805 (2.37%)	22,304 (2.34%)	23,539 (2.47%)
TOTAL VOTES	1,172,883 (100.00%)	1,171,490 (100.00%)	1,171,683 (100.00%)	954,061 (100.00%)	953,985 (100.00%)
REGISTERED VOTERS	1,698,984	1,698,984	1,698,984	1,422,890 ^{**}	1,422,890 ^{**}
TURNOUT	69.03%	68.95%	68.96%	67.05%	67.05%

^{*}% of total votes cast

^{**}Residents of Asunción do not vote in departmental elections

Source: Tabulations based on the official results provided by the *Junta Electoral Central* (JEC).

TABLE III. Results of the May 9, 1993 National Elections for President and Vicepresident in Paraguay (by Departments)

DEPARTMENTS	Registered Voters [%Total Reg.Vote]	Total Votes (%Turnout)	ANR (%Total Votes)	PLRA (%Total Votes)	AEN (%Total Votes)
ASUNCION (Capital)	276,094 [16.25%]	217,771 (78.87%)	79,264 (36.39%)	45,496 (20.89%)	85,911 (39.45%)
CONCEPCION	55,276 [3.25%]	28,777 (52.06%)	11,089 (38.53%)	11,539 (40.09%)	4,670 (16.22%)
SAN PEDRO	96,717 [5.69%]	62,925 (65.06%)	25,829 (41.04%)	25,375 (40.32%)	7,262 (11.54%)
CORDILLERA	100,295 [5.90%]	74,012 (73.79%)	30,065 (40.62%)	32,290 (43.62%)	8,498 (11.48%)
GUAIRA	69,853 [4.11%]	47,409 (67.87%)	22,409 (47.26%)	15,138 (31.93%)	7,732 (16.30%)
CAAGUAZU	138,526 [8.15%]	89,926 (64.92%)	37,660 (41.87%)	37,382 (41.56%)	10,937 (12.16%)
CAAZAPA	46,375 [2.73%]	31,938 (68.87%)	15,040 (47.09%)	8,913 (27.90%)	6,228 (19.50%)
ITAPUA	137,956 [8.12%]	92,369 (69.95%)	41,392 (44.81%)	27,394 (29.65%)	17,303 (18.73%)
MISIONES	42,120 [2.48%]	30,889 (73.33%)	13,119 (42.47%)	10,128 (32.78%)	5,937 (19.22%)
PARAGUARI	92,008 [5.42%]	64,140 (69.71%)	27,817 (43.36%)	21,582 (33.64%)	11,250 (17.53%)
ALTO PARANA	131,584 [7.74%]	86,574 (65.79%)	36,462 (42.11%)	26,577 (30.69%)	18,916 (21.84%)
CENTRAL	382,494 [22.51%]	259,724 (67.90%)	91,697 (35.30%)	88,771 (34.17%)	67,711 (26.07%)
ÑEEMBUCU	35,241 [2.07%]	26,058 (73.94%)	11,863 (45.52%)	6,048 (23.20%)	6,760 (25.94%)
AMAMBAY	35,707 [2.10%]	23,229 (65.05%)	8,196 (35.28%)	9,013 (38.80%)	4,722 (20.32%)
CANINDEYU	22,016 [1.30%]	15,400 (69.94%)	6,912 (44.88%)	6,496 (42.18%)	1,324 (8.59%)
PTE. HAYES	23,144 [1.36%]	14,657 (63.33%)	6,364 (43.41%)	3,803 (25.94%)	3,701 (25.25%)
ALTO PARAGUAY	5,263 [0.31%]	3,155 (59.94%)	1,493 (47.32%)	700 (22.18%)	702 (22.25%)
BOQUERON	8,315 [0.49%]	3,930 (47.26%)	1,542 (39.23%)	223 (5.67%)	1,857 (45.25%)
TOTAL	1,698,984 [100.00%]	1,172,883 (69.03%)	468,213 (39.92%)	376,868 (32.13%)	271,421 (23.14%)

Source: Tabulations based on the official results provided by the *Junta Electoral Central* (JEC).

TABLE IV. Results of the May 9, 1993 National Elections for Senators in Paraguay (by Departments)

DEPARTMENTS	Registered Voters [%Total Reg.Vote]	Total Votes (%Turnout)	ANR (%Total Votes)	PLRA (%Total Votes)	AEN (%Total Votes)
ASUNCION (Capital)	276,094 [16.25%]	217,668 (78.83%)	82,506 (37.90%)	64,012 (29.40%)	59,642 (27.40%)
CONCEPCION	55,276 [3.25%]	28,727 (51.97%)	11,464 (39.90%)	11,948 (41.59%)	3,628 (12.62%)
SAN PEDRO	96,717 [5.69%]	62,823 (64.95%)	28,560 (45.46%)	25,152 (40.03%)	4,896 (7.79%)
CORDILLERA	100,295 [5.90%]	73,963 (73.74%)	32,053 (43.33%)	32,907 (44.49%)	5,908 (7.98%)
GUAIRA	69,853 [4.11%]	47,349 (67.78%)	23,335 (49.28%)	15,865 (33.50%)	6,000 (12.67%)
CAAGUAZU	138,526 [8.15%]	89,777 (64.81%)	39,362 (43.84%)	37,691 (41.98%)	8,569 (9.54%)
CAAZAPA	46,375 [2.73%]	31,936 (68.86%)	15,300 (47.90%)	8,952 (28.03%)	6,064 (18.98%)
ITAPUA	137,956 [8.12%]	92,255 (66.87%)	43,644 (47.30%)	28,004 (30.35%)	14,147 (15.33%)
MISIONES	42,120 [2.48%]	30,896 (73.35%)	13,924 (45.06%)	10,552 (34.15%)	4,709 (15.24%)
PARAGUARI	92,008 [5.42%]	64,179 (69.75%)	31,248 (48.68%)	22,076 (34.39%)	7,463 (11.62%)
ALTO PARANA	131,584 [7.74%]	86,371 (65.64%)	37,243 (43.11%)	26,698 (30.91%)	16,694 (19.32%)
CENTRAL	382,494 [22.51%]	259,254 (67.78%)	96,855 (37.35%)	97,477 (37.59%)	48,917 (18.86%)
ÑEEMBUCU	35,241 [2.07%]	26,058 (73.94%)	12,514 (48.02%)	6,468 (24.82%)	5,644 (21.65%)
AMAMBAY	35,707 [2.10%]	23,197 (64.96%)	8,486 (36.58%)	8,974 (36.68%)	4,356 (18.77%)
CANINDEYU	22,016 [1.30%]	15,377 (69.84%)	7,519 (48.89%)	6,497 (42.25%)	745 (4.84%)
PTE. HAYES	23,144 [1.36%]	14,615 (63.15%)	6,633 (45.38%)	4,084 (27.94%)	2,862 (19.58%)
ALTO PARAGUAY	5,263 [0.31%]	3,105 (59.00%)	1,547 (49.82%)	702 (22.60%)	620 (19.96%)
BOQUERON	8,315 [0.49%]	3,940 (47.38%)	1,504 (38.17%)	223 (5.65%)	1,808 (45.88%)
TOTAL	1,698,984 [100.00%]	1,171,490 (68.95%)	493,697 (42.14%)	408,282 (34.85%)	202,672 (17.30%)
TOTAL SEATS	45	—	20	17	8

Source: Tabulations based on the official results provided by the Junta Electoral Central (JEC).

TABLE V. Results of the May 9, 1993 National Elections for Deputies in Paraguay (by Departments)

DEPARTMENTS	Total Votes (%Turnout)	Total Seats	ANR (%Tot.Vote)	Seat s	PLRA (%Tot.Vote)	Seat s	AEN (%Tot.Vote)	Seat s
ASUNCION (Capital)	217,672 (78.84%)	13	80,447 (36.95%)	5	69,398 (31.88%)	5	55,222 (25.36%)	3
CONCEPCION	28,868 (52.22%)	3	11,276 (39.06%)	1	11,971 (41.46%)	2	3,893 (13.48%)	0
SAN PEDRO	62,803 (64.93%)	4	28,460 (45.31%)	2	24,761 (39.42%)	2	5,087 (8.09%)	0
CORDILLERA	73,917 (73.70%)	5	31,988 (43.27%)	2	33,176 (44.88%)	3	6,027 (8.15%)	0
GUAIRA	47,240 (67.63%)	3	23,026 (48.74%)	2	16,084 (34.04%)	1	5,949 (12.59%)	0
CAAGUAZU	89,822 (64.84%)	6	39,368 (43.82%)	3	37,435 (41.67%)	3	8,585 (9.55%)	0
CAAZAPA	32,038 (69.08%)	2	15,164 (47.33%)	1	9,063 (28.28%)	1	6,342 (19.79%)	0
ITAPUA	92,215 (66.84%)	7	44,253 (47.98%)	4	27,738 (30.07%)	2	14,394 (15.60%)	1
MISIONES	30,885 (73.33%)	2	14,021 (45.39%)	1	10,644 (34.46%)	1	4,845 (15.68%)	0
PARAGUARI	64,203 (69.78%)	4	31,365 (48.85%)	2	21,762 (33.89%)	2	7,749 (12.06%)	0
ALTO PARANA	86,363 (65.63%)	6	35,319 (40.89%)	3	25,811 (29.88%)	2	16,363 (18.94%)	1
CENTRAL	259,336 (67.80%)	17	95,396 (36.78%)	7	98,998 (38.17%)	7	48,471 (18.69%)	3
ÑEEMBUCU	25,993 (73.76%)	2	12,716 (48.92%)	1	6,501 (25.01%)	1	5,599 (21.54%)	0
AMAMBAY	23,193 (64.95%)	2	8,388 (36.16%)	1	8,833 (38.08%)	1	4,722 (20.35%)	0
CANINDEYU	15,402 (69.96%)	1	7,565 (49.11%)	1	6,555 (42.55%)	0	694 (4.50%)	0
PTE. HAYES	14,621 (63.17%)	1	6,540 (44.73%)	1	4,214 (28.82%)	0	2,943 (20.12%)	0
ALTO PARAGUAY	3,175 (60.33%)	1	1,518 (47.81%)	1	1,046 (32.94%)	0	369 (11.62%)	0
BOQUERON	3,937 (47.35%)	1	1,532 (38.91%)	0	218 (5.53%)	0	1,799 (45.69%)	1
TOTAL	1,171,683 (68.96%)	80	488,342 (41.68%)	38	414,208 (35.35%)	33	199,053 (16.99%)	9

Source: Tabulations based on the official results provided by the *Junta Electoral Central* (JEC).

TABLE VI. Results of the May 9, 1993 National Elections for Departmental Governors in Paraguay

DEPARTMENTS	Registered Voters [%Total Reg.Vote]	Total Votes [%Turnout]	ANR (%Total Votes)	PLRA (%Total Votes)	AEN (%Total Votes)
CONCEPCION	55,276 [3.88%]	28,863 (52.22%)	11,255 (38.99%)	13,332 (46.19%)	2,747 (9.51%)
SAN PEDRO	96,717 [6.80%]	62,737 (64.87%)	28,898 (46.06%)	25,081 (39.97%)	4,769 (7.60%)
CORDILLERA	100,295 [7.04%]	73,842 (73.62%)	32,012 (43.35%)	33,421 (45.26%)	5,489 (7.43%)
GUAIRA	69,853 [4.91%]	47,334 (67.76%)	23,141 (48.88%)	16,756 (35.39%)	5,436 (11.48%)
CAAGUAZU	138,526 [9.74%]	89,895 (64.89%)	39,438 (43.87%)	38,501 (42.82%)	7,899 (8.78%)
CAAZAPA	46,375 [3.26%]	32,072 (69.16%)	14,641 (45.65%)	9,043 (28.19%)	6,778 (21.13%)
ITAPUA	137,956 [9.70%]	92,296 (66.90%)	45,194 (48.96%)	27,627 (29.93%)	13,465 (14.58%)
MISIONES	42,120 [2.96%]	30,898 (73.36%)	14,687 (47.53%)	10,692 (34.60%)	4,335 (14.03%)
PARAGUARI	92,008 [6.46%]	64,177 (69.75%)	31,331 (48.81%)	21,439 (33.40%)	7,907 (12.32%)
ALTO PARANA	131,584 [9.25%]	86,339 (65.61%)	36,675 (42.47%)	24,569 (28.45%)	14,461 (16.74%)
CENTRAL	382,494 [26.88%]	259,273 (67.78%)	94,371 (36.39%)	99,789 (38.48%)	48,739 (18.79%)
ÑEEMBUCU	35,241 [2.48%]	26,037 (73.88%)	13,184 (50.63%)	6,259 (24.03%)	5,658 (21.73%)
AMAMBAY	35,707 [2.51%]	23,221 (65.03%)	8,243 (35.49%)	8,727 (37.58%)	5,192 (22.35%)
CANINDEYU	22,016 [1.55%]	15,388 (69.89%)	7,764 (50.45%)	6,465 (42.01%)	590 (3.83%)
PTE. HAYES	23,144 [1.63%]	14,613 (63.14%)	6,599 (45.15%)	4,593 (31.43%)	2,595 (17.75%)
ALTO PARAGUAY	5,263 [0.37%]	3,168 (60.19%)	1,514 (47.79%)	131 (4.13%)	1,320 (41.66%)
BOQUERON	8,315 [0.58]	3,908 (47.00%)	1,538 (39.35%)	189 (4.83%)	1,834 (46.92%)
TOTAL*	1,422,890 [100.00%]	954,061 (67.05%)	410,485 (43.02%)	346,614 (36.33%)	139,214 (14.60%)
TOTAL GOVERNORS	17	—	12	4	1

*Residents of Asunción do not vote in departmental elections

Source: Tabulations based on the official results provided by the *Junta Electoral Central* (JEC).

TABLE VII. Results of the May 9, 1993 National Elections for Departmental Legislatures in Paraguay

DEPARTMENTS	Total Votes (%Turnout)	Total Seats	ANR (%Tot.Vote)	Seat s	PLRA (%Tot.Vote)	Seat s	AEN (%Tot.Vote)	Seat s
CONCEPCION	28,876 (52.24%)	9	11,215 (28.83%)	4	11,616 (40.22%)	4	3,503 (12.13%)	1
SAN PEDRO	62,687 (64.81%)	10	28,488 (45.44%)	5	25,038 (39.94%)	4	5,176 (8.25%)	1
CORDILLERA	73,925 (73.71%)	11	32,239 (43.61%)	5	32,972 (44.60%)	5	6,151 (8.32%)	1
GUAIRA	47,365 (67.81%)	9	23,107 (48.78%)	5	15,967 (33.71%)	3	6,031 (12.73%)	1
CAAGUAZU	89,789 (64.82%)	12	39,388 (43.86%)	6	37,515 (41.78%)	5	8,657 (9.64%)	1
CAAZAPA	32,045 (69.10%)	8	15,131 (47.21%)	4	8,870 (27.67%)	2	6,317 (19.71%)	2
ITAPUA	92,219 (66.84%)	12	44,360 (48.10%)	6	27,610 (29.93%)	4	14,514 (15.73%)	2
MISIONES	30,878 (73.31%)	8	14,199 (45.98%)	4	10,408 (33.70%)	3	4,852 (15.71%)	1
PARAGUARI	64,137 (69.71%)	10	31,354 (48.88%)	5	21,674 (33.79%)	4	7,844 (12.23%)	1
ALTO PARANA	86,314 (65.60%)	11	35,434 (41.05%)	5	25,812 (29.90%)	4	16,060 (18.60%)	2
CENTRAL	259,468 (67.83%)	21	96,227 (37.08%)	8	93,501 (36.03%)	8	54,059 (20.83%)	5
ÑEEMBUCU	26,035 (73.88%)	8	12,734 (48.91%)	4	6,457 (24.80%)	2	5,839 (22.42%)	2
AMAMBAY	23,190 (64.94%)	8	8,438 (36.38%)	3	8,720 (37.60%)	3	4,879 (21.03%)	2
CANINDEYU	15,383 (69.87%)	8	7,600 (49.40%)	4	6,466 (42.03%)	4	755 (4.90%)	0
PTE. HAYES	14,629 (63.21%)	8	6,550 (44.77%)	4	4,082 (27.90%)	2	2,953 (20.18%)	2
ALTO PARAGUAY	3,088 (58.67%)	7	1,495 (48.41%)	4	667 (21.59%)	1	670 (21.69%)	2
BOQUERON	3,957 (47.59%)	7	1,536 (38.81%)	3	201 (5.07%)	0	1,840 (46.49%)	4
TOTAL	953,985 (67.05%)	167	409,495 (42.92%)	79	337,576 (35.39%)	58	150,100 (15.73%)	30

Residents of Asunción do not vote in departmental elections

Source: Tabulations based on the official results provided by the *Junta Electoral Central* (JEC).

TABLE VIII. Districts Won by the ANR, PLRA, and AEN for Each of the Elective Posts in the May 9, 1993 National Elections in Paraguay (by Departments)

DEPARTMENTS	# of Dist.	ANR					PLRA					AEN				
		P	S	D	G	L	P	S	D	G	L	P	S	D	G	L
ASUNCION (Capital)	6	2	6	6	-	-	0	0	0	-	-	4	0	0	-	-
CONCEPCION	10	6	7	6	5	6	4	3	4	5	4	0	0	0	0	0
SAN PEDRO	16	10	10	10	10	10	6	6	6	6	6	0	0	0	0	0
CORDILLERA	20	8	10*	10	9	9	12	11*	10	11	11	0	0	0	0	0
GUAIRA	17	15	16	16	15	16	2	1	1	2	1	0	0	0	0	0
CAAGUAZU	20	11	11	11	11	11	9	9	9	9	9	0	0	0	0	0
CAAZAPA	10	10	10	10	9	10	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
ITAPUA	31	26	29	28	28	28	4	2	3	3	3	1	0	0	0	0
MISIONES	10	8	9	9	9	9	2	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0
PARAGUARI	17	14	14	14	14	14	3	3	3	3	3	0	0	0	0	0
ALTO PARANA	18	17	17	16	17	16	1	1	2	1	2	0	0	0	0	0
CENTRAL	19	10	11	7	6	11	7	8	12	13	8	2	0	0	0	0
ÑEEMBUCU	16	13	14	14	14	14	2	2	2	2	2	1	0	0	0	0
AMAMBAY	3	1	2	2	2	1	2	1	1	1	2	0	0	0	0	0
CANINDEYU	8	5	5	5	6	6	3	3	3	2	2	0	0	0	0	0
PTE. HAYES	11	11	10	10	10	10	0	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0
ALTO PARAGUAY	7	7	7	7	6	7	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
BOQUERON	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1
TOTAL	240	174	188	181	171	178	57	52	58	61	55	9	1	1	2	1

- Residents of Asunción do not vote in departmental elections

* In one district, both the ANR and PLRA tied for the first place in the senatorial race

P= President

S= Senators

D= Deputies

G= Governors

L= Legislatures

Source: Tabulations based on the official results provided by the *Junta Electoral Central* (JEC).

The PLRA showed a similar trend: Whereas Laíno obtained 32.13% of the presidential votes, his party got 34.85% for the Senate, winning 17 seats in the upper chamber; 35.35% for the deputies, winning 33 seats; 36.33% in the gubernatorial race, winning in four departments; and 35.39% in departmental legislatures, winning 58 seats [see Tables II, IV, V, VI, and VII].

In contrast with the candidates of the two 'traditional' parties, Caballero Vargas outpolled AEN candidates for other posts by a considerable margin. Whereas Caballero Vargas obtained 23.14% of the presidential votes, his movement got 17.30% for the Senate, winning eight seats in the upper chamber; 16.99% for the deputies, winning nine seats; 14.60% in the gubernatorial race, winning in one department; and 15.73% in departmental legislatures, winning 30 seats [see Tables II, IV, V, VI, and VII].

It is somewhat easier to account for the higher voting turnout among the Colorados for their party than for their presidential candidate than it is for the similar results among the Liberals. In fact, the scramble surrounding the nomination of the party standard bearers did not affect the race for other elective posts, since there were plenty of *Argañistas* running for national and departmental legislative seats and/or governorships.⁹³ As far as the Liberals go, since they went to the polls united, the fact that the PLRA performed far better for the other elective posts than for the presidency may signal that the image of Laíno is not sufficiently appealing to non-liberal voters. Finally, the opposite trend in respect to the AEN may indicate that this movement has yet to transcend its status of an ad-hoc alliance and to coalesce as a party of national dimension.

Despite the resounding victory of Colorado candidates for departmental governorships, this result merits a couple of observations: (1) Although the opposition won in fewer departments than the Colorados, they did so --especially the PLRA-- in some of the most densely populated ones. The 12 departments won by Colorados, represent 54.50% (or 2,260,091 people) of the total population and 49.49% (or 840,803 people) of the total electorate while the other five departments won by the opposition represent 33.00% of the total population (or 1,361,033 people) and 34.21% of the total electorate (or 582,087 people) [see Table I].⁹⁴ (2) In the distribution of seats in the departmental legislatures, the ANR won 79, the PLRA 58 and the AEN 30. The combined seats of the opposition (PLRA + AEN) vis-á-vis the Colorados, puts them in the majority in six departments, tied in nine departments, and only in a minority in two departments [see Table VII].

The above observations are relevant to the extent that it places a system of checks and balances in the activities of Colorado governors.

In general, some of the most important trends of the May 9, 1993 elections are the following: (a) despite their victory, the Colorados no longer have an absolute majority. Long gone

is the "absolute" majority of over 90% that the Colorados used to obtain under Stroessner. That alleged absolute majority (on which almost 50 years of ANR hegemony was supposedly based) has been eroding with practically every election conducted during the transition. Thus, the ANR pulled 74.22% of the votes in the 1989 presidential elections. In the mayoral municipal elections of 1991, it obtained 43.38%. Although the ANR rebounded to 55.10% in the Constituent Assembly elections of 1991, it was reduced to 39.92% in the presidential elections of May 9, 1993 [see Table IX]. Among the factors which may account for this decreasing electoral preference for the official party, one of the most important is the purging of the electoral register. The widely-held view that internal factionalism was responsible for the ANR's decreasing voting turnout in the presidential race was not sustained in the last May election. In fact, 456,627 votes were cast for the selection of the party ticket in the Colorado primaries of December 27, 1992, whereas, in the presidential election of May 9, 1993, the ANR gained 468,213 votes.⁹⁵ In other words, there were 11,486 more votes cast for the Colorado ticket in the last elections.

The performance of the Liberals --reaching almost one third of the electorate in the presidential race and 35% in the parliamentary races-- was acceptable for an opposition party of modest financial resources which, according to most pollsters, was running a poor third. As far as the PLRA is concerned, it obtained only 20.33% in the 1989 presidential elections; the party did very well in the mayoral municipal elections of 1991, gaining 33.33% of the votes; its share decreased to 27.00% in the Constituent Assembly elections of 1991 but rose to 32.13% in the presidential elections of 1993 [see Table IX].

As far as AEN is concerned, although 23.14% of the votes in a presidential election is a significant achievement for a new party, it is not enough for a group with the longest and one of the most expensive campaigns. Seen from this perspective and taking into consideration the high expectations which had arisen, the distant third place of the AEN is disappointing. Nevertheless, it seems that within the perspective of the emergence and development of independent political movements in Paraguay, the AEN has been successful in establishing itself on the political map [see Table IX].

IX. ASSESSMENT OF THE ELECTIONS

A. *Pre-election Irregularities*

Some events which took place long before the election demonstrated that powerful members of the ruling party machinery and the top echelons of the military would not hesitate to resort to intimidation and even fraud to increase the vote for their party. Different types of irregularities occurred before, during, and after election day which taken together,

seriously damaged the electoral process as a whole. What follows is a brief account of the most serious pre-electoral problems.

TABLE IX. Summary of Election Results in Paraguay: 1989-1993

Election Year	Registered Voters	Total Votes (Turnout%)	ANR	PLRA	INDEPENDENTS
1989* (President)	2,226,061	1,189,657 (53.37%)	882,957 (74.22%)	241,832 (20.33%)	—
1991* (Mayors)	1,383,307	989,702 (71.54%)	412,529 (43.38%)	316,882 (33.33%)	182,941 (19.24%)
1991** (Assembly)	1,438,543	743,546 (51.69%)	409,730 (55.10%)	201,040 (27.00%)	81,860 (11.00%)
1993 (President)	1,698,984	1,172,883 (69.03%)	468,213 (39.92%)	376,868 (32.13%)	271,421 (23.14%)

* Arditi, 1992:211, 215, 216.

** *Noticias*, diciembre 7, 1991, p.8.

Tampering with the Electoral Register

Approximately a year before the May 9, 1993 elections, the representative of the PLRA -- which had a minority representation at the Central Electoral Board-- alleged a series of irregularities related to the elaboration of the new electoral register.⁹⁶ Subsequently, all major newspapers gave extensive coverage to what came to be referred in the Paraguayan press as "computerized fraud" consisting in the merging of the files of the Colorado Party membership with those of the National Electoral register. One of the specific tasks consisted in entering the identification numbers of party members recorded at party headquarters into a separate file of the Central Electoral Board computers. This permitted the Central Electoral Board (JEC) to separate "Colorados" from "Non-Colorados" and --among other things-- to change the locations where the latter were supposed to cast their votes. Thus an undetermined number of Laíno and Caballero supporters were apparently transferred from their current voting district to another in what was called "dispersion of votes." This manoeuvre was, moreover, engineered with the help of the military. According to the press, Captain Oscar Velázquez, an expert in computer engineering, became the head of a group of military officers (on active duty) and civilian personnel appointed by the top echelon of the Armed Forces to perform this task.⁹⁷ Concomitantly, it was also reported that military officers were in charge of the computer center at the Colorado Party headquarters, and that a number of computers (15 in total) which were donated by the United

States Agency for International Development (USAID) for the purpose of upgrading the capability of the Central Electoral Board were used instead at the Computer Center of the ruling party.⁹⁸ These incidents pointed to the high degree of military involvement not only in the Colorado Party but also in the Central Electoral Board, which by law, is supposed to be a national, civilian, non-partisan institution.⁹⁹

Another important irregularity associated with the elaboration of the electoral register was the issuing and utilization of forged identity cards (*cédulas de identidad*) for Colorado followers late in registering for the upcoming elections. Finally, the Central Electoral Board refused to provide magnetic tapes of the register to the opposition parties. Once again, as in the May 1, 1989 elections, only hard copies were made available to them and, once again, with less than a month lead time, making it extremely difficult for the opposition to check for possible irregularities and make modifications to the register.

Pressure upon Public Sector Employees to Campaign and Vote for the Colorado Party

All bureaucrats, from the most humble to Vice-Ministers and Ministers, were pressured by the President of the Party, by high ranking military officers and by General Rodríguez himself, to vote for Colorado candidates under threat of losing their jobs.¹⁰⁰ A common official recommendation given to government employees during the last months of the campaign was "vote for your house, your job, your party."¹⁰¹ A leaflet distributed among government employees stated: "*Compañero Funcionario Público...No Patee su Olla...Vote Lista 1 para Salir Adelante!!*" [see Figure III].¹⁰² Furthermore, all public sector employees were required to make a "voluntary contribution" in the amount of 1% of their salaries to help defray the costs of the official party's campaign.¹⁰³

Non-compliance with the requirement of supporting the official candidate could lead to the dismissal of the functionary, as occurred with the Minister of Education, Raúl Sapena Brugada, who was forced to resign when he refused to pressure his subordinates, including Ministry employees and teachers, to mobilize voters for the ruling party.¹⁰⁴

Intimidation of the Electorate

Intimidation was carried out by both civilians and elements of the military. The actions of the latter group will be discussed under the next heading.

At a Colorado Party meeting in Tobatí, Department of Cordillera, the Party chairman, Blás N. Riquelme promoted the use of fraud, stating, among other things, (a) that this was not the time for theorizing because the Colorado Party was "at war" against the opposition, (b) that the election would be won "by assault," (c) that the party would establish a "special commission to commit

FIGURE III. Political Advertisements Used by the Colorado Party in the May 9, 1993 National Elections in Paraguay



fraud," (d) that it had the necessary resources in arms and money and above all, the support of the Armed Forces, to implement this strategy. He concluded his speech with a call for continued good relations between the Colorados and the military to keep the ruling party in power.¹⁰⁵

Intimidation was more widespread in the countryside, particularly at the level of rural hamlets. Violence and death threats used by members of the Colorado Party with complicity of the local authorities were committed against Maskoy indians in Puerto Casado, in the department of Alto Paraguay (Chaco). Doroteo Centurión, a Maskoy *cacique* denounced that Kiko Díaz, a Colorado deputy candidate threatened their lives if they did not vote for the Colorado Party.

The indigenous leader pointed out that... a tractor that was transporting the natives to the reservation was intercepted by a group of Colorados headed by Kiko Díaz and his wife. The former fired shots at the wheels of the vehicle, preventing thus to arrive to their

destination, and all because they would vote for the opposition.¹⁰⁶

The LASA delegation heard several reports of local police chiefs instructing the population to vote for the Colorado Party with threats of retribution if they did not. In a small town of approximately 300 registered voters, the police chief declared that he expected to see at least 250 votes for the Colorados and that he had ways of finding out how people had voted.

Open Intervention of the Military in the Colorado Political Campaign

As mentioned earlier, since the Election for the Constituent Assembly Delegates (December 1, 1991), there had already been a considerable degree of intervention of the military on behalf of the ruling party. Throughout 1992, the military top echelon intervened first to ensure that the man they trusted would be chosen President of the Governing Board of the Party; subsequently they intervened in the selection of the Colorado presidential candidate for the national elections of 1993.

It was, however, in the final stage of the campaign for the May 9, 1993 Elections, that the military, in clear violation of the 1992 Constitution and the Electoral Code, exhibited the most open and aggressive intervention in partisan politics. When the majority of public opinion polls indicated that the Colorado candidate was trailing in third place, the military decided to implement a strategy to win back dissident Colorados who were leaning towards Caballero Vargas, and at the same time, to intimidate the electorate at large. This strategy was carried out by members of the military's top echelon, particularly by Division General Lino Oviedo, Commander of the First Corp and an open proponent of the continuation of the pact between the Armed Forces and the ruling party formalized under Stroessner.

Less than two weeks before election day, at a luncheon with employees of the Ministry of the Interior, General Oviedo, made international news by declaring that it was the decision of the Armed Forces to:

co-govern with the Colorado party *por secula seculorum* [sic] until the country achieves welfare and the common good, whether anyone likes it or not, no matter who dislikes it, and no matter who squeals...[Those] 'who attack and wish to denigrate the armed forces' by announcing that if elected they would reduce the numbers of general troops, and trim the budget, [should realize] that 'we have the same courage, decisiveness and balls between our legs, and will not stand by with our arms crossed' ...¹⁰⁷

This was the first of a series of similar statements made in Asunción, Villarrica, Pilar and Ciudad del Este, among others.

Leaders of the PLRA and AEN, church dignitaries, public opinion leaders and newspapers reporters criticized Oviedo's open intervention in partisan politics, which violated Article 173 of the 1992 Constitution and the Electoral Code. In response, other officers with even more seniority

than he, like Rear Admiral Eduardo González Petit and Division General Pedro C. Ocampos, rallied in support of Oviedo's open campaign for the Colorados.¹⁰⁸

This type of open proselytizing by military officers on active duty would be out of the question in democratic societies. Any infractor would have been sent into retirement. Moreover, such behavior might well have harmed the party it was intended to support. By contrast, in Paraguay it galvanized many vacillating Colorados, who, in the eleventh hour, were reassured that the military was again their trusted ally and that the defeat predicted by most public opinion polls could once more be turned into victory as, indeed, it was.¹⁰⁹

After the election day, during a press conference, President Carter stated that

The great reputation that Paraguay deserves has been seriously harmed by the unacceptable meddling of the military in the political process.¹¹⁰

Thus the events of the pre-electoral period demonstrated that rule by intimidation, while no longer unchallenged, was still the norm for significant sectors of the leadership. Hopes for a "transparent" election that would constitute an important stage in the transition to democracy coexisted with skepticism and fear that significant sectors of the party and the armed forces were not ready to accept defeat.

B. Election Day

Despite many irregularities which surrounded the May 9, 1993 elections and which will be addressed later, members of the LASA observation team were very positively impressed by the behavior of the electorate prior to and on election day. In fact, the eagerness to participate, the tolerance and civic spirit of the people provided a festive atmosphere to the election day. It was a clear refutation of the stereotype—often mentioned locally and abroad—that Paraguayans were not capable of living in a democratic society.

Throughout the country, hundreds of thousands of Paraguayans waited patiently for hours, in long lines, under intense heat to cast their votes. Many of them had to go from one voting locale to another to look for the polling station where they were assigned to vote. In the rural areas, many *campesinos* rode their horses or walked considerable distances to get to the polling sites. Paraguayans should be commended for having exhibited a great deal of endurance and determination to cast their votes peacefully during the election day.

Also most observers agreed that, at least in the urban areas, there were no major problems in terms of the general organization of the election (e.g., actual voting and counting procedures, participation of *apoderados* [party polling site supervisors] *veedores* [party pollwatchers] and *vocales* [party vocals] of the different political parties and movements). However, these conditions were not always present in many rural areas.

In contrast to the above mentioned positive attitudes of the population at large and the rather peaceful conduct of voting procedures, we were disturbed by a sequence of two serious violations on Election day committed by the Colorado Party and by governmental authorities.

Rifle and Grenade Attack Against Channel 13 (TV) and Radio Cardinal

In the early morning (2:30 AM) Channel 13 and Radio Cardinal which had been very critical of the candidate of the Colorado Party during the presidential campaigns, were subjected to a rifle and grenade attack by an unidentified group. As a result of this attack, their main electric transformer was destroyed and they were not able to go on the air until after the elections began. It is not clear who the attackers were, but it seems that the motivations were political.¹¹¹

Interruption of Independent Poll Counting

SAKA¹¹² an umbrella organization embracing a number of Paraguayan non-governmental organizations --with financial support from a series of national and international organizations-- organized a vote-tallying operation parallel to that of the government. SAKA was the first organization to request the presence of international observers to LASA because of their fears of a government orchestrated fraud during elections day. Their fears became a reality as their work was seriously impaired by the government. In the early afternoon on election day their telephone lines suddenly were disconnected. This interrupted communications between their central offices and the organization's field operators or messengers who were all over the country.

All seven dedicated telephone lines that were to allow SAKA volunteers to call in their own calculations, precinct by precinct, were cut from about 2 PM on election day, May 9, until about 2 AM on the 10th. The government's explanation, echoing that of the state owned telephone company (ANTELCO), cited technical difficulties, but when President Carter complained directly to General Rodríguez, the company managed to restore the service for some 10 minutes. President Carter's conclusion, as well as ours, is that the interruption could only have been intentional.¹¹³

In the meantime polling stations in many locations were surrounded by police, and SAKA messengers who were to have delivered the parallel count, by prior agreement with election officials, were prevented from entering or leaving those stations. In other places, SAKA volunteers were physically abused --even beaten up-- and there was an episode in which a vehicle carrying SAKA messengers was forced off the road and overturned.

On the evening of the day following the election, SAKA nevertheless presented its preliminary findings. The figures seemed to be in accord with the unofficial count of the Central Electoral Board (JEC), a count reflecting totals called in by the principal officers of each voting

precinct.

Closing of the International Borders to Paraguayan Citizens Returning to Paraguay the Day of the Election

Among the most serious irregularities committed during the electoral process, stands out the closing of the international border to Paraguayan citizens returning from abroad during the election day (detailed accounts of this issue are provided by Harald Prins in Itapúa and Héctor Vélez in the "Silvio Pettirosi" International Airport, members of LASA team, in part IV of this report).

This action, taken in response to a court order (*Orden Judicial*) issued by Judge Luís Pereira, was a consequence of a request filed by Colorado party attorneys, who claimed that, according to the 1992 Constitution, Paraguayans living abroad were ineligible to participate in the election.¹¹⁴

Thus, pursuant to Pereira's newly issued court order of May 8, 1993, police and army troops --some equipped with sub-machine guns-- were strategically positioned at checkpoints all along Paraguayan's borders with Argentina (where the majority of Paraguayans abroad live) as well as at the International Airport of Asunción, effectively blocking entry of all Paraguayan citizens on election day.

This unprecedented measure, which caused outrage and sharp protest from Paraguayans and international observers alike (including President Carter),¹¹⁵ was suddenly revoked around midday and the border was re-opened to Paraguayan citizens after 4 o'clock. There is no way of telling how many Paraguayans living abroad had in fact registered to vote in Paraguay (and therefore eligible to vote) and how many of those returning to Paraguay the day of the elections were permanent residents abroad, returning tourists or simply border commuters. The government's hostile treatment towards its citizens abroad and fear of an election overturn with their vote (real or potential) lead it to commit an illegal act. Regardless of whether or not people were prevented from exercising their civil right to vote, the point is that citizens of Paraguay were prevented from entering their own country and therefore deprived of their right of moving freely in and out of the country, as guaranteed by Art.41, of the 1992 National Constitution.

The events described above constituted a serious breach of Paraguayan laws, in addition to human rights violations. In our minds they compromised the credibility of the government's commitment to enforce the law and effectively guarantee the rights of freedom of speech and freedom of movement of Paraguayan citizens.

C. *Post-election Process*

The official vote count had barely begun when protests about irregularities started to emerge. On the second day after the election, complaints were raised that *actas electorales* or voting records, were arriving at the Central Electoral Board (JEC) in Asunción, unsealed or unsigned or were being reported lost or damaged.

Opposition party officials found this particularly disturbing, as even marginal alterations in the reported outcome, while perhaps not affecting the presidential election, could well determine whether or not the opposition parties would jointly gain a congressional majority. Such an outcome had been predicted by early unofficial computations carried out under the auspices of SAKA and the JEC. Opposition suspicions were confirmed as the official count indicated that their expected majority in Congress began to erode gradually by the fifth day of the count.

Such irregularities prompted the opposition to challenge the tally reported from various locations. The opposition gave serious consideration to the possibility of nullifying the results in instances where more than 20% of the ballots counted were contested. Under this process, however, the resolution of the dispute would fall first to the Colorado-controlled JEC and then to the Colorado-controlled Congress. Such recourse would have held some appeal had the Congress in question been fairly elected in accordance with a democratic tradition. But as pointed out earlier, such was not the case. Apparently, some of the major problems arose in the handling of the *actas electorales*. The prescribed process was a complex one, and turned out to have been liable to manipulation, given the partisan character of the electoral boards (*Junta Electoral Seccional* and *Junta Electoral Central*). According to the Law #132 of 1993, the *Junta Electoral Seccional* was supposed to send the *actas electorales* within properly sealed envelopes to the *Junta Electoral Central* within a period of 24 hours after the closing of the polls. There is evidence that in some districts of several departments (e.g., Concepción, San Pedro, Amambay, Caaguazú, and Boquerón, among others) the results originally transcribed in the *actas electorales* were subsequently altered to the advantage of the Colorado Party.

When the *apoderados* (party polling site supervisors) of the major opposition parties found evidence that hundreds of envelopes, which began arriving the *Junta Electoral Central* on May 10, 1993, were unsigned, opened and/or resealed (a fact that was widely reported by major newspapers), they immediately charged that fraud had occurred. Luís Alberto Wagner (from the PLRA), expecting to become governor of the department of Central, was outraged and went on radio, calling upon the citizenry to go immediately to the premises of the *Junta Electoral Central*, to help ensure accuracy and accountability in the voting counting. Laíno and Caballero Vargas attended an improvised rally, in front of the JEC building, that ended peacefully when they joined a representative of the ruling Colorado party to sign an agreement by which the *apoderados* of the

three major parties would verify the condition of the *actas electorales* for each of the 8,468 *mesas* (voting tables).

This process of examination of the *actas electorales* took place between May 10 and 23, 1993. Some of our observers were present during the first few days and the principal author of this report witnessed the entire process, during which it became obvious in some cases that irregularities extended to the contents of the *actas electorales* themselves. The extent of tampering, however, was a matter for Congress to determine. Upon completion of this initial screening and examination, the *actas electorales* were forwarded to Congress together with the list of irregularities. According to the transitory provisions cited earlier, the old Congress was to evaluate and pass judgement on the validity of the election, as the Electoral Judiciary created by the new constitution had not yet been assembled. It is ironic, of course, that the old Colorado-controlled Congress (in which the *Encuentro Nacional* had no representation) was charged with the task of judging the fairness of the electoral process. Given its conflict of interest, the old Congress was not properly constituted to arbitrate and pronounce an impartial judgement on the election's validity. However, in order to lessen the magnitude of the problem, the opposition requested -- in Congress -- the formation of a balanced commission in which the ruling party and the opposition would be equally represented. That motion was, as expected, defeated by the Colorado majority. Subsequently, a Bicameral Congressional Commission made up of six Colorados, four Liberals and one Febrerista, was convened. After five days of work this commission confirmed some 433 defective *actas electorales*. These defects fell into two general sets. The first (and less common) was comprised of such irregularities as (a) alterations of numerical results and (b) lack of signatures of some of the *apoderados* of a given *mesa*. The second (and far more frequent) embraced such improprieties as (c) monopolized representation at the *mesas*, (d) illegal transfers of *mesas* from previously assigned locations to the *compañías* (rural hamlets) where the ruling party could have complete (but unlawful) control of the local election process, (e) pressure and/or violence by ruling party members in some polling sites or in their immediate surroundings.

The opposition regarded this second set of irregularities as just as explicitly illegal and compromising of electoral legitimacy as the first, and consequently requested the annulment of all 433 defective *actas*, representing 5.11% of the total. However, after long deliberations the Colorados (who favored the restrictive interpretation) approved -- through their majority -- the annulment only of the 137 *actas* that were vitiated by the first set of flaws [see Table IX]. Through this maneuver, only 1.59% instead of 5.11% of the total number of defective *actas* were annulled.¹¹⁶

Through the annulment of these *actas* (mostly from the departments of Concepción and Boquerón), the opposition was able to recover a governorship and two congressional seats, by

which it secured the majority in Congress. If the second set of irregularities, representing the remaining 3.52% of the total defective *actas*, had also been taken into account other significant electoral gains could have been achieved by the opposition.

CONCEPCION		CORDILLERA		CAAGUAZU		CENTRAL	
	<u>Mesas</u>		<u>Mesas</u>		<u>Mesas</u>		<u>Mesas</u>
Concepción	9	Altos	2	Caaguazú	1	F. de la Mora	1
Horqueta	17	Arr. y Esteros	2	Col. Unificadas	1	Lambaré	2
Yby Yaú	25	Isla Pucú	1	Santa Rosa	1	M.R. Alonso	6
		Nueva Colombia	2	J. D. Ocampos	1		
		Piribebuy	4	R.A. Oviedo	1		
		San Bernardino	2	R.I. Corrales	8		
		San J. Obrero	1	3 de Febrero	1		
Total	51	Total	14	Total	14	Total	9
SAN PEDRO		GUAIRA		ITAPUA		AMAMBAY	
	<u>Mesas</u>		<u>Mesas</u>		<u>Mesas</u>		<u>Mesas</u>
San Estanislao	2	Col. Ind.	1	Alto Vera	3	Bella Vista	16
25 de Diciembre	1	Villarrica	1	Capitan Meza	1	P.J. Caballero	3
				T.R. Pereira	2		
Total	3	Total	2	Total	6	Total	19
ALTO PARANA		CANINDEYU		PTE. HAYES		ALTO PARAGUAY	
	<u>Mesas</u>		<u>Mesas</u>		<u>Mesas</u>		<u>Mesas</u>
C. del Este	2	Ygatimi	1	Pinasco	2	Fuerte Olimpo	2
Ita Kyry	2						
Total	4	Total	1	Total	2	Total	2
PARAGUARI		BOQUERON		MISSIONES		ASUNCION	
	<u>Mesas</u>		<u>Mesas</u>		<u>Mesas</u>		<u>Mesas</u>
Ybytymí	1	M. Estigarribia	7	San Miguel	1	La Encarnación	1
Total	1	Total	7	Total	1	Total	1

Source: *abc Color*, June 1, 1993, p.2.

The results of the Bicameral Congressional Commission were finally and unanimously approved by congressional plenary on June 1, 1993. In the final analysis, as noted by close observers, the incumbent Colorado Party had shown itself to be more adept than some expected. By allowing minor concessions to the opposition, while steadfastly refusing to follow legal requirements concerning not only one but both categories of irregularities denounced by the former, it achieved its major objective of legitimizing the results obtained in a flawed electoral process.¹¹⁷

X. POLLS: Why did they "fail"?


With the exception of the poll conducted by the Naumann Foundation, which predicted the victory of Laíno, most agencies which carried public opinion polls declared Caballero Vargas as the winner, followed by Wasmosy and Laíno, respectively. A good illustration of this was the

poll published in *Ultima Hora* on April 23, 1993, according to which Caballero Vargas had 40.1%, Wasmosy 26.3%, Laíno 24.2%, others 1.6%, and 7.8% were undecided.¹¹⁸

As late as the third week of April, the Paraguayan press was filled with information and speculation about polls indicating this trend among the electorate. When the more definite figures of the election showed just the opposite, many people, both lay folk and political pundits, began to wonder what had gone wrong with the polls. Some went even as far as to discredit the validity of public opinion polls as the basis for predicting electoral outcomes.

There are many factors that should be taken into consideration in accounting for the faulty predictions put forward by most public opinion pollsters: (a) The figures just cited above expressed voter preferences or leanings that may have been valid at the time the polls were conducted. The Electoral Code prohibits the publication of results of public opinion polls within 15 days of the election (Art. 326^o). This is important because quite often a significant portion of the electorate may make up its mind only in the last two weeks before the election. The expressed preference for a candidate cannot automatically be equated with a firm commitment. This is particularly true when one of the leading contenders, as in the case of Guillermo Caballero Vargas, lacks an established political base. In fact, AEN strategists were betting heavily on a significant switch or crossover of votes from the *Argañistas* to Caballero Vargas. (b) Apparently, there were also some errors in the sampling frame of the polls. Urban sectors, particularly in Asunción, where Caballero Vargas had a strong following, were overrepresented in the sample, at the expense of rural areas where the strength of the two other major parties is concentrated. It is not clear whether or not this was done consciously, or if it was due to faulty methodology. (c) In the last two weeks of the campaign, the Colorado Party recovered its electoral base. The intervention of General Lino Oviedo and other key military officers who openly campaigned for the official party candidate proved to be a decisive element. This seems to have affected earlier expressed preferences of a significant segment of Colorado followers, *Argañistas* and/or undecided voters who opted for Wasmosy in the final stage of the campaign. Declarations made by the Minister of Interior, Hugo Estigarribia, before the elections of May 9, 1993, eloquently sum up this last thesis:

Survey polls forget that the military and the police are all Colorados.¹¹⁹



CONCLUDING REMARKS

As academically-based international observers, we travelled to Paraguay to observe and collect the necessary information to analyze and evaluate the nation's contentious electoral process. Although our terms of reference did not include evaluating the performance of other observation delegations, we were, however, concerned by certain public statements that seemed to prejudge the electoral process. For instance, the Secretary General of the Organization of American States (OAS), João Baena Soares, stated before the elections were held:

"I cannot say if there will be fraud or not, but I am surprised that the press and the people in general speak of a possible fraud. What I have seen thus far is that there are indicators that assure that the elections will be free and clean, just as president Rodriguez expressed to me."¹²⁰

One major problem with many international observation teams is that they usually focus almost exclusively on voting during the election day. When this is the case, observers tour casually some polling sites --usually in urban areas-- and if they do not see any blatant irregularities and/or open acts of violence, they conclude that the elections were fair.

It appears that some observers did not have an adequate understanding of the complex political context within which the May 9, 1993 elections took place. Briefly stated, the incumbent Colorado Party has been in power for 46 years, 35 of which it shared power with a general and during the last four years with yet another military commander. Further, the Armed Forces of the "Nation" became affiliated to the Colorado Party. The opposition parties and the citizenry at large had valid reasons to be concerned about the fairness of the elections. Otherwise, why would they have requested the presence of international observers?

Although the voting process itself appeared to have been generally satisfactory, it took place within a macro-political arena that retained certain fundamentally undemocratic features. Specifically, a necessary condition of free and fair elections was absent: the willingness on the part of the ruling elite to acknowledge possible defeat and transfer office if it should fail to gain a plurality. In the case of Paraguay, it appears that the ruling group (here understood as prominent sectors of the Armed Forces as well as of Colorado politicians) was reluctant to accept an adverse result in the National Elections. The imposition of Wasmosy as a Colorado presidential candidate, after Argaña had won a majority in his party's primary, was an early indication that a similar stratagem might be implemented in the National Elections. An additional indicator of a refusal to admit defeat in the presidential elections was revealed in the government's direct interference with SAKA's parallel vote computation. The government's explanations of the "breakdown," however, were not entirely convincing, and it appears that the "misfortune" was engineered as an "insurance policy" against a possible electoral setback. There is reason to suspect that had the popular vote not favored the Colorado Party, ways would have been found within the Central Electoral Board or Congress to nullify the results in sufficient

polling sites to declare its own candidate the winner.

While this scenario is hypothetical, it cannot be lightly dismissed in view of the subsequent maneuver in the *Junta Electoral Central* to deprive the opposition of a parliamentary majority. Finally, one cannot forget the strident public statements by General Lino Oviedo as the campaign came down to the wire. Given his position in the power structure and his personal history of conduct in contempt of an autonomous political process, his repeated insistence that the military would not accept electoral defeat of the Colorado Party cannot be ignored.

Taking these threats into consideration one can only guess what the outcome would have been in case of a more than marginal victory for an opposition party presidential candidate. Evidence from national elections elsewhere suggests that a substantial victory margin for an opposition candidate could secure sufficient legitimacy to prevent action to nullify the electoral outcome by means of violence. But, given Paraguay's recent political history, it remains an open question whether such force would have been used, regardless of the electoral margin. In fact, the refusal by the opposition to acknowledge the victory of the Colorado Party in the presidential race, on the grounds of fraud, angered Colorado vice-presidential candidate Angel R. Seifart who at one point declared that:

The ANR will use force to defend the [election] results. The ANR has a limit to its patience and will have its rights be respected...¹²¹


The election outcome which resulted in the victory of the Colorados and the defeat of the opposition merit comment. Although the Colorados won the election, they did so without an absolute majority, with less than 40% of the total vote. Colorados won with great difficulty despite being the incumbent party in power for over half a century and with all the state resources at their disposal. Despite the fact that the combined opposition forces of the PLRA and AEN, which totalled 55.27% of the vote, gave them an absolute majority of the vote, as opposition they lost. Nevertheless, the PLRA and the AEN garnered sufficient votes to control both houses of Parliament and most departmental legislatures. Thus, the new president was inaugurated without a mandate and was immediately forced to negotiate with the opposition to prevent a situation of ungovernability. This historical phenomenon may help to foster a desirable tempering of executive power in a country which has had a strong presidentialist tradition.

There is additional evidence that democratization is taking place in Paraguay. Currently, state-sponsored violence is negligible, human rights are observed and there is freedom of speech. Moreover, the new constitution guarantees the separation of powers and introduces a balance between the Executive, Judicial and Legislative branches of government. The judiciary remains an area of concern for democratic forces. Not only because of older politically appointed judges who have demonstrated partisanship bias, but also because there have been well-documented

cases of blatant corruption. Yet today, the rhetoric of democracy is the only one publicly acceptable, a sign that the merits of a democratic way of life are generally appreciated. Hence, attitudes toward political opponents --with some exceptions-- exhibit a welcome measure of civility. Newly recruited cadets to the Military Schools are no longer officially required to join the Colorado Party, and younger officers are said to favor terminating the institutional linkage between the Armed Forces and the Party. Most importantly, an expanded opposition presence in a Congress given more autonomy by the new Constitution should serve to open the political process further.

However, the biggest obstacle to consolidation of democracy in Paraguay has not yet been removed: the lingering alliance between the State and the Colorado Party. So long as the Armed Forces and the civil service remain intertwined with the Colorado Party, democracy will be precarious in Paraguay. Accusations of fraud repeatedly brought by opposition leaders deserve to be evaluated with this particular historical context in mind. As challengers of the status quo, the PLRA and AEN could not effectively compete with the incumbent ruling Colorados on an equal footing as they were compelled to confront the State itself.

In sum, the general conclusion is that Paraguay has taken significant steps on the road toward representative government. Current conditions do not yet warrant a determination that the nation has achieved a full democratic character. An essential condition is that all segments of the Colorado Party and the military be willing to engage in national elections without reservations such as the ones noted above. Hence, further progress toward democracy depends to a considerable degree on the dismantling of the military-Colorado political complex. As long as the apex of the military continues to be the major political broker, electing a civilian president is insufficient guarantee that government will evolve into a civic institution. The extrication of the military from the political sphere, and its subordination to civilian power as mandated in the national Constitution, is a *sine qua non* for the consolidation of democracy in Paraguay. Accomplishing this will require persistent effort by opposition parties, independent media, civil organizations, and above all, an informed citizenry. "Opening from above" has gone as far as it can be expected to go. The impetus for any further progress in negotiating democratic corridors in Paraguay will have to come from below.




PART IV

Individual Experiences and Comments of LASA Observers

PRESENTATION

Most members of the LASA observation team arrived five days before the election to monitor the last few days of the campaign and elections themselves. Upon arrival in Asunción, all members of the delegation registered with the Central Electoral Board (JEC) and were issued an identification card that accredited them as official international observers.

Our base institution in Paraguay, the *Centro de Información y Recursos para el Desarrollo* (CIRD) of the Paraguay-Kansas Committee, organized a series of meetings with representatives of political parties, civic organizations, governmental officials, international organizations and the United States Embassy [see listing in Annex E] and arranged for the escorts to accompany each member for election day. Members of the observation team were assigned to six of the most populated departments of the country including: Cordillera, Itapúa, Misiones, Paraguari, Alto Paraná, and Central.



Department of Cordillera(I)

Nora Hamilton
University of Southern California

On election day I went with an observer from the Liberal party to three communities in the neighboring department of Cordillera: San José, Itacurubí, and Tobatí. The Liberals have a strong presence in Cordillera; the mayor of Itacurubí, whom I met, was a Liberal, having been elected in the 1991 municipal elections (Cordillera was one of four departments in which a Liberal would be elected governor.)

Most of the polling places we visited were in the countryside. For the most part, the process seemed quite orderly, if slow; there were long lines of people waiting patiently for their turn to vote. There were *apoderados* as well as *observadores* from the three major parties at most of the voting sites; I spoke to several representatives of the opposition and official parties who reported that everything was going peacefully; in some cases there had been minor problems (e.g., some ballots had been badly printed with most of the colors washed out), but these problems had been resolved. Both electoral officials and voters appeared to take their respective roles seriously and perform them conscientiously.

In Itacurubí an argument broke out between a Colorado delegate and a young woman (apparently from one of the opposition parties) whom he accused of having taken one of the registration lists. She insisted that she had picked it up in order to locate her polling table and returned it immediately. The argument went on for some time with the delegate loudly denouncing her and she angrily defending herself. What was amusing is that the delegate claimed that his wife, an *apoderada*, had accused the woman, but his wife, in some confusion, kept saying, "*yo no dije eso*" ("I didn't say that".) In the end the young woman appeared to win her point. As I was told later, this incident couldn't have occurred five years ago, when the Colorados were in such control that no one would have dared to oppose them.

At the last place we visited, Tobatí, a woman complained of several infractions and irregularities, claiming that identification cards were being given away inside the voting precinct and that several members of the Liberal party were not on the registration list and had to travel to other locations, in some cases at considerable distance, in order to vote. It is possible some of her accusations were exaggerated, but they were similar to complaints heard in other parts of the country. My overall impression of most of the places we visited, however, was of a relatively orderly process in which problems were minor, unintentional, and quickly resolved.

After returning to Asunción, I went with another member of the LASA delegation to

watch the preliminary vote count at a polling site (a school) near our hotel. A representative from the *Encuentro Nacional* asked us to oversee the process at two of the tables (of a total of 12 or 14) where they suspected some subterfuge might be tried. At the table where I was watching there were also a number of members of the opposition parties watching; any fraud at that point would have been virtually impossible. The vote count is a meticulous, not to say, tedious process. First, the registration lists were checked and the names listed and counted; then the votes for the presidential, senatorial and congressional races were separated; then the votes for the presidential race were separated according to candidate and counted; the same process was followed for the senatorial and deputy races. It took approximately two hours to count 147 votes. At this table the presidential vote went to the *Encuentro Nacional* by a small margin (56 to 53 for the Colorados); the votes for Senator and Deputy went to the Colorados.

Department of Cordillera(II)

Frank Mora
University of Miami

It is clear from the observations of this member and from the final results of the Paraguayan elections that the Colorado party still remains a dominant force in the countryside. In the Department of Cordillera the political machine of the Colorado party is quite prevalent. There in such towns as Piribebuy, Eusebio Ayala, Isla Pucú, Curupayty and their surrounding *compañías*, its mechanisms of control and intimidation are still in active operation, despite the relatively successful democratic transition process in the country at large.

Although there was no major fraud, the Colorado party's subtle but effective control of the process in Cordillera, a PLRA stronghold, did not give the opposition equal access. In fact, in many areas of the interior, particularly in remote areas such as the Itauguá and Rolón *compañías*, the opposition was not equally represented at the mesas. In fact, the *Encuentro Nacional* was not represented at all in many of these towns, which allowed the Colorado party to steer the electoral process in its favor.

Some of the most prevalent irregularities concerned expired *cédulas de identidad*, attempts at buying votes, and the absence of credentials of those working at the *mesa*. In the Itauguá *compañía* there was evidence of intimidation and physical threats by a local Colorado boss against opposition representatives and those "who refused to vote Colorado." In Isla Pucú, the president of *mesa* number 5 voted for someone who did not present his *cédula*. Also in Isla Pucú, representatives from the PLRA and *Encuentro Nacional* fervently complained that several *veedores* and *apoderados* from the *Encuentro Nacional* had been threatened with loss of their jobs if they reported to their posts on election day. In San Bernardino, several disputes arose concerning the correct interpretation of article 223 of the Electoral Code, which states what shall be done in the case of a 10% discrepancy in the number of ballots cast and those registered in the *padrón*, the whole *mesa* has to be annulled. The incident almost came to blows, but the police intervened. The *mesa* was eventually annulled.

Despite some of these problems and irregularities, there was no major fraud which could have altered the final results in these towns. No violence was observed during the elections. However, in Asunción (on Mariscal López Avenue) at about 11:30 p.m. on election day this observer saw a violent confrontation between drunken young Colorados and PLRA cadres. One Colorado took out a gun and fired it into the air to disperse PLRA juveniles who were throwing rocks and bottles.

Generally speaking, the election was held without much fraud or violence. However, it is clear to this observer that the Colorado party and General Lino Oviedo had taken measures before the closing of the polls to impede a possible victory by the opposition (closing of Encarnación border and shutting down the lines of SAKA). In my opinion, there were several fundamental reasons why the Colorado party won the presidential election and most gubernatorial races without much fraud:

1) the Colorado's well structured and efficient political machine was particularly strong and effective in the rural areas. The opposition did not have much strength or representation in these areas.

2) although people may have expressed a preference for the opposition, particularly EN, as the polls suggested, when it came time to voting, people opted for one of the traditional parties. Many people may have feared that a victory by the opposition would have resulted in violence. Statements made by General Oviedo may have not only united the Colorado party but instilled fear in the populace.

3) a divided opposition. The PLRA and the AEN relied too much on either their "cautivo" vote or, as in the case of AEN, hoped to attract disgruntled Colorados. Moreover, political irresponsibility, ambitions, and immaturity were important factors in this fragmentation.

Department of Itapúa

Harald E.L. Prins
Kansas State University

Intimidation in the countryside

Generally, the electoral process in the rural towns of *Carlos A. López* (3,975 voters) and *Mayor Otaño* (3,613 voters), in the southeastern province of Itapúa appeared regular. At López, opposition party representatives alerted me to vehicles cruising around or parked near the polling place, outfitted with Colorado flags. The drivers of these vehicles had removed the number plates of their government-owned cars.

Further, the Armed Forces had directed small groups of rifle-carrying soldiers to stand guard at the local polling places. At López, there were 6 soldiers and an officer stationed at the places of entry and exit, while at nearby Otaño at least 4 armed guards were placed at each of its two polling places. Overt intimidation by the armed forces occurred at the border where Paraguayan citizens, having voted in López, were, *de facto*, detained for several hours.

The frontier issue

On my way from Asunción to López on May 8, I stopped at the AEN headquarters in Encarnación where opposition party officials alerted me about government plans to close the international border on national election day.

The following day at López, I was called by PLRA *apoderado* Hugo Ocampo, a lawyer from Encarnación, to join him and three others to drive to 7 de Agosto, a small frontier river post and ferry dock place to Puerto Pirai on the Upper Parana. There, we encountered a group of about 20 Paraguayan men and women. Already having voted in López, where they were registered, these people were being blocked from returning to their homes in Argentina by two armed border guards. Having had no difficulties when they entered the country before May 9, they were now prevented from taking the ferry back across the river. Apprehensive, they asked me to intervene on their behalf.

I interviewed both guards who told me that their commanding officer, Teniente de Fragata Raúl Alderete had issued the orders, and that he could be found about 10 km upriver at Puerto Primera Línea Otaño. Accompanied by PLRA *apoderado* Ocampo and several opposition party members, I drove to the small port, where we encountered the officer, two subalterns, and two armed border guards. After initially trying to stonewall our questioning regarding the incident, the Teniente admitted that he was under direct orders, based on a court order in Asunción.

Credentials of *apoderados*

Accompanying Dr. Ramón Fogel, assigned by AEN as *apoderado* in López, I stopped in Encarnación on May 8, where local opposition party officials complained that about 70% of the credentials requested for their *apoderados* had not arrived from the *Junta Electoral Central* (JEC) in Asunción. As López was still six hours of travel away, we departed that same evening, while an *Encuentro* official flew to Asunción to obtain the missing documents. At noon, May 9, halfway during the elections in López, Dr. Fogel finally received his credentials, hand-delivered by *Encuentro* cohorts. Initially, the local electoral council refused to acknowledge his credentials. I attended the hearing, and participated in the deliberations. After reading an accompanying JEC document to the illiterate council president (a Colorado), Dr. Fogel was finally recognized as an official *apoderado*.

Voting procedures at López and Otaño

After 11 hours of travel from Asunción, by omnibus and landrover over dusty roads, Dr. Fogel and I arrived in López at midnight. At 5 in the morning, rural folk began trickling into town. Some came on foot, on horseback, or in mule-drawn wagons, others arrived in cars, trucks, and chartered busses.


The local school complex served as polling place. Wooden tables and simple booths were set up in the classrooms and in the wooden sheds. Before 6 o'clock, local election officials, party activists, and volunteers began setting up, and panels of local townspeople, were assigned to their respective voting tables. A Colorado *apoderado* gave them formal instructions about rules and regulations. The two other *apoderados* were a lawyer from Encarnación (for the PLRA) and a university professor from Asunción (for AEN). Some rifle-carrying soldiers took their respective positions at the places of entry and exit. At 6 o'clock, the booths were opened and the voting started.

Soon, opposition party *apoderados* asked me to review irregularities involving forged personal identification cards, etc. Another minor incident concerned an accident involving an inkpot spilling over the PLRA copy of the electoral register (*padrón*). I confirmed that the substitute was valid. One electoral problem concerned local Mbya Guaraní. As "Indians" do not possess "legal documentation" of their Paraguayan citizenship, authorities prevented them from participating in the electoral process.

Having been interviewed by a journalist from *El Diario Noticias*/Radio Cardinal, I visited both local polling place at nearby Otaño. Voters were lined up in a huge open shed, where some booths were open on the backside. Others had short black curtains, blowing in the wind and fully exposing voters in their booths. Overall, however, people seemed satisfied.

Upon return to López, I was called to the Argentine border where Paraguayans returning from López were held up by the military (see above). After two hours, I drove back to López, where many were still lined up waiting to cast their ballots.

The counting of ballots presented minor problems; some for List# 1 (Colorado) were marked with "Argaña" handwritten over "Wasmosy." Occasionally, panels requested my presence when the validity of ballots was contested. Nevertheless, many seemed to feel that the local election had been fair. Later that night, all ballots having been counted, it appeared that there had been a turnout of about 75%. Based on the preliminary outcome that evening, the Colorados had won in López.



Department of Misiones

Jan Black
Monterey Institute of International Studies
and
Martin Needler
University of the Pacific

On election day we went to Misiones, visiting 7 polling places, then watched the vote-tally procedures in a polling area in Asunción. We found that the voting generally proceeded in exemplary fashion, with poll official very versed in procedures, which seemed to be carried out faithfully and well. We did, however, hear reports from opposition precinct officials and *apoderados* of "shady practices" whose overall effect on the election might have been enough to alter the outcome had the candidates been within one or two percentages points of each other. These reports consisted of intimidating behavior by Colorados officials toward supporters of the opposition, of the buying of *cédulas* in the polling vicinity, and of a large number of voters being told that they were registered elsewhere. One official reported that opposition *apoderados* had been intimidated and that trucks carrying opposition voters had been stopped by highway patrol. Minor infractions included a generalized failure to clean fingers before dipping them in ink (grease on the finger could facilitate the washing off of ink, enabling a person to vote more than once). We also noticed Colorado propaganda in a telecommunications center, which is illegal.

For a benchmark election such as this one, there are several good arguments for having observers on hand. The most important, perhaps, is that the presence of foreign observers might inhibit would-be perpetrators of the most outrageous abuses, such as the government thugs who assaulted voters and candidates at the polls and on the streets in Haiti in 1987 and in Panama in 1989.

But there are risks and liabilities in observing and passing judgement upon elections. The misuse of observers comes about in part because only those most intimately involved in the electoral process or most likely to be affected by the outcome will read observer reports in their entirety. For most, the judgement of observers will be passed on in headlines and sound-bites. Finally, in most cases, the focus of observers, or of the media's use of observers, falls too narrowly on what transpires on election day at the voting precincts and on the outcome or projection of the vote count. In the Paraguayan case, most observers, including those of the LASA team, accepted the government's finding that the official candidate had received a plurality of the popular vote, but that was far from the whole story and far from a finding that the election represented a breakthrough to democracy.

A more serious assessment of the process and the validity of its outcome should take into account the macro-political environment. Paraguay has come a long way since the corrupt and brutal 35-year rule of General Alfredo Stroessner was ended by a coup d'etat in 1989. A new generation mobilized to force a democratic opening, and freedom of expression and of assembly gradually came to be generally respected. But the ruling trail of military, bureaucracy, and official party (the Colorados) still had control of most of the money, all of the weapons, and all of the electoral machinery.

Such a controls made it possible for the government to lay on a smorgasbord of election chicanery, from the blatant rigging of the Colorado's own primary to the closing of borders on election day to keep out opposition voter returning from work in Argentina or Brazil. But the crucial flaw in the incumbent regime's approach to elections, the apparent existence of contingency plans in the event that result were not to their liking, was given away when communications between independent pollwatchers in outlying areas and observers in the capital were sabotaged on election day. And the ultimate catch was that disputes could be resolved only by the Colorado-controlled Central Election Commission and results confirmed or annulled by the Colorado-controlled Congress.

Early unofficial computations, showing a plurality for the government's candidate in the presidential election, had indicated that the opposition parties together would have majorities in both houses of Congress. During the days following the May 9th election, however, as the official count dragged on and international observer and media attention were directed elsewhere, the government appeared to abandon the new math of electoral politics and the opposition lead gradually eroded.

The ultimate restoration of the opposition majority most likely represented to some degree the government's response to the resolve for the major opposition parties to boycott the Congress unless they were able to occupy the seats they were confident they had won. However it appears that pressure from some international monitors also contributed to that outcome.

Department of Paraguari


Paul Lewis
Tulane University

On Sunday, May 9, I visited the following Polling sites:

- 1) 8:30 a.m., a school in the Villa Mora *barrio* of Asunción;
- 2) 10:00 a.m., a school in the town of Itá;
- 3) 11:00 a.m., two schools in the town of Paraguari;
- 4) 5:00 p.m., a school in downtown Asunción, where I watched the counting of ballots.

In each place the public mood seemed cooperative. I spoke to *apoderados*, both of the government party and of the opposition, in all places. No serious incidents were reported to me. The main problem I encountered was that in Itá, the *vocal* for the *Encuentro Nacional* did not receive his credentials in time, and was so replaced at the *mesa* by a Colorado. I was with an official of the *Encuentro* at the time, who, after investigating the incident, decided that the decision accorded with the Electoral Code.

Otherwise, the only "irregularity" that I observed was that in Paraguari, the voters crowded the *mesas*, instead of forming proper lines. This was not a problem in Itá, or at the places I visited in Asunción.



Department of Alto Paraná(I)

Beverly Nagel
Carleton College

We arrived in Ciudad del Este on Saturday morning, and spent the day interviewing election officials and party representatives.* In the morning we met first with the Delegado de Gobierno and then jointly with members of the Junta Electoral Seccional (JES) and the Tribunal Electoral of Ciudad del Este. During the afternoon, we met with gubernatorial candidates of the *Encuentro Nacional*, *Partido de los Trabajadores (EN)*, three independent movements, and the Colorado candidate for governor, Carlos Barreto. (We were unable to locate and schedule a meeting with PLRA representatives.)

The officials that we met with on Saturday morning assured us that all had run smoothly in the period leading up to the elections.

The representatives of the political parties presented a somewhat different picture. Three of the opposition candidates noted the tremendous advantages that the Colorado candidate enjoyed by virtue of access to the state apparatus for his campaign. Opposition parties alleged that the resources of Itaipú Binacional were being put to use on behalf of the Colorado campaign (though no specific instances were cited) and that state vehicles were being used for political purposes. Members of the *Movimiento Regional Paranaense* claimed that guns had been fired near their meeting the preceding evening, and blamed the Colorados for this incident. They had called the *Delegado* to complain, but had not been able to locate him. The PT candidate for governor complained that his party had been excluded or marginalized from various meetings preceding the election.

Our interview with the Colorado candidate for governor, Carlos Barreto, was quite unlike any our other interviews. Barreto has long been one of the most powerful men in Alto Paraná. Reputed to have made his fortune through smuggling, today he is believed to control much of the smuggling traffic through Ciudad del Este. He also owns one of the main radio stations in Alto Paraná, as well as the local casino. We were received at his estate outside of Ciudad del Este, located adjacent to the radio station that he owns. Several of Barreto's comments proved

*The interviews with government and voting officials on Saturday morning, as well as the interview with Carlos Barreto, were conducted with the NDI delegation to Ciudad del Este; the other interviews with party officials I conducted alone. On election day I was accompanied for most of the day by Cedric Grant, former Ambassador from Guyana to the U.S. and a member of the NDI delegation.

quite fateful in light of subsequent events.

On Sunday I observed voting at 6 voting sites in Ciudad del Este, Hernandarias, Juan León Mallorquín and Minga Guazú. In all cases the voting was orderly, though often slow, and election workers in all sites and of all parties that I spoke with assured me that adequate materials were available. All voting tables were covered by the requisite number of election workers, as well as *veedores*.

In Ciudad del Este, given the fact that more than two hundred *mesas* were crowded into one locale, voting was remarkably orderly. Some tables were delayed as much as an hour in opening voting, largely because ballot boxes and other materials could not be distributed from the central Junta office quickly enough. This meant that in some cases, voters had to stand in line for long periods. At one table, party representatives nearly came to blows over the seating of election workers. The Colorado party workers claimed that the PLRA *vocal* had not presented himself on time, and hence put one of their own colleagues as *vocal* (election official). That meant that all three *mesa* officials were Colorado. In the end, the third Colorado *mesa* official was replaced by a PLRA representative, and voting began. Aside from this incident, I observed no incidents in the voting. One Colorado *mesa* official refused to allow me and my colleague to approach his table; on another occasion the Colorado *presidente de mesa* allowed us to observe but made clear his displeasure. We also encountered a similar problem in observing the counting of ballots, again involving Colorado *mesa* officials.

Voting in Hernandarias and Juan León Mallorquín proceeded smoothly. At both sites, voting had begun on time, and election workers reported no problems. However, in Hernandarias the police presence was palpable. At least three armed police stood guard at each of the narrow gateways through which voters entered the polling site. Inside, both ordinary police (reporting to the Delegado de Gobierno) and members of the Special Forces were present; additional armed guards stood at attention at the entrance to the officers used by the JES. A team comprised of a policeman and Special Forces member strolled from table to table inside the polling place. Officials in Hernandarias also reported two problems with register: (1) Married women had been listed under their maiden names, leading to confusion in finding the correct voting table. (2) Some people who had registered for the Colorado party primary erroneously believe that registration served as well for the national elections, and consequently did not find their names on the register.

In Juan León Mallorquín, the atmosphere was extremely festive. Though virtually no one reported problems, the lines at some of the tables were extremely long. Some voters had waited in line for over two hours without reaching the *mesa*.


Ironically, when my colleague and I arrived in Minga Guazú, we walked into the polling

site and directly into the midst of Carlos Barreto and a number of his supporters campaigning. Barreto was ostensibly being interviewed by a radio journalists (employed by his own radio stations), making a very loud campaign speech within about ten feet of a line of voters. *Apoderados* for the EN, enraged, filed a complaint with the JES about his campaign activities; they had earlier filed a complaint against some of his campaign workers who had reportedly strolled up and down the lines of people waiting to vote, pressuring them to vote for Barreto. The EN *apoderados* told us also that there had been considerable harassment and tension in the community in preceding days. The harassment was directed primarily against members of the *Movimiento Regional Paranaense*, a break-away Colorado group of Argaña supporters, by *oficialista Colorados* (e.g., Barreto supporters). Although we tried to speak with other pollwatchers, the radio reporter employed by Barreto clung to us like a barnacle, making frank conversation impossible.

I observed the vote counting in both Hernandarias and Ciudad del Este. In Hernandarias, counting proceeded without incident, although the SAKA workers reported that in the days preceding the election they had been subjected to considerable pressure (from local Colorado officials) to abandon their work. In Ciudad del Este, in general, the counting proceeded without incident. However, I was approached by a young man working with SAKA for assistance when officials at his assigned table refused to allow him to record the count. I accompanied the student back to the table and watched as he repeated his request for voting tallies. The officials of the *mesa* grabbed the ballot box and angrily marched off toward the *Junta Electoral Seccional* (JES) office, without so much as a comment to either the SAKA worker or to me. A member of the JES staff was present and shared his tally of the *mesa's* results with the SAKA worker; at this table, the Colorado party had lost the presidential race by two votes.

Despite these incidents, I was generally impressed with the competence with which the elections were administered, especially in comparison with past elections. I was also greatly impressed by the perseverance of the voters who often stood in line for long periods of time to vote.

On the other hand, I was distressed especially by the delay in opening some mesas in Ciudad del Este, by the powerful police presence in Hernandarias, and by the violation of electoral law by Carlos Barreto, in campaigning and pressuring voters inside a voting site. Moreover, the negative attitudes toward our delegation and toward the students working with SAKA displayed by some Colorado election workers indicate a disturbing mentality and deep entrenchment on the part of some members the official party that may well diminish public confidence in the electoral process.



Department of Alto Paraná(II)


Timothy R. Scully
University of Notre Dame

I spent the day of the May 9 election in Ciudad del Este, mostly in that city's largest polling place, *el Centro Regional*.

There can be no doubt that the Colorado party there used its long-lived power to grind out great support. Though open acts of electoral fraud were very difficult to detect, undoubtedly the Colorados used PRI-like techniques to generate electoral support. Allow me some examples:

1. The local transport companies were rented, almost exclusively that day, by the Colorado Party. The remaining few independents were rented out by the Liberals. There was not a single bus or taxi that was not rented out by the Colorados (with the exception of a few leftovers for the Liberals). Obviously, this meant that it was very difficult for opposition organizations to acquire a support truck or bus or taxi. I cannot imagine that this power did not significantly alter the results in favor of the Colorados.
2. The *Encuentro Nacional* computer system experienced a sudden and mysterious breakdown in the area the night before the campaign, owing to the introduction of a virus into the system. A pure coincidence?
3. In the polling place where I acted as observer, Colorado *apoderados* outnumbered those of the opposition visibly. When a count was made, it was discovered that the Colorados had at least 32 *apoderados* in the voting area, when they were only allowed 6. A formal complaint was made to the authorities in my presence.
4. It was common that people were voting in the midst of the lines of those waiting to register for the vote. The location of the ballot booths in the midst of the crowds made it absolutely impossible to guarantee a secret ballot. I saw plenty of people milling around the voters, in some cases openly instructing them how to vote.

I came away from the experience with a clear sense that the Colorados were prepared to do what they had to in order to win the elections. I have little doubt that the vote totals they reported officially reflect the "real" result. I am equally convinced that the environment that surrounded the elections, and the distribution of resources, overwhelmingly favored the Colorado victory.



Department of Central(I)

Kennett Cott
Washburn University

I visited the following fourteen places:

Villeta

Escuela de la Parroquia Nuestra Sra. del Rosario, where *apoderados* complained of problems with the *padrones*. Many who wished to vote were not listed. *Colegio Nacional Carlos Antonio López* and *Escuela Graduada Adolfo María Monges*, where I could not identify any problems.

Ypane

When I arrived at the school in this small town, the *apoderado* for the *Encuentro Nacional* told me that there had been no problems. But about 11:00 *apoderados* for the PLRA and *Encuentro* complained that a group of 200 to 300 young men, apparently soldiers dressed in civilian clothes, had arrived and were seeking to vote. They were not from Ypané but their names were in the *padrones*. This the *apoderados* denounced as fraud. The Colorado *apoderado* said the law is clear: anyone with a cedula whose name is in the *padrones* must be allowed to vote. There were, he said, many people registered in towns where they no longer lived.

Lambaré

Asociación de Empleados del Ministerio de Hacienda: PLRA *apoderados* complained that the ballots had arrived almost two hours late and that Colorados were belligerently contesting many voters. *Salón Multiuso Parroquial*--I neither saw nor heard of any problems.

Luque

Escuela Graduada #269, *Escuela Gen. Elizardo Aquino*, *Escuela Graduada Mariscal José F. Estigarribia*, and *Escuela Capitán Bernardino Caballero*. Everyone said that there had been no problems and that everything was quiet and orderly. At the *Colegio Nacional de Luque*, an *Encuentro* *apoderado* complained that one *mesa* the president and the vocal were using different *padrones* and the names were not the same in some cases. All sides had agreed that during the vote tally they would destroy ballots equal in number to the disrupted names. At the *Colegio Manuel Domínguez*, the PLRA *apoderado* said that the only problem as of 3:00 p.m. had come in the morning during the organizing of the *mesas*, when the JES official in charge of the local sought to appoint all members of several *mesas*, packing them his people. The PLRA had been unable to change his decisions,

but the *Encuentro* had been unable to cover all the tables.

I concluded [my observations] by visiting two rural locations, Maramburé and Yuquyry. Both had fewer than ten *mesas* and were much more manageable than some of the larger voting places. The *apoderados* from all three parties agreed that everything had gone beautifully. (At Maramburé, the PLRA *apoderado* said that this old town was heavily liberal and that they did not therefore expect the Colorados to try anything.)

The most widespread problem that I observed throughout the day was the omission from the *padrones* of the names of many voters. There was, however, no indication that this affected one party more than another.

Department of Central(II)

Marysa Navarro
Dartmouth College

I visited the following voting stations:

The National Girls School was the first place I went. Voting started late, at 7:30 a.m., because not all the tables were ready, but I could not see any kind of disruption when things got going. There were nervous poll watchers who warned us of possible incidents but I could not see anything.

In the Dante Alighieri School there were two heated discussions—one particularly loud—between *Democracia Vigilantes*, who were too close to the tables, and the party representatives.

I then went to the University, the *Facultad de Filosofía*, where I counted some 34 tables, next to very precarious voting booths, all by then with long lines of people patiently waiting their turn to vote. Several persons said that they had waited for more than three hours in line. Despite the lines and the heat, no incidents.

The next polling station was the *Escuela Fundación Molinos*, located in a working class neighborhood. I was told that before my arrival, there had been problems with the voting lists but things were quiet. What I did see was a woman and two young men, whose obvious task was to accompany elderly persons, who seemed to have only a vague idea of what they were doing in the booths. On two different occasions I saw the woman enter the booth with the voter—which was very easy to do because the booth was a piece of cloth swinging with the wind. Once inside the booth, despite complaints from the poll watchers, the woman insisted on telling the voters to vote *colorado* and to explain where to do it.

At a few blocks from the School there was a *colorado* station with tables, chairs, and many cars. People approached the tables, their names were checked on several lists and the persons were taken to nearby cars or trucks which in most instances had the *colorado* flag.

In the José de Antequera y Castro School, a run down, small building, voting was made difficult by the crowds, the large number of tables and booths in a very limited space. Once again I was told that there had been incidents before my arrival (in this case people wanting to vote with old *cedulas*) but though I stayed more than an hour, I did not see any irregularity.

My hostess took me to her house for lunch and we went to her polling station. She lived in an elegant sector of the city. The voting station was in a school, spacious and very well kept, but like all other places we visited, very crowded.

The last place I visited was outside the city perimeter (Lambaré), in a very large shed in

the middle of a working class neighborhood. There was a large number of tables, precarious voting booths and very long lines.

When we went to the different schools we saw many cars with *colorado* banners and an occasional liberal symbol. Everywhere we went we were welcomed and thanked for our presence in Paraguay.

I went with Nora Hamilton to the *Escuela Nacional de Niñas* in Asunción to watch the counting. We were asked to observe two tables in particular because the authorities were suspicious. The one I watched was very lengthy process because each party representative had to count each vote. I did not see any irregularity.

Department of Central(III)

Héctor Vélez
Ithaca College

I arrived in Asunción on the very day of the election, Sunday, May 9, 1993 at about 10:00 a.m. The very first experience I had was at the airport, where none of my Paraguayan fellow travelers were allowed out of the airport. Upon asking about this, the officials told me they were under court orders not to allow Paraguayans living abroad into the country for the sole purpose of voting against the Colorado Party. When I mentioned that the action taken seemed unconstitutional to me, one official mentioned that the Constitution had been changed to allow for this. As a non-Paraguayan, however, I was allowed to go on my way.

Since I arrived when the voting process was already well on its way, I was unable to travel much further than the Capital city. I was present when a group of SAKA observers came to complain that they had been turned away from a Fernando de la Mora School, a polling site near Asuncion. With Marcial Riquelme, the entire group of about six persons went to Fernando de la Mora where we found a military presence. They denied that the group had been turned away, and we were allowed inside. I witnessed there a room where election officials were surrounded by torn voting envelopes, with ballots strewn all over the floor. We asked about the torn or opened envelopes, to which they responded that the ballots had already been included in the official count. There was no evidence there of adequate safeguards, or even of the sacredness of the secret ballot. Indeed, the military presence in the school, and throughout the Capital seemed like an obvious intimidation of the voters. There was also abundant evidence of the partnership of the military, since military trucks criss-crossed the Capital city carrying Colorado followers to different polling sites.

In unofficial conversations with citizens during the day, (and for many days later) I heard over and over about widespread fraud, such as people voting with fraudulent voting cards. Public suspicion about the process was very high, since in many places poll observers were not allowed access to the counting. I was present when the SAKA lines went out of commission, and we later learned they had been cut. Thus, although President Jimmy Carter's group recognized that the lines had been cut intentionally, his group still mentioned before leaving Paraguay that the elections had been generally fair. Based on my experience, however, illegal acts and intimidation were reported by individual voters. Some of our own observers were shut out of the official counting process of the Electoral Junta itself. When a judge asked one of our observers to leave the Junta counting room, I hailed a few television and newspaper reporters that were

present in the hallway and told them of the incident. The media immediately surrounded the Judge when he walked out of the room for a moment, and pointedly asked him why he had excluded an international observer from the official counting. He claimed that the reason was that the room was filled beyond capacity. When I pointed out that our observer had been one of the first to enter the room and was in fact sitting at the official table, he stated that the observer could indeed come in, which the observer immediately did.


We were all especially surprised when the television stations announced the victory of the Colorado Party while the count was still going on. Indeed, the count would go on for many days after the Colorado Party had been declared, and declared itself the winner.

My main observation is that, although the electoral process itself was fairer than might have been expected given the electoral history of Paraguay, the lack of *transparencia* or clarity was much more evident in the aftermath of the election process. The Colorado Party was determined to win at any cost, even by the use of fraud and intimidation if necessary. It is my belief, based on my experience and wide-ranging conversations with Paraguayans of diverse political affiliations, that the Colorado Party would probably have won anyway, even without obvious fraud, given the lack of unity in the opposition parties. Its determination to win, however, left no room to chance.


PART V

Documentation

ANNEXES



Annex A1. SAKA's Request to LASA for a Delegation of Academic Observers



Asunción, 12 de Marzo de 1993.

Dr. Gabriel Riquelme
304 Fairchild Hall
Manhattan, Kansas 65806-1111

Estimado colega,

El motivo de la presente carta es solicitar observadores y analistas políticos para las elecciones presidenciales y parlamentarias del Paraguay del mes de mayo.

Las elecciones en nuestro país revisten un carácter crítico. Serán, de llevarse a cabo con limpieza, las primeras elecciones democráticas de la historia política del Paraguay, y la coronación --o, en su defecto, el fracaso-- del proceso de transición a la democracia iniciado en febrero de 1989.

Existe una enorme incertidumbre ciudadana sobre la voluntad política del gobierno --basado fundamentalmente en el estamento militar--, de respetar resultados si ellos son desfavorables a sus candidatos.

Acaba de ocurrir que, dentro de las elecciones internas de la Asociación Nacional Republicana, partido de gobierno, ganó el candidato que no tenía el respaldo del oficial, Luis María Argaña, y los resultados no fueron respetados.

Después de una serie de procesos completamente irregulares, un tribunal electoral partidario, conformado por simpatizantes de una de las listas, proclamó la victoria del Ingeniero Juan Carlos Wasmosy, que había perdido los comicios.

Todo ello hace conveniente y de enorme utilidad la presencia de autoridades de solvencia académica y prestigio internacional que realicen análisis y observación del proceso.

Además puede aprovecharse el hecho de que en la misma noche un Consorcio de Organizaciones no Gubernamentales realizará un conteo paralelo que, en cuatro horas, dará el resultado extraoficial, pero completo, de los comicios.

El mencionado consorcio llamado Saka, Iniciativa para la Transparencia Electoral, ya demostró su capacidad de aportar un servicio útil al electorado en mayo de 1991, durante las elecciones municipales. Tu participación personal, en esa fecha, aportó criterios importantes que, transmitidos en vivo y en directo por los canales de televisión dieron, junto a los datos criterios para la confiabilidad del proceso electoral.

Recordemos que la Junta Electoral Central tardó un mes en entregar resultados exactos, que coincidieron puntualmente con los de Saka.

Personalmente me tocó dirigir la parte ejecutiva y técnica de Saka en 1991, y volveré a hacerlo en mayo de año actual. Como parte del Task Force de Lasa y como coordinador ejecutivo de Saka pero también como ciudadano comprometido con el futuro de nuestra frágil democracia te solicito que invites a los colegas del Latin American Studies Program para que colaboren en un evento apasionante desde el punto de vista de la observación y enormemente importante para el futuro de nuestra libertades.

Con amistad,

Dr. Gabriel Riquelme
304 Fairchild Hall
Manhattan, Kansas 65806-1111
Tel: (595 21) 23 59 21 / 212 746. Casilla Postal 2550
Asunción Paraguay

Annex A2. SAKA's Request to LASA for a Delegation of Academic Observers

English Translation

Asunción, March 12, 1993

Dr. Marcial Riquelme
304 Fairchild Hall
Manhattan, Kansas 66506-1111

Dear Colleague,

The purpose of the following letter is to request observers and political analysts for the presidential and parliamentary elections of Paraguay in the month of May.

The elections in our country are of a critical nature. They will be, if they are carried out cleanly, the first democratic elections of the political history of Paraguay, and the culmination --or, on the contrary, the failure-- of the process of democratic transition initiated in February 1989.

There is a great uncertainty among the citizenry over the political will of the government --which is based mainly on the military establishment--, of respecting the results if they are unfavorable to their candidates.

Recently, during the primaries of the governing party, the *Asociación Nacional Republicana*, the candidate which did not have the official backing, Luis María Argaña, won and the results were not respected.

After a series of completely irregular procedures, a party electoral tribunal, made up by sympathizers of one of the [competing] lists, proclaimed the victory of the *Ingeniero* Juan Carlos Wasmosy, who had lost in the elections.

All of this makes the presence of academic authorities of international prestige to analyze and observe the [electoral] process convenient and of great use.

The same night [of election day] a consortium of non-governmental organizations will conduct a parallel counting that, in four hours, will give the unofficial, but complete, results of the elections.

Said consortium, called *Sakâ*, *Iniciativa para la Transparencia Electoral*, has already demonstrated its ability to provide a useful service to the electorate in May 1991, during the municipal elections. Your participation at that time, transmitted live through television channels, contributed with important analysis which together with the data [provided by Sakâ] made the electoral process reliable.

Lets recall that it took the Central Electoral Board one month to deliver the exact results, which coincided exactly with those of Sakâ.

I personally directed the executive and technical part of Sakâ in 1991 and will do it again in May of this year. As a member of the LASA Task Force [on Scholarly Relations with Paraguay] and as the Executive Coordinator of Sakâ, but also as a citizen committed to the future of our fragile democracy, I ask that you invite the colleagues of the Latin American Studies Program to collaborate in an historic event, from the point of view of observation, and critically important for the future of our liberties.

With friendship,

Jose Carlos Rodríguez

Annex B1. AEN's Request to LASA for a Delegation of Academic Observers



Asunción, 16 de Marzo de 1993.

Dra. Carmen Diana Deere
Presidente
Latin American Studies Association


Estimada Dra. Deere:

Nos dirigimos a usted a fin de solicitarles el envío de una delegación académica de observadores para los comicios generales que el próximo 9 de Mayo se realizarán en el Paraguay.

Las elecciones del 9 de Mayo serán un hito crucial en el proceso de transición a la democracia en el Paraguay. De su éxito depende que se abran las puertas al establecimiento y consolidación de un régimen democrático que, por el contrario, el proceso de transición experimente un retroceso fatal. Por ello es fundamental que ante tan histórico acontecimiento la comunidad internacional, política y académica, fije sus ojos en el caso de Paraguay y ponga así la dosis de presión necesaria para que se respeten las normas propias de una elección democrática.

Esta presencia, de por sí importante en etapas tan cruciales de cualquier proceso de transición, es aún más importante debido a la reiteradas declaraciones y actos del gobierno y de altas autoridades del partido de gobierno que están poniendo en tela de juicio la feliz culminación del proceso. Esto incluye insinuaciones de suspender las elecciones, cambio de las reglas de juego a solo 50 días de las elecciones, declaraciones oficiales acerca de una posible desintegración de la Junta Electoral Central que es el organismo encargado de organizar y juzgar en primera instancia las elecciones, no entrega del padrón electoral a las fuerzas políticas, declaraciones acerca de una supuesta imposibilidad material de entregar el padrón en el plazo establecido en la legislación electoral. De aquí la imperiosa necesidad de contar con una calificada delegación de LASA que con su presencia contribuya a la realización de elecciones libres, limpias y justas.

Confiamos en que el espíritu democrático de su organización prestará la debida atención a nuestro pedido y esperamos contar con su ayuda que, tengan la seguridad, será bienvenida por todo el pueblo paraguayo.


Dr. Mario Paz Castaing
Coordinador General
ENCUENTRO NACIONAL

Annex B2. AEN's Request to LASA for a Delegation of Academic Observers

English Translation

Asunción, March 16, 1993

Dr. Carmen Diana Deere
President
Latin American Studies Association

Dear Dr. Deere:

We write to you with the purpose of requesting that you send an academic delegation of observers for the general elections that will take place next May 9 in Paraguay.

The May 9 elections will be a crucial milestone in the process of democratic transition in Paraguay. Its success depends on the opening of the doors for the establishment and consolidation of a democratic regime or that, on the contrary, the process of transition experience a fatal reversal. For this reason it is critical that in the face of such an historic event, the international political and academic community, take notice of the Paraguayan case and thus apply the necessary pressure so that the proper norms of a democratic election are respected.

This presence, in-and-of-itself important in such crucial stages of any process of transition, is even more important due to the repeated declarations and actions of the government and high authorities of the ruling party that are creating doubts about a happy culmination of the process. These include suggestions of cancelling the elections, changing the rules of the game only 50 days before the elections, official statements made about the possible disintegration of the Central Electoral Board, which is the entity in charge of organizing and judging in the first instance the elections, failure to deliver the electoral register to the political forces, declarations over an allegedly material impossibility of submitting the electoral register at the time stipulated by the electoral legislation. As a result, it is of utmost importance to have a qualified delegation of LASA [observers] who, with their presence, contribute to the carrying out of free, clean and just elections.

We trust that the democratic spirit of your organization will pay the appropriate consideration to our request and hope to count on your support; and you can be assured that you will be welcome by all the Paraguayan people.

Dr. Mario Paz Castaing
General Coordinator
Encuentro Nacional

Annex C1. PLRA's Request to LASA for a Delegation of Academic Observers



PARTIDO LIBERAL RADICAL AUTÉNTICO

SAN JOSE 866 - Tel.: 24364/202497 - ASUNCION - PARAGUAY

Asunción, 23 de Marzo de 1993.

Señora
Dra. Carmen Diana Deere
Presidente
Latin American Studies Association

Estimada Dra. Deere:

Mns dirigimos a Ud., en nombre del Partido Liberal Radical Auténtico, a objeto de solicitarle la presencia de una delegación académica de observadores para las elecciones generales del próximo 9 de Mayo que habrán de realizarse en Paraguay.


Dichas elecciones constituyen un acontecimiento importantí simo en la búsqueda del pueblo paraguayo de consolidar definitivamente una so ciudad democrática.

Si bién somos los Paraguayos quienes tenemos mayor respon sabilidad de lograr el establecimiento del régimen democrático, no es menc cierto que la presencia de observadores internacionales constituye una valio sa ayuda para hacer posible la transparencia electoral.

Por ello estamos solicitando la presencia de L.A.S.A. en la confianza de que en ésa institución existe un solidario interés por el pro ceso de la transición Paraguaya, interés que valoramos y agradecemos y nos im pulsa a formular éste pedido.

Sin otro particular nos complacemos en saludarle con inm tra consideración más distinguida.




Juan Manuel Benítez Florentín
Presidente

Annex C2. PLRA's Request to LASA for a Delegation of Academic Observers

English Translation

Asunción, March 23, 1993

Dr. Carmen Diana Deere
President
Latin American Studies Association

Dear Dr. Deere:

On behalf of the *Partido Liberal Radical Auténtico*, we write to you to request the presence of an academic delegation of observers for the general elections for next May 9 that will take place in Paraguay.

Said elections represent a very important event in the search for the consolidation of a democratic society by the Paraguayan people.

Although it is we Paraguayans who have a greater responsibility of achieving the establishment of a democratic regime, it is no less true that the presence of international observers constitutes a valuable help to make possible electoral transparency.

For this reason we are requesting the presence of LASA, trusting that in this institution exists solidarity in the Paraguayan process of transition -interests that we value and acknowledge and gave us impetus to make this request.

Without further adue we are pleased to salute you with our most distinguished consideration.

Juan Manuel Benítez Florentín
President

Annex D1. Statement by the U.S. Embassy in Asunción

☎ 212 21 212312

USIS ASUNCION

02/01 '93 14:23

P01

Servicio Informativo y Cultural
de los Estados Unidos de América

Av. Mca. López 1778
Asunción, Paraguay
Tels. 213718/28



USIS

Enero 2 de 1993

DECLARACION DE LA EMBAJADA DE EE.UU.

El Paraguay ha dado grandes pasos hacia una sociedad más democrática y abierta desde la terminación de la dictadura de Stroessner. Bajo el gobierno del Presidente Rodríguez, la democracia se ha consolidado. El Presidente Rodríguez ha afirmado en reiteradas oportunidades que hará entrega del poder el 15 de agosto del año en curso. Tenemos confianza en que el proceso democrático continúe su afianzamiento, y dentro de este contexto, esperamos que las cuestiones políticas puedan ser resueltas por medio del diálogo y los medios judiciales previstos en la constitución y leyes del Paraguay.

La Embajada de los Estados Unidos no espera que tenga lugar una interrupción de ninguna índole del orden democrático. Sin embargo, los Estados Unidos reafirma que una interrupción del proceso democrático en el Paraguay provocaría una fuerte reacción de los Estados Unidos, como así también de la comunidad internacional.

La Embajada de los Estados Unidos reitera su posición claramente expresada de neutralidad total y equidistancia de las candidaturas al gobierno de la República del Paraguay. Al mismo tiempo esta Embajada expresa nuevamente su apoyo a la libertad política y económica y a la llegada a buen término de la transición democrática.

Annex D2. Statement by the U.S. Embassy in Asunción

English Translation

January 2, 1993

STATEMENT BY THE U.S. EMBASSY

Paraguay has taken important steps towards a more democratic and open society since the termination of the dictatorship of Stroessner. Under the government of President Rodriguez, democracy has been consolidated. President Rodriguez has stated in several opportunities that he will turn in power on August 15 of this year. We trust that the democratic process will continue its consolidation, and within this context, we hope that the political issues can be resolved through dialogue and the judicial means provided by the Constitution and the laws of Paraguay.

The Embassy of the United States does not expect that an interruption of any kind of the democratic order would take place. However, the United States reasserts that an interruption of the democratic process in Paraguay would provoke a strong reaction by the United States, as well as that of the international community.

The Embassy of the United States reiterates its clearly expressed position of total neutrality and distance from the candidates for the government of the Republic of Paraguay. Also, this Embassy expresses again its support for the political and economic freedom and the completion of the democratic transition.

Annex E. Members of the LASA Delegation

Jan Black
Monterey Institute of International Studies

Jerry Cooney
Department of History
University of Louisville

Kennett Cott
Department of History
Washburn University

Nora Hamilton
Department of Political Science
University of Southern California

Paul Lewis
Department of Political Science
Tulane University

Frank Mora
Graduate School of International Studies
University of Miami

Beverly Nagel
Department of Sociology and Anthropology
Carleton College

Marysa Navarro
Department of History
Dartmouth College

Martin Needler
School of International Studies
University of the Pacific

John Portner
Department of Social Work
Kansas University

Harald E.L. Prins
Department of Anthropology
Kansas State University

Marcial A. Riquelme
Department of Sociology/
Latin American Studies Program
Kansas State University

Timothy R. Scully
Kellogg Institute
University of Notre Dame

Héctor Vélez
Department of Sociology
Ithaca College

Annex F. Organizations and Individuals Interviewed in Paraguay

Partido Liberal Radical Auténtico (PLRA)

Domingo Laíno, Presidential Candidate
Juan Manuel Benítez Florentín, Vice-presidential Candidate
José Félix Fernández, Senator elect
Carlos Caballero Royg, former Congressman
Gustavo Riart, former Congressman
Miguel Abdón Saguier, Senator elect
Hermes Rafael Saguier, Congressman elect
Luís Alberto Wagner, Governor elect (Central)
Carlos Alberto Gonzalez, Senator elect
Armando Espinola, Senator elect

Alianza Encuentro Nacional (AEN)

Diego Abente, Senator elect
Basilio Nikiphoroff, Senator elect
Miguel Chase-Sardi, Senator candidate
Juan María Carrón, Senator elect
Mario Paz Castaing, General Coordinator
Marcelo Duarte, Congressman elect
Juan Manuel Peralta, Senator elect
Blanca Zucolillo de Rodríguez, Senator candidate
María Esther Prieto, Public Relations

Asociación Nacional Republicana (ANR)

Juan Crisóstomo Gaona, Legal Representative (*apoderado*)
Miguel Angel Ramírez, former Congressman
Carlos Barreto Sarubbi, Governor elect (Alto Parana)
Benjamín Fernández Bogado, former Delegate to the National Constituent Assembly

Concertación Democrática y Social (CDS)

Adolfo Ferreiro, Congressman candidate
Luis Alfonso Resck, Senator candidate

Junta Electoral Central (JEC)

Leopoldo Elizeche, member, PRF
Joaquín Casal, member, PLRA

SAKA

José Carlos Rodríguez, Technical Coordinator
José Giménez

DECIDAMOS

Humberto Ayala
Marta Antonelli Parceriza
María Liz Román

**Centro de Información y Recursos para el Desarrollo (CIRD)/
Paraguay-Kansas Committee**

José Regúneza, President,
Alvaro Caballero, Director
María de la Paz Peña, Human Resource Specialist

Centro de Documentación y Estudios (CDE)

Line Bareiro, Director, Area Mujer
Nidia Glavinich, Area Mujer
Clyde Soto, Area Mujer

Centro Paraguayo de Estudios Sociológicos (CPES)

Domingo Rivarola, Director
Jose Luis Simón, Researcher

Universidad Nacional

Ramón Fogel, Director, Masters Program in Social Sciences

Universidad Católica

Luis A. Galeano, Dean, School of Philosophy
Adriano Irala Burgos, Professor
Carlos Martini, Assistant Professor

Organization of American States (OAS)

Rubén Perina, Head of Delegation

United States Embassy

Jon Glassman, Ambassador
Stephen M. Geis, First Secretary
Jeffrey M. Hovenier, Second Secretary
Patrick Duddy, Director of U.S. Information Services

REFERENCES

- Abente, Diego, ed. 1993. Paraguay en Transición. Caracas: Editorial Nueva Sociedad.
- Abente, Diego. 1989. "The May 1 1989 Elections in Paraguay: Toward a New Era of Democracy. Report by the International Commission of the Latin American Studies Association to Observe the Paraguayan Elections." LASA Forum, 20(3):39-48.
- Arditi, Benjamín. 1992. Adiós a Stroessner: La Reconstrucción de la Política en el Paraguay. Asunción: RP Ediciones/Centro de Documentación y Estudios.
- Caballero, Esteban; Escobar, Arístides. 1990. Guía del Parlamento Paraguayo. Asunción: Centro de Estudios de Economía y Sociedad/Fundación Friedrich Ebert.
- Derbyshire, J. Denis; Derbyshire, Ian. 1989. Political Systems of the World. Edinburgh: W & R Chambers Ltd.
- Dirección de Informaciones y Cultura (DIC). Presidencia de la República. República del Paraguay. 1993. Manual Práctico: Elecciones Generales, 9 de Mayo / 1993. Asunción: DIC.
- Dirección General de Estadística, Encuestas y Censos (DGEEC). Presidencia de la República. Secretaría Técnica de Planificación. República del Paraguay. 1992. Censo Nacional de Población y Viviendas 1992 (Cifras Provisorias). Asunción: DGEEC.
- Dix, Robert H. 1989. "Cleavage Structures and Party Systems in Latin America." Comparative Politics, 22(1):23-37.
- Encuentro Nacional. 1993. Encuentro Nacional. Programa de Gobierno. 1993-1998. Asunción: Encuentro Nacional.
- Encuentro Nacional. 1993. "General Information Brochure." Asunción: Encuentro Nacional.
- Freedom House. 1989. Mission to Paraguay, Special Report. (September)
- Junta Electoral Central (JEC). 1993. Elecciones Generales, 1993. Asunción: Junta Electoral Central. Unpublished data (30/06/93)
- Kafka, Reinhard. 1989. "Legalizado el Partido Liberal Radical Auténtico (PLRA)." Perfiles Liberales, 11(3):26-27.
- Lewis, Paul H. 1980. Paraguay Under Stroessner. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press.
- Morínigo, José N.; Silvero, Ilde. 1986. Opiniones y Actitudes Políticas en el Paraguay. Asunción: Editorial Histórica/Fundación Friedrich Naumann/Universidad Católica "Nuestra Señora de la Asunción."
- National Democratic Institute for International Affairs. 1989. The 1989 Paraguayan Elections: A Foundation for Democratic Change. National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, Washington D.C.

- Organization of American States (OAS). 1993. Informe de la Misión de Observación Electoral en el Paraguay sobre las Elecciones Generales realizadas el 9 de Mayo de 1993. Washington D.C.
- República del Paraguay. 1990. Código Electoral (Ley N°01/90 y sus modificaciones, ampliaciones y supresiones). Asunción: Ministerio de Hacienda.
- República del Paraguay. 1992. Constitución Nacional del Paraguay. Asunción: Centro de Documentación y Estudios.
- Riquelme, Marcial A. 1992. Stronismo, Golpe Militar y Apertura Tutelada. Asunción: CDE/RP Ediciones.
- Riquelme, Marcial A.; Martini, Carlos. 1988. Reforma, Ruptura o Continuismo en el Paraguay. Dificultades y Perspectivas para una Apertura Democrática. Asunción: Fundación Friedrich Naumann (Documento de Trabajo N°1).
- Seiferheld, Alfredo M. 1985. Nazismo y Fascismo en el Paraguay: Vísperas de la II Guerra Mundial, 1936-1939. Asunción: Editorial Histórica.
- Velázquez, Rafael. 1990. "El Partido Liberal." Síntesis, 10 (Enero-Abril):217-235.

ENDNOTES

1. Ultima Hora, marzo 25, 1993, pp.4-5.

2. This is the second time that a LASA delegation has been organized to observe elections in Paraguay. The first delegation was coordinated by Dr. Diego Abente for the May 1, 1989 presidential elections. Four years later, on May 9, 1993, Dr. Abente was elected Senator for the *Alianza Encuentro Nacional* (AEN).

3. Given the short time available to form a delegation of qualified observers and the absence of funds to finance the delegation, the majority of the observers had to make arrangements on their own to go for a limited time only--no more than few days. Since the whole process appeared to be tainted by serious irregularities before, during, and after the election day itself, members of the team met several times between the 10th and the 15th of May and agreed on a basic outline for the report. They submitted brief reports on some topics (e.g., background materials, parties and candidates and electoral climate) and accounts of their observations of the electoral process in the locations they had visited on election day. They also provided inputs from informal interviews with diplomats and observers from other missions (e.g., members of the OAS and NDI). However, since none of the observers could stay for a longer period and the results were changing dramatically every day, the delegation's coordinator, Marcial Antonio Riquelme, was entrusted with the responsibility of staying in the country to gather additional information needed to produce this report.

4. The foreign press that covered the past May 9, 1993 elections inaccurately describe it as the first contested election in Paraguay's history as an independent nation. In fact, in the 1928 elections, the incumbent Liberal candidates for the offices of the President and vice-president, José P. Guggiari and Emiliano Gonzalez Navero respectively, were challenged by the candidates of the Colorado Party, Eduardo Fleitas and Eduardo López Moreira. On a cable report published on April 19, 1928, by The New York Times the following was stated: "The count late today in the Presidential elections held last Sunday indicated an overwhelming victory for the Liberal candidate, Jose P. Guggiari. The tabulation shows 51,139 for the Liberals and 23,687 for the Republicans. At that time 14,043 blank ballots had been counted, cast, it is said, as a protest against alleged election frauds."

5. Arditi, 1992:211. The *Partido Liberal Radical* (PLR) obtained 12,547 (1.05%) of the votes; the *Partido Revolucionario Febrerista* (PRF) 11,007 (0.93%); the *Partido Demócrata Cristiano* (PDC), 8,032 (0.67%); and, other parties, 9,026 (0.76%).

6. National Democratic Institute for International Affairs. 1989. The 1989 Paraguayan Elections: A Foundation for Democratic Change. Washington D.C. pp.38-39.

7. Ultima Hora, mayo 26, 1993, p.8.

8. APT's candidate, Carlos Filizzola, received 34.26% of the votes; the candidate of the Colorado Party came in second with 27% of the votes; and, the candidate of the PLRA third with 19.48% of the votes (Arditi, 1992:218).

9. Arditi, Benjamin. 1992. Adiós a Stroessner: La Reconstrucción de la Política en el Paraguay. Asunción: CDE/RP Ediciones. p.216.

10. abc Color, julio 13, 1991, p.3.

11. Ultima Hora, junio 27, 1992, p.6.

12. Noticias, 7 de diciembre, 1991, p.8.
13. Noticias, 7 de diciembre, 1991, p.8. Given the short period of time between the municipal elections and the Constituent Assembly ones, it is conceivable that the opposition parties did not have enough time to generate the necessary resources to mobilize their electorate.
14. Derbyshire, Denis, Ian Derbyshire. 1989. Political Systems of the world. Edinburgh (Great Britain): W R Chambers Ltd. p.12.
15. A few amendments in the Electoral Code have been incorporated to adjust it to the new constitution (1992).
16. The prohibition of reelection made the past constitutional period inclusive. This measure, which was clearly aimed at preventing a possible nomination of General Rodríguez for another term, was introduced at the last minute under the section of Final and Temporary Dispositions (Article 19). This article was proposed by an internal faction of the Colorado Party headed by Luis María Argaña, who was openly anti-Rodríguez. His faction of the Colorado Party, together with the combined vote of the opposition in the Constitutional Convention was enough to include it in the new constitution. Although General Rodríguez had stated several times publicly that he would not run for another term, the Argañistas were not convinced. Gen. Rodríguez was angered and offended. One of his cabinet members in a public speech declared that 'the word of a soldier is worth more than a thousand laws.' In an effort to demonstrate displeasure with this move, for the act of inauguration of the new constitution in the Congress, Rodríguez, his cabinet and the president of Congress refused to attend the ceremony. The overreaction of Rodríguez perhaps lends support to the Argañistas fears.
17. Consistent with the official separation between the Catholic Church and the Paraguayan State (Article 24, Paraguayan Constitution).
18. Under the previous constitution, there was a system referred to as 'ballotage.' If the presidential candidate who had the most votes does not have an absolute majority, there would be a second round between the two candidates with the most votes.
19. Under the previous constitution, all the national territory was treated as a single electoral jurisdiction for both chambers and therefore the members of congress did not represent any particular department, but the totality of the electorate. In addition, the party which obtained the absolute majority of votes was automatically assured two-thirds of the seats in both chambers (Caballero; Escobar, 1990:12-13). The remaining one-third of the seats were distributed proportionally by the number of votes obtained by the other parties. In other words, this voting system did not equate the number of votes cast with the number of seats won (that is, for the party which obtained a majority vote). This electoral mechanism, known as the "Ley de Acerbo," was modeled after Mussolini's Italy (Abente, 1993:150-151).
20. Asunción, the Capital, is treated as a separate jurisdiction and therefore has its own deputies.
21. According to Article 273^º.2. of the Electoral Code, the distribution of seats according to the D'Hont is as follows:
 - "a) the total number of votes obtained by each list is ordered from highest to lowest;
 - b) the number of votes obtained by each list is divided by one (1), two (2), three (3), etc., until there are

as many coefficients as seats to be distributed." For example, if there were five lists competing for ten seats, one would arrange in a column by decreasing order the total number of votes obtained by each list and place these values in column 1, then one would divide each of these values by two and place the results in column 2, and then divide the values in column 1 by three and put the result in column 3, and so on and so forth.

<u>Division</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>5</u>
List A	168,000	84,000	56,000	42,000	33,600
List B	104,000	52,000	34,666	26,000	20,800
List C	72,000	36,000	24,000	18,000	14,400
List D	64,000	32,000	21,333	16,000	12,800
List E	40,000	20,000	13,333	10,000	8,000

The seats are assigned to the candidates who obtained the highest coefficients in the columns, following a descending order until all ten seats are filled (see numbers in boldface). Hence:

(1)	168,000 List A	List A =	4 seats
(2)	104,000 List B	List B =	2 seats
(3)	84,000 List A	List C =	2 seats
(4)	72,000 List C	List D =	1 seat
(5)	64,000 List D	List E =	1 seat
(6)	56,000 List A		
(7)	52,000 List B	TOTAL =	10 seats
(8)	42,000 List A		
(9)	40,000 List E		
(10)	36,000 List C		

22. For a further discussion on this issue, see Morínigo and Silvero (1986) and Lewis (1980).

23. Electoral Code, Article Nº 365.

24. Electoral Code, Article 47^o.2.a. Previously, children were affiliated in order to increase the number of affiliates.

25. This article referred more specifically to the Colorado Party. Previously Colorado Party affiliation had been required for holding a job in the public sector.

26. On these issues, see Electoral Code, Articles Nº 39, 42 and 269^o.

27. "The *Corte Suprema de Justicia*, by unanimity, declared unconstitutional the action taken by the Capital Electoral Tribunal (TEC), by which the latter attributed to itself the authority to coordinate and organize the elections for next year.

By the TEC's resolution, the invalidating Supreme Court returned to the Central Electoral Board (JEC) the responsibilities that the TEC had taken from it...

The ruling was based on the finding that the current TEC is not the Electoral Justice, which is an entity created by the new Constitution and that it therefore cannot take upon itself the functions of it. It was also pointed out that a temporary constitutional provision authorized the JEC to coordinate and organize the elections until the new Electoral Justice is set up.

The opposition regarded the verdict as more political than juridical and stressed that the unequal constitution of the JEC originates from electoral laws drafted during the previous dictatorial regime." (*Análisis del mes*, Año VII, nº92, agosto 1992, p.4.)

28. Article 238^o states the following: "In the elections of members of the Constitutional Convention, of the President and the Vice-president of the Republic, of members of Congress, of Governors, of Departmental Legislatures, of Mayors and members of City Councils, the summoning, the judging, the organizing, coordinating, supervising and controlling, as well as the conferring the rights and titles to those who are elected, correspond to the Electoral Justice in accordance with Article 273 of the National Constitution."

29. Electoral Code, Articles Nº 85, 93, & 98.

30. Under the previous Constitution, the Chambers of Senators and Deputies were composed by 36 and 72 members respectively. Departmental delegates were appointed by the Executive.

31. Art. 367, Suppressed by Law Nº39 on September 10, 1992.

32. Although this registration rate is high, it is likely that it would be higher still if the (non-naturalized) foreign population (18 years of age or older) were excluded from the population census.

33. About 23% fully illiterate and an additional 27% functionally illiterate (Source: Encuentro Nacional (brochure), Asunción, 1993).

34. According to the latest population census (1992), 50% of the population lives in rural areas.

35. Just to point out a few, the former President of Paraguay, Gen. Andrés Rodríguez is a son of Liberal parents. The current president of Paraguay, Juan Carlos Wasmosy, before becoming a Colorado, was allegedly affiliated to the Liberal Party. The Liberal presidential candidate and the most well known figure of that party, Domingo Laíno, is a son of Colorados. Caballero Vargas is a great grandson of Gen. Bernardino Caballero, founder of the Colorado Party. Party cross-overs are not new and are indeed quite extensive.

36. Dix, Robert H. 1989. "Cleavage Structures and Party Systems in Latin America." *Comparative Politics*, 22(1):23-37. P.30.

37. For an excellent analysis of the ANR see: Arditi, Benjamín. 1993. "Del granito al archipiélago: el Partido Colorado sin Stroessner." Pp.161-172 in *Paraguay en Transición*, by Diego Abente, ed. Caracas: Editorial Nueva Sociedad.

38. For more details on this split and the MOPOCO, see Lewis (1980).

39. There were also other splits within the Colorados under Stroessner: The *Movimiento Etico y Doctrinario* and the *Asociación Nacional Republicana en el Exilio y la Resistencia* (ANRER).

40. Some 'prominent' *Militantes* included: Eugenio J. Jacquet, former Minister of Justice and Work; Anibal Fernández, former Sub-Secretary of Information; Luis Martínez Miltos, Former President of the Supreme Court Justice and former President of the lower house of congress (*Hoy*, 13 de abril, 1993, p.4.)

41. Arditi, 1992:165 & 174.

42. Análisis del mes, Año VII, n°85, noviembre 1992, p.5.

43. abc Color, mayo 16, 1993, p.10.

44. It is not clear why the Electoral Tribunal of the Capital (*Tribunal Electoral de la Capital*) authorized this newly formed party to bear the name of Liberal Party, since there is one party that already bears that name. The ruling therefore violates Article 26 of the Electoral Code, which states the following: "The name, the slogan and symbols constitute exclusive attributes of the party or political movement. They will not be used by any other political party or movement..." Perhaps this was a tactic of the ruling party for creating confusion among the Liberal electorate.

45. MAPN is composed of the following: *Movimiento Patria Libre (MPL)*, *Movimiento Independiente por la Participación Popular (MIPP)*, *Movimiento Democrático Popular Antiimperialista (Mo.De.Pa.)*, *Grupos de Apoyos Sociales* and *Cristianos de la Teología de la Liberación*.

46. Other Parties, that participated in the May 1, 1989, elections but not in the May 1993 ones, are the following: *Partido Revolucionario Febrerista (PRF)*, *Partido Demócrata Cristiano (PDC)*, *Partido Liberal (PL)*, *Partido Liberal Radical (PLR)*, *Partido Liberal Radical Unificado (PLRU)* and *Partido Humanista (PH)*. All of these parties, in light of their poor performances in various electoral contests during the 1989-1992 period, formed coalitions, joined ranks with other parties, or disappeared altogether. Another noticeable absence was of the movement *Asunción Para Todos (APT)*, whose members supported mainly the AEN and to a lesser extent the PLRA. Similarly, both the pro-China and the pro-former USSR Paraguayan Communist parties, having been banned from participating in the 1989 elections and subsequently legalized, fused with other left-wing political movements.

47. Análisis del mes, Año VII, n°81, julio 1992, p.5

48. Análisis del mes, Año VII, n°82, agosto 1992, p.4.

49. Análisis del mes, Año VII, n°82, agosto 1992, p.5.

50. Análisis del mes, Año VII, n°82, agosto 1992, P.5.

51. Análisis del mes, Año VII, n°85, noviembre 1992, p.5.

52. Análisis del mes, Año VII, n°86, diciembre 1992, p.31.

53. Análisis del mes, Año VII, n°86, enero 1993, pp.10-12.

54. Análisis del mes, Anuario, 1992, p.8.

55. Análisis del mes, Año VIII, n°89, marzo 1993, p.5.

56. Análisis del mes, Año VII, n°85, noviembre 1992, p.8.

57. Análisis del mes, Año 7, n°75, enero 1992, p.5.

58. Análisis del mes, Año VII, n°85, noviembre 1992, p.6.

59. The PRF and the PDC got only 1.2% and 0.8% of the votes respectively (Noticias, 7 de diciembre, 1991, p.8.)
60. The PNS and the MAPN, two minor parties, later also announced women candidates for their respective vice-presidential slots.
61. This section was elaborated on the basis of Manual Práctico: Elecciones Generales, 9 de Mayo / 1993, Dirección de Informaciones y Cultura (DIC) de la Presidencia de la República, Asunción, Paraguay.
62. Based on a regional trade agreement known as the Common Market of the South (MERCOSUR) between Argentina, Paraguay, Brazil and Uruguay.
63. abc Color, marzo 20, 1993, p.3.
64. abc Color, abril 2, 1993, p.7.
65. abc Color, marzo 28, 1993, pp.8-9.
66. Of the three government programs, only the PLRA's was done with some degree of consultation with its membership. The ANR's was drafted by the Rodríguez team and the AEN's by a selected group of 'tecnopolíticos.'
67. See Tiempo 14, marzo 3, 1993, p.12 and Hoy, marzo 7, 1993, p.4.
68. Words pronounced by the vice-presidential candidate for the Colorado Party, Angel R. Seifart, during a political rally in Encarnación (abc Color, mayo 7, 1993, p.13).
69. abc Color, abril 25, 1993, p.4.
70. Análisis del mes, Año VIII, nº91, mayo 1993, pp.5-6.
71. abc Color, mayo 1, 1993, p.8.
72. Última Hora, mayo 1, 1993, pp.2-3.
73. Última Hora, abril 22, 1993, p.10.
74. Última Hora, mayo 1, 1993, p.2.
75. Análisis del mes, Año VII, nº86, enero 1993, p.6.
76. Análisis del mes, Año VII, nº86, enero 1993, p.5.
77. Análisis del mes, Año VII, nº88, febrero 1993, p.7.
78. abc Color, mayo 7, 1993, p.18.
79. abc Color, mayo 7, 1993, p.11.

99. Diario Noticias, abril 6, 1993, p.4.
100. Ultima Hora, marzo 20, 1993, p.31.
101. Ultima Hora, mayo 7, 1993, p.24.
102. This advertisement warns public employees of literally not giving up on their food and therefore to vote for the Colorado Party, 'to move ahead.' An English equivalent of this expression could be 'do not shoot on your own foot.'
103. Ultima Hora, marzo 20, 1993, p.3.
104. Diario Noticias, abril 10, 1993, p.6.
105. abc Color, marzo 27, 1993, p.5.
106. Análisis del mes, Año VIII, nº91, mayo 1993, p.26.
107. Ultima Hora, abril 28, 1993, p.3 and abc Color, abril 28, p.21.
108. abc Color, mayo 2, 1993, p.8.
109. In a rather disturbing article by Paraguayan journalist Bernardo Neri Farina, he justifies the open intervention of the military thus: "Many Paraguayans keep inside the dream of their own general. Colorados more than anyone. And the Colorado Party -perhaps as a result of its own history- needs 'its' general to feel 'complete'." (La Opinión, mayo 14, 1993).
110. Ultima Hora, mayo 11, 1993, p.10.
111. The owners of Channel 13 and Radio Cardinal, are open supporters of the Argañista faction of the Colorado Party. Diario Noticias, marzo 30, 1993, p.16.
112. Guarani for transparency, or, with respect to elections, openness or cleanliness.
113. abc Color, mayo 11, 1991, p.10.
114. As noted earlier, Colorado Party delegates to the Constitutional Assembly of 1992 had voted to deny Paraguayans living abroad the right to vote. This fundamental right had never been contested before even under Stroessner's regime.
115. During a press conference, President Carter made the following remark with respect to the closing of the borders:

"It was ironic that international observers from Russia and South Africa were welcomed to the country and Paraguayan citizens were detained at the borders of Argentina and Brazil." (abc Color, mayo 11, 1993, p.10)

Endnotes

116. The numerical data was taken from the Organization of American States (OAS). 1993. Informe de la Misión de Observación Electoral en el Paraguay sobre las Elecciones Generales realizadas el 9 de Mayo de 1993. Washington D.C., pp.46-48 and from abc Color, junio 1, 1993, p.2.
117. Análisis del mes, Año VIII, nº92, junio 1993, p.5.
118. Última Hora, abril 23, 1993, pp.2-3.
119. abc Color, abril 24, 1993, p.7.
120. Última Hora, mayo 7, 1993, p.10.
121. abc Color, mayo 17, 1993, p.5.